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In this thesis, we address privacy concerns in personalized mobile services.
While there has been much progress in privacy-preserving data publishing, ex-
isting techniques are ill-fitted as they assume static user data. In contrast, in the
mobile setting both user contexts and the user population change over time.
• We present online frameworks for context-based personalization. Privacy
is defined with respect to a set of sensitive contexts specified by the user.
Guaranteeing privacy means to limit what an adversary can learn about
the user being in a sensitive context. The adversary can have knowledge
about the framework and about frequent contexts or patterns of users.
– For targeting advertisements, our framework generalizes contexts to
protect against adversaries knowing the framework. The generalized
context is sent to an ad server that selects and returns a set of ads. The
most relevant one is displayed to the user. The optimization of select-
ing the most relevant ad for a user is done jointly by the user and the
server under constraints on privacy and communication complexity.
We show that the optimization problem is NP-hard and present an
efficient approximation algorithm.
– Our second framework creates a filtered stream of contexts made
available to services for personalization. We explain which contexts
to suppress in order to protect privacy against powerful adversaries
knowing the framework and temporal correlations in the stream.
• We also present offline algorithms that aggregate user contexts and activ-
ities. For example, we can count how many users in a specific context
clicked on some ad. This implicit user feedback can be used to update
how the personalization is done in the online framework. Our algorithms
guarantee probabilistic differential privacy [74] which protects privacy of
a user against strong adversaries who know the data of all other users.
– Our first algorithm is run by a trusted server and – unlike previous
work – provides accurate count statistics even for large domains such
as Web search queries.
– Our second algorithm does not require a trusted server. It is the first
distributed protocol that efficiently handles dynamic and malicious
users.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices today are increasingly equipped with a range of sensors such
as GPS, microphone, accelerometer, light, and proximity sensors. These sensors
can be effectively used to infer a user’s context including her location (at home
or in the office? from the GPS), transportation mode (walking or driving? from
the accelerometer), social state (alone or in a group? from the microphone),
and other activities (in a meeting? from the microphone and the GPS). Con-
sequently, a large and increasing number of services in popular smart phone
platforms such as the iPhone, the Android, and the Windows Phone utilize user
contexts in order to offer personalized services. Examples of such services in-
clude GeoReminder that notifies the user when she is at a particular location,
JogBuddy that monitors how much she jogs in a day, PhoneWise that automati-
cally silents the phone during meetings, SocialGroupon that delivers coupons or
recommendations when she is in a group of friends, etc.
However, these context-aware mobile services raise serious privacy con-
cerns. Today, people already believe that risks of sharing location informa-
tion outweigh the benefits in many location-based services [96]. One reason
why risks are high is that many mobile services aggressively collect much more
personal context information than what is needed to provide their functionali-
ties [27] (for example, a calculator service might send user locations to an adver-
tisement server). Moreover, services rarely provide privacy policies that clearly
state how users’ sensitive information will be used, and with what third-parties
it will be shared. Finally, even if the context information is actually used for the
functionality and not shared with third-parties, users might simply not trust
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service providers with some of their context information.
This thesis enhances personalized services with privacy guarantees. This
requires (1) to limit the context information that a user shares with the service.
In order to personalize based on this limited information only, (2) services need
to adapt.
For (1) we explore attractive tradeoffs between privacy and utility. One ex-
treme is to offer no privacy and benefit from the full functionality. Another
extreme is to avoid all privacy risks by not to installing these service or not re-
leasing any context information to the services (by explicitly turning off sensors)
which destroys utility. Following [58, 96] we can let the user control at a fine
granularity when and what personal context information is shared with which
service. For example, a user might be okay to release when she is at lunch but
she might be hesitant to release when she is at a hospital. With such fine-grained
decisions, a user can choose a point in the privacy-utility tradeoff for a service
and can still enjoy its full functionality when she chooses to release her context
information or when her context information is not actually needed. But how
can users assess the risks and decide which point in the privacy-utility tradeoff
to choose? With formal privacy guarantees this thesis helps users to understand
the consequences of their choices in terms of what an adversary can learn about
them.
In order to sanitize services so that user privacy is preserved (2), we need to
understand how services utilize user context information for personalization.
The basic idea of personalization is to adapt the service based on the users cur-
rent context. We call this the online personalization framework (2a). Moreover,
some services have a feedback loop (2b) and collect historic context information
2
together with information on user activity in order to learn how to personalize.
The collection can be run as an offline algorithm periodically. As an example,
consider a personalized ad delivery system. This system gathers users’ contexts
and clicks and interprets them as implicit relevance feedback. This feedback is
utilized in the delivery of targeted ads based on the user’s current context. Both
components utilize context information and need to be adapted to preserve user
privacy.
To address the privacy concerns we present offline algorithms for privacy-
preserving statistics gathering that allow to learn personalization rules and online
personalization frameworks. Since these two components are fundamentally dif-
ferent, we use different, but state of the art, privacy guarantees for them. For
the gathering of statistics, we guarantee differential privacy [24], i.e., that a sin-
gle user’s data will hardly affect the statistics. Such a strong privacy guarantee
is needed in practice since statistics are often shared and used extensively. It
has been widely used (see for instance [44, 45, 74, 79, 89, 93, 103]). For the on-
line framework, such a strong guarantee is not possible as it conflicts with the
idea of personalization. Instead, we follow [5, 17, 106] and define privacy with
respect to a set of sensitive contexts and guarantee that an adversary does not
learn that a user is in a sensitive context. The two components differ in other
key parameters explained below.
1.1 Personalization Frameworks
Frameworks determine how much information about the user’s context to share
in requests for personalized services and how to honor these requests. The
shared context information is limited in order to preserve privacy. We evalu-
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ate a framework based on the following parameters:
• Privacy: We follow [5, 17, 106] and define privacy with respect to a set of
sensitive contexts. Users can decide on the sensitivity of contexts (for ex-
ample, including “at hospital” but not “walking the dog”) with the help of
special tools (see for example [94]). A naı¨ve approach to protect sensitive
contexts is to simply suppress them. This, however, does not necessarily
prevent an adversary from inferring sensitive contexts.
Guaranteeing privacy means to limit what an adversary can learn about a
user being in a sensitive context at some point in time from the released
contexts. By looking at the released contexts and combining them with
her background knowledge, an adversary should not be able to learn that
a user was/is/will be in a sensitive context.
• Adversary model: In this thesis, we consider Bayesian adversaries with
varying degrees of background knowledge. One type of background
knowledge we consider is knowledge about the sanitized personalization
framework. With this knowledge an adversary can infer suppressed sen-
sitive contexts since the suppression itself leaks information: Consider a
user who suppresses her context if and only if she is playing a video game
at work. An adversary knowing the suppression rule can infer exactly
when she is playing a game at work. In general, we want to guard against
leakage attacks from adversaries knowing the sanitized personalization
framework. Such adversaries are powerful and can reverse-engineer the
framework in order to infer information about sensitive contexts. Protect-
ing against them follows Shannon’s maxim “The enemy knows the sys-
tem.” and does not rely on privacy through obscurity.
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Another type of background we consider is knowledge about temporal corre-
lations of contexts. With this knowledge an adversary can infer a sensitive
context: Consider a user who suppresses her location when she is at a re-
mote hospital. This, however, might not be sufficient: when she releases
her non-sensitive context while she is driving to the remote hospital, the
adversary can infer where she is heading. In this case the sensitive context
can be inferred from its dependence on non-sensitive contexts. In general,
we want to guard against inference attacks from adversaries knowing tem-
poral correlations.
• Utility: We measure the utility as information loss of the contexts and as
the effect this has on the quality of the personalized service.
• Efficiency: We measure the efficiency both on the user-side (deciding what
information to share) as well as on the service-side (deciding how to per-
sonalize). Moreover, we consider the communication cost between the
two.
1.1.1 Targeted Advertising
(1) Our first framework considers the service of delivering targeted advertise-
ments; it can also be used for personalizing local searches of close-by businesses.
In order to guarantee privacy against adversaries knowing the framework, we
generalize contexts to contain sensitive and non-sensitive contexts.
(2a) We formalize the task of delivering personalized ads from a server to
a client as an optimization problem with three important variables: privacy,
communication cost, i.e., how few ads are sent to the client, and utility, i.e., how
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useful the displayed ads are to the user in terms of revenue and relevance.
Several previous works on privacy-preserving search personalization
present extreme points in the trade-off space: they propose to personalize search
results based on a user’s private information either at the server only [66, 105] or
at the client only [92]. A server-only solution achieves optimal efficiency at the
cost of privacy or utility, while a client-only solution ensures optimal privacy
but sacrifices efficiency or utility. While all these prior solutions represent dis-
crete points in a vast trade-off space of privacy, efficiency, and utility, a natural
question arises: can we formalize a common framework for personalization that can be
instantiated to any desired trade-off point? An answer to this question would also
provide a better understanding of the trade-offs provided by existing solutions.
We answer the above question with a hybrid framework where the per-
sonalization is done jointly by the server and the client. Such a hybrid ap-
proach has been previously explored in privacy-preserving location-based ser-
vices [21, 59, 108]. However, existing techniques focus on answering nearest
neighbor queries and cannot be applied to target advertisements.
In our framework users can decide which contexts are sensitive. To protect
these sensitive contexts, the current user context is generalized before sending
it to the server. Based on the generalized context, the server selects a set of ads
or search results, with bounded communication overhead, and sends them to
the client. The client then picks and displays the most relevant ad based on the
complete context information.
The framework solves the following optimization problem: The ads sent by
the server and the ad displayed at the client ought to be chosen in a way that
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maximizes revenue given constraints on maximum communication cost and
privacy. Note that the aforementioned existing privacy-preserving personal-
ization solutions are special cases of our framework; and our framework can be
configured to explore other attractive points in the trade-off space of privacy,
communication cost, and utility.
The optimization problem is easy when there are no sensitive contexts that
need to be protected. However, we show that it becomes NP-hard when the
contexts are generalized. For that case, we present an efficient greedy algorithm
for hybrid personalization with tight approximation guarantees.
1.1.2 User Context Streams
We propose a framework to sanitize user contexts before releasing them to
context-aware services. The goals of the framework are to sanitize user contexts
to guarantee privacy against powerful adversaries while making it easy for ser-
vices to adapt to the sanitized context streams. For the latter goal, we sanitize
user contexts by either releasing them or suppressing them. This reflects stan-
dard access control mechanisms in existing phones and is the modus operandi
of many personalized mobile services [96]. All that is necessary is the ability to
deal with suppressed contexts in the stream. Existing services already can toler-
ate such ⊥ symbol in a stream of contexts, since sometimes the software fails to
extract a high-level context due to the imprecision of sensor readings (e.g., GPS
inside a building), the unavailability of sensor data when the sensors are turned
off or software bugs. We do not specify how services can use these streams (2)
but we expect that it will be easy to adapt to the “suppress or release” paradigm.
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(1) We consider adversaries knowing the system and temporal correlations
in the context streams. In particular, we use a Markov chain to model user
behavior—her frequent contexts and patterns. The central question is: When
and what context should be suppressed in order to protect privacy against adversaries
knowing temporal correlations and also the system making this decision? We present
MASKIT, a framework that addresses the above question with two novel privacy
checks deciding in an online fashion whether to release or suppress the current
context of the user. The probabilistic check flips for each context a coin to decide
whether to release or suppress it. The bias of the coin is chosen suitable to
guarantee privacy. The simulatable check makes the decision only based on the
released contexts so far and completely ignores the current context. That way,
the decision does not leak additional information to the adversary. Both checks
provably provide privacy, but interestingly their relative benefit varies across
users—there are situations where the probabilistic check provides higher utility
than the simulatable check and vice versa. We explain how to select the better
one among the two for a given user.
Both checks provide privacy against very strong adversaries who know the
system and the Markov chain modeling a user.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to release user context
streams while protecting privacy of sensitive contexts against powerful adver-
saries knowing the system and various temporal correlations including typical
user behavior (the user gets up every day at 6am) and correlations (after going
to the doctor the user is likely to go to the pharmacy).
We have evaluated MASKIT on a PC as well as on a smart phone, with real
public traces from 91 human subjects over the course of nine months, represent-
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ing user contexts over 266,000 hours. We compare the performance of MASKIT
with that of a naı¨ve approach that only suppresses the sensitive contexts. The
naı¨ve approach does not guarantee privacy. Our evaluation shows that we do
not have to pay a high price in terms of utility and efficiency for the privacy
guarantee: MASKIT releases only < 8% fewer contexts than the naı¨ve approach.
Moreover, the suppression decision incurs negligible overhead (≤ 128 ms on a
smart phone on average) compared to the context extraction time of typically a
few to tens of seconds.
1.2 Privacy-preserving Statistics Gathering
We present privacy-preserving algorithms to gather aggregate statistics across
users. Aggregate statistics of interest to personalization are, for example,
context-dependent click-through rates of advertisements and frequent key-
words, queries and clicks in search logs. They represent implicit user feedback
that can be used to personalize Web search results and target advertisements.
We evaluate an aggregation algorithm based on the following parameters:
• Privacy: We consider a strong privacy guarantee, differential privacy [25],
which ensures that the output of the algorithm is insensitive to chang-
ing/omitting the complete data of a single user. This protects the privacy
of a user against strong adversaries who know everyone else’s data. We
work with a probabilistic relaxation [74] that achieves differential privacy
with high probability.
• Utility: We can measure utility in terms of the accuracy of the aggregate
statistics: How much do the privacy-preserving statistics differ from the
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exact statistics? We can also measure utility in terms of the quality of the
personalized services relying on these statistics.
• Setup: We consider two different set-ups. In the first setup a trusted server
is available to gather all user data to compute sanitized statistics. In the
second setup no trusted server exists; and we need a distributed aggrega-
tion protocol that protects user privacy, even under adversarial scenarios
such as when a fraction of the users behave maliciously, send bogus mes-
sages, or collude with each other.
• Efficiency: We measure computational complexity and in case of a dis-
tributed protocol also communication complexity.
• Scalability: We need to scale to large domains over which we gather
aggregate statistics such as queries in search logs. Moreover, without a
trusted party we need a protocol that scales to a large number of users.
• Robustness: In case of a distributed protocol we face an additional chal-
lenge: The protocol runs across a large and transient population of mobile
users. A small fraction of users can become unavailable during the course
of computing statistics. For example, a user may turn off her mobile de-
vice any time or may want to answer an aggregation query only at a con-
venient time when her phone is being charged and connected through a
local WiFi network. Another user might decline to participate in the ex-
change of certain messages in the protocol. Yet another user might leave
or join the community of mobile users. Developing a robust protocol that
can deal with these dynamics is challenging with regard to efficiency and
utility.
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1.2.1 Trusted Server
Previous works on publishing privacy-preserving aggregate statistics such as
the Laplacian mechanism [25] are unsuitable for finding frequent items in large
domains such as frequent queries in a search log. In fact, we can show that for
any algorithm guaranteeing differential privacy, it is impossible to achieve good
utility for finding frequent items in large domains.
We describe Algorithm ZEALOUS, developed independently by Korolova
et al. [65] and us with the goal to achieve relaxations of differential privacy.
Korolova et al. showed how to set the parameters of ZEALOUS to guaran-
tee (, δ)-indistinguishability [23], and we offer a new analysis that shows how
to set the parameters of ZEALOUS to guarantee (, δ)-probabilistic differential
privacy [74], a much stronger privacy guarantee as our analytical comparison
shows.
We present an extensive experimental evaluation. We compare the utility of
ZEALOUS with that of a k-anonymous algorithm. To protect anonymity, this al-
gorithm publishes all queries that were issued by at least k users. We argue that
this guarantee is insufficient and show that the algorithm can be attacked by an
adversary who actively influences the search log. Nevertheless, we include it in
our comparison to measure the price of a formal privacy guarantee relative to
an insufficient k-anonymity guarantee. We find that it is acceptable for two ap-
plications we tested that use the sanitized search logs to improve search quality
and search performance.
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1.2.2 Distributed Protocol
Previous distributed privacy-preserving aggregation protocols [23, 89, 93] do
not efficiently handle dynamic user populations, rendering them unsuitable for
the estimation of statistics across mobile users. Then, how can we, in an efficient
and privacy-preserving way, gather statistics over a dynamic population?
To answer this with we present a novel aggregation protocol to compute ag-
gregate statistics without a trusted server that can handle dynamics. To the best
of our knowledge, our protocol is the first differentially-private protocol that
computes accurate aggregations efficiently even when a fraction of participants
become unavailable or behave maliciously.
This protocol can be used to gather context-dependent click-through rates
that can be used to personalize advertisements and search results.
We evaluated our protocol with a large trace of location-aware searches in
Microsoft Bing for mobile. We measure the utility in terms of the relevance
of personalized local searches. We also measure the increased robustness in
comparison to efficient previous aggregation protocols [89, 93].
1.3 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows: First, we lay out some background on pri-
vacy in Chapter 2, Then we present online frameworks for sanitizing context
streams in Chapter 3 and for targeting advertisements in Chapter 4. We present
offline algorithms to gather statistics for estimating context-dependent click-
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through rates without a trusted server in Chapter 5 and for finding frequent
keywords, queries and clicks in search logs with a trusted server in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
There are many privacy and anonymity definitions in data publishing includ-
ing k-anonymity [91], `-diversity [75, 78], t-closeness [71], (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy [28], and
variants of differential privacy [25, 88]. We refer the reader to an excellent sur-
vey [16].
These definitions assume that the data of a user represents a tuple in a
database. In this thesis we work with a few of them and adapt them to our
dynamic setting with mobile users.
2.1 Anonymity
A simple type of disclosure is the identification of a particular user’s data in
the release. The concept of k-anonymity has been introduced to avoid such
identifications.
Definition 1 (k-anonymity [90]). A data release is k-anonymous if the data of
every individual is indistinguishable from the data of at least k − 1 other indi-
viduals.
2.1.1 Online Personalization Frameworks
There has been a lot of deep work on anonymity in location-based services.
Here, the adversary is assumed to know the location of all users. The goal is to
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hide the identity of a user issuing a query specifying her location. Using spatial
cloaking introduced in the seminal work by Gruteser and Grunwald [39], the
user’s exact location in a query is replaced by a broader region. Following the
principles of k-anonymity [91], a region is broad enough if at least k users are in
it. The idea of spatial cloaking has been used extensively since then [18, 5, 33,
35, 81, 39, 104, 56]. Typically, the smallest region containing k users is desired to
minimize communication and maximize accuracy.
System Architecture and Efficiency. The proposed systems differ in their sys-
tem architecture; both centralized systems requiring a trusted third-party and
peer-to-peer systems are developed. For the latter a user communicates with
her peers to find the smallest region containing at least k − 1 other users. These
systems further differ in the techniques used to generate cloaked regions (e.g.
quad-trees [39, 81], finding cliques in graphs [33], Hilbert curves [56]) yielding
differences in their efficiency and accuracy.
Guarantees. Some of these systems are subject to attacks exploiting the knowl-
edge of the system. This basic approach is subject to the “center-of-cloak” at-
tack because an attacker knowing the algorithm used to generate the cloaked
area can infer that it is very likely that the user’s exact location is in the cen-
ter of the cloaked region [56, 37, 20]. There are systems preventing this at-
tack [19, 56, 37]. Similarly, inference can be made when users request different
levels of anonymity and overlapping regions are published [109].
Most of the work considers single shot queries and thus do not offer protec-
tion against adversaries knowing temporal correlations. As such they are not
appropriate for tracking services. Notable exceptions include [18, 104].
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There is an effort to extend the techniques to general contexts beyond loca-
tion [87].
2.1.2 Offline Algorithms
There are several proposals in the literature to achieve different variants of k-
anonymity for logs. Adar proposes to partition the search log into sessions and
then to discard queries that are associated with fewer than k different user-ids.
In each session the user-id is then replaced by a random number [1]. We call
the output of Adar’s Algorithm a k-query anonymous search log. Motwani and
Nabar add or delete keywords from sessions until each session contains the
same keywords as at least k − 1 other sessions in the search log [82], following
by a replacement of the user-id by a random number. We call the output of
this algorithm a k-session anonymous search log. He and Naughton generalize
keywords by taking their prefix until each keyword is part of at least k search
histories and publish a histogram of the partially generalized keywords [47]. We
call the output a k-keyword anonymous search log. Efficient ways to anonymize a
search log are also discussed by Yuan et al. [50].
2.2 Privacy
A privacy guarantee limits what an adversary can learn about a user.
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2.2.1 Offline Algorithms
Differential privacy guarantees that an adversary learns roughly the same in-
formation about a user whether or not the data of that user was included in the
release [25].
It has been applied in the centralized setting where a trusted server sanitizes
the users’ data and in the distributed setting where no such server exists.
Centralized Differential Privacy
Differential privacy has previously been applied in the centralized setting to
contingency tables [6, 103, 44, 45], learning problems [9, 57], synthetic data gen-
eration [74] and more.
Definition 2 (-differential privacy [25]). An algorithm A is -differentially pri-
vate if for all user activity logs L and L′ differing in the data of a single user and
for all output logs O:
Pr[A(L) = O] ≤ ePr[A(L′) = O].
This definition ensures that the output of the algorithm is insensitive to
changing/omitting the complete data of a single user. We will refer to logs
that only differ in the data of a single user as neighboring logs. Therefore, a user,
given the choice of whether or not to supply her data has hardly any incentive
to withhold it. The parameter  determines how much the outcome may be
affected.
Differential privacy is a very strong guarantee and in some cases it can be
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too strong to be practically achievable. We will review two relaxations that have
been proposed in the literature. Machanavajjhala et al. proposed the following
probabilistic version of differential privacy.
Definition 3. [74] An algorithm M satisfies (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy if
for all user activity logs L and neighboring ad logs L′ obtained from L by adding or
deleting the contexts and clicks of a single user we can divide the output space Ω into
two sets Ω1,Ω2 such that
(1) Pr[M(L) ∈ Ω2] ≤ δ, and
and for all O ∈ Ω1:
(2)e− Pr[M(L′) = O] ≤ Pr[M(L) = O] ≤ e Pr[M(L′) = O]
This definition guarantees that algorithm A achieves -differential privacy
with high probability (≥ 1− δ). The set Ω2 contains all outputs that are consid-
ered privacy breaches according to -differential privacy; the probability of such
an output is bounded by δ. For δ = 0 this definition is equivalent to -differential
privacy.
Our motivation for resorting to a probabilistic relaxation instead of differ-
ential privacy is twofold: We show that sometimes under differential privacy
we cannot maintain any utility. This is the case in publishing frequent queries
in search logs, see Section 6.3. Moreover, sometimes it is easier to achieve this
relaxation and we do not know how to achieve differential privacy. This is the
case in our distributed aggregation protocol which uses Gaussian noise. Gaus-
sian noise can be realized in a distributed manner easily but does only achieve
the relaxed privacy guarantee.
The following relaxation has been proposed by Dwork et al. [23].
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Definition 4 (indistinguishability [23]). An algorithmA is (, δ)-indistinguishable
if for all user activity logs L,L′ differing in the data of a single user and for all
subsets O of the output space Ω:
Pr[A(L) ∈ O] ≤ e Pr[A(L′) ∈ O] + δ
We will compare these two definitions in Section 6.5. In particular, we will
show that probabilistic differential privacy implies indistinguishability, but the
converse does not hold: We show that there exists an algorithm that is (′, δ′)-
indistinguishable yet not (, δ)-probabilistic differentially private for any  and
any δ < 1, thus showing that (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy is clearly
stronger than (′, δ′)-indistinguishability.
To achieve a relaxation of differential privacy, we can sanitize the output of
any real-valued function f : ad logs → Rd by adding Gaussian noise to f(L).
The standard deviation of the noise depends on the L2-sensitivity of f which
describes how much the value of the function can change if a single user’s data
is deleted from or added to the input. This change is measured by the L2-norm.
Theorem 1. For  ≤ 1 and σ2 ≥ s22 ln(4/δ)/2, adding Gaussian noise with variance
σ2 to a function f with L2-sensitivity s gives (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy.
This theorem has been established for δ-approximate -indistinguishability [23]
and extends to our definition, which is stronger, see Section 6.5.
Proof. Consider two logs L,L′ differing in the data of one user. We define Ω1 =
{O = o1, . . . , od|− σ2 ≤
∑
i(oi− f(L)i)(f(L)i− f(L′)i) ≤ σ2− s2/2}We analyze
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the ratios of outputting some O ∈ Ω1 given L and L′.
Pr[M(L) = O]
Pr[M(L′) = O]
=
Πi:1≤i≤de−(oi−f(L)i)
2/(2σ2)
Πi:1≤i≤de−(oi−f(L
′)i)2/(2σ2)
= Πi:1≤i≤de(−(oi−f(L)i)
2+(oi−f(L′)i)2)/(2σ2)
= e1/(2σ
2)·∑i:1≤i≤d−(oi−f(L)i)2+(oi−f(L′)i)2
= e1/(2σ
2)·∑i:1≤i≤d−(oi−f(L)i)2+(oi−f(L)i+f(L)i−f(L′)i)2
= e1/(2σ
2)·∑i:1≤i≤d−(oi−f(L)i)2+(oi−f(L)i)2+2(oi−f(L)i)(f(L)i−f(L′)i)+(f(L)i−f(L′)i)2
= e1/(2σ
2)·∑i:1≤i≤d 2(oi−f(L)i)(f(L)i−f(L′)i)+(f(L)i−f(L′)i)2
≤ e1/(2σ2)·(s2+
∑
i:1≤i≤d 2(oi−f(L)i)(f(L)i−f(L′)i))
≤ e1/(2σ2)·(s2+2(σ2−s2/2)) By Def. of Ω1
= e
Similarly, for the other ratio we have for O ∈ Ω1:
Pr[M(L′) = O]
Pr[M(L) = O]
=
Πi:1≤i≤de−(oi−f(L
′)i)2/(2σ2)
Πi:1≤i≤de−(oi−f(L)i)
2/(2σ2)
= Πi:1≤i≤de(−(oi−f(L
′)i)2+(oi−f(L)i)2)/(2σ2)
= e1/(2σ
2)·∑i:1≤i≤d−(oi−f(L′)i)2+(oi−f(L)i)2
= e1/(2σ
2)·∑i:1≤i≤d−(oi−f(L)i+f(L)i−f(L′)i)2+(oi−f(L)i)2
= e1/(2σ
2)·∑i:1≤i≤d−(oi−f(L)i)2−2(oi−f(L)i)(f(L)i−f(L′)i)−(f(L)i−f(L′)i)2+(oi−f(L)i)2
= e1/(2σ
2)·∑i:1≤i≤d−2(oi−f(L)i)(f(L)i−f(L′)i)−(f(L)i−f(L′)i)2
≤ e1/(2σ2)·(
∑
i:1≤i≤d−2(oi−f(L)i)(f(L)i−f(L′)i))
≤ e1/(2σ2)·2(σ2) By Def. of Ω1
= e
Together it follows that
e− Pr[M(L′) = O] ≤ Pr[M(L) = O] ≤ e Pr[M(L′) = O].
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It remains to bound the probability that the output is not in Ω1. An output
is not in Ω1 if the noise is really low or really high. We denote by X1, . . . , Xd the
random variables of the noise added. Note that if the ith output is oi and the true
function value is f(L)i then the amount of noise added Xi = oi − f(L)i. These
random variables are distributed according to N (0, σ2).
We will use the following facts:
Fact 1. The family of Gaussian distributions is closed under linear transformation. In
particular, for Gaussian variables X1, . . . , Xd with Xi ∼ N (µi, σ2i ), for all αi ∈ R
d∑
i=1
αiXi ∼ N
(
d∑
i=1
αiµi,
d∑
i=1
α2iσ
2
i
)
From this fact it immediately follows that
d∑
i=1
αiXi ∼
√√√√ d∑
i=1
α2iσ
2
iZ +
d∑
i=1
αiµi, (2.1)
where Z is a standard Gaussian random variable (i.e., Z ∼ N (0, 1)).
The following fact bounds the tail probability of a standard Gaussian ran-
dom variable.
Fact 2.
Pr[Z ≥ z] ≤ e
−z2/2
z
√
2pi
The proof follows from
Pr[Z ≥ z] =
∫ ∞
z
1√
2pi
e−t
2/2dt ≤
∫ ∞
z
t
z
1√
2pi
e−t
2/2dt =
e−z
2/2
z
√
2pi
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Hence, we can rewrite the probability that a privacy breach happens, i.e,
Pr[M(L) 6∈ Ω1]
≤Pr
[
d∑
i=1
Xi(f(L)i − f(L′)i) < −σ2
]
+ Pr
[
d∑
i=1
Xi(f(L)i − f(L′)i) > σ2 − s2/2
]
= Pr

√√√√ d∑
i=1
(f(L)i − f(L′)i)2σ2Z < −σ2

+ Pr

√√√√ d∑
i=1
(f(L)i − f(L′)i)2σ2Z > σ2 − s2/2
 By Eq. (2.1)
≤Pr
[√
s2σ2Z < −σ2 − s2/2
]
Pr
[√
s2σ2Z > σ2 − s2/2
]
By Def. of s
≤2 Pr
[√
s2σ2Z > σ2 − s2/2
]
By symmetry of Z
=2 Pr [Z > σ/s− s/(2σ)]
≤2 e
−(σ/s−s/(2σ))2/2
(σ/s− s/(2σ))√2pi By Fact (2)
=2
e−
2σ2/(2s2)+/2−s2/(8σ2)
(σ/s− s/(2σ))√2pi
This expression decreases with σ. Thus, it suffices to show that for σ =
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√
2 ln(2/δ)s/ we have that
2
e−
2σ2/(2s2)+/2−s2/(8σ2)
(σ/s− s/(2σ))√2pi ≤ δ
⇔ 2σe/2 ≤ δ(σ2/s− s/2)
√
2pie
2σ2/(2s2)+s2/(8σ2)
⇔ 2σe/2 ≤ δ(σ2/s− s/2)
√
2pie
2(
√
2 ln(4/δ)s/)2/(2s2)es
2/(8σ2)
⇔ 2σe/2 ≤ δ(σ2/s− s/2)
√
2pi
4
δ
es
2/(8σ2)
⇔ σe/2 ≤ (σ2/s− s/2)
√
2pi2es
2/(8σ2)
⇔
√
2 ln(2/δ)s/e/2 ≤ (σ2/s− s/2)
√
2pi2es
2/(8σ2)
⇔
√
ln(2/δ)e/2 ≤ (2σ2/s2 − /2)√pi2es2/(8σ2)
⇔
√
ln(2/δ)e/2 ≤ (22 ln(2/δ)s2/(2s2)− /2)√pi2es22/(16 ln(4/δ)s2)
⇔
√
ln(2/δ)e/2 ≤ (2 ln(2/δ)− /2)√pi2e2/(16 ln(4/δ)))
⇐
√
ln(2/δ)e1/2 ≤ (4 ln(2/δ)− 1)√pi Since  ≤ 1
⇐ e1/2 +√pi/
√
ln(2/δ) ≤ 4
√
ln(2/δ)
√
pi
⇐ e1/2 +√pi/
√
ln(2) ≤ 4
√
ln(2)
√
pi Since δ ≤ 1
⇔ true
Thus, Pr[M(L) 6∈ Ω1] ≤ δ. The theorem follows.
Distributed Probabilistic Differential-Privacy
We can adapt the privacy Definition 3 to the case where no trusted server ex-
ists to sanitize the data and instead a distributed protocol is used by consid-
ering partial views from all (non-) participants and requiring that a change in
an user’s data hardly changes the distribution over the messages received. To-
wards that end we introduce the following notation.
Notation. Consider a user activity log L containing the data of a set of users U .
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We can restrict the log L to the data of a subset of the users U ′ ⊂ U , denoted by
LU ′ . If U ′ contains users not in U , we define LU ′ to be LU∩U ′ . For a distributed
protocol M involving a set of participants P . Note that the set of users and
the set of participants can be overlapping. We define the view of a subset of
participants P ′ ⊂ P in the execution of M on input L, denoted by VP ′ , to be a
random variable for all messages received and sent by a participant in P ′. For a
non-participant we define the view to be the output of the distributed protocol.
The set of participants can be partitioned into malicious and honest, but possible
unavailable participants. We denote by Pm the set of malicious participants and
by Ph the set of honest and possibly unavailable users. We have that P = Ph∪Pm
and Ph ∩ Pm = ∅.
Definition 5. A distributed protocol M with participants P satisfies (, δ)-distributed
probabilistic differential privacy of the users if for all user activity logs L and all (non-)
participants p the following holds.
In case p is malicious let P ′m denote the set of malicious participant colluding with p
which are a subset of the malicious participants Pm. Otherwise let P ′m be {p}.
There exist randomized algorithms M ′ and R so that:
(a) M ′(LU\(Pm∪{p})) preserves (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy.
(b) R generates the distribution of the view VP ′m givenM
′(LU\(Pm∪{p})) and LPm∪{p},
i.e., VP ′m and R(M
′(LU\(Pm∪{p})), LPm∪{p}) are identically distributed.
The definition considers the view of a (non-)participant p. This view contains
messages sent and received by any participant colluding with p, denoted by
P ′m. In case p is not malicious P ′m is {p}. Privacy means that this view can be
simulated from an output that preserves probabilistic differential privacy of the
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users who are not malicious. This output is generated by some algorithm M ′
from the users’ input that are neither malicious nor equal to p (LU\(Pm∪{p})). We
do not attempt to protect the privacy of malicious participants. This is indeed
impossible, since the adversary controlling them could always sent a message
containing LPm which breaches their privacy. Moreover, we do not protect p’s
privacy against herself. The simulation takes this output as well as the input
from all malicious participants to produce the same view. The second input is
indeed necessary for a simulation to be possible at all.
2.2.2 Online Personalization Frameworks
Following [5, 17, 106], guaranteeing privacy means to limit what an adversary
can learn about a user being in a sensitive context at some point in time from
the released contexts. By looking at the released contexts and combining them
with her background knowledge, an adversary should not be able to learn that
a user was/is/will be in a sensitive context. Privacy of sensitive locations is not
implied by anonymity, e.g., k users can be in the same sensitive location.
Definition 6. We say that a system A preserves δ-privacy against an adversary if for
all possible inputs ~x, for all possible outputs ~o (Pr[A(~x) = ~o] > 0), for all times t and
all sensitive contexts s ∈ S
Pr[Xt = s|~o]− Pr[Xt = s] ≤ δ.
Note, that our privacy definition also limits what an adversary can learn
about the user being in some (as opposed to a specific) sensitive context at a
certain time. In general, for any subset S ′ ⊂ S, any t, any ~o preserving δ/|S ′|-
privacy according to the above definition we have that Pr[Xt ∈ S ′|~o] − Pr[Xt ∈
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S ′] ≤ δ. This is because Pr[Xt ∈ S ′|~o] is equal to
∑
s∈S′ Pr[Xt = s|~o]. By the
δ/|S ′|-privacy guarantee this is at most∑s∈S′ δ/|S ′|+ Pr[Xt = s] which is equal
to Pr[Xt ∈ S ′] + δ.
Furthermore, our privacy definition limits what an adversary can learn
about the user being in a sensitive context in a time window. For a time win-
dow of length ∆ any ~o preserving δ/∆-privacy we have that the posterior belief
formed after observing ~o of the user being in a sensitive context s at some point
in the time window is at most δ larger than her prior belief.
Adversary Model. Different classes of adversaries can be considered. For
adversaries with knowing only the system used we assume a uniform prior.
To protect privacy we generalize contexts according to a given hierarchy. We
choose a cut in the context hierarchy so that each leaf node has exactly one an-
cestor on the cut to which it is generalized. This basic technique introduces
uncertainty of an adversary about whether the user is in a sensitive context or
not.
Theorem 2. Consider a cut in the context hierarchy that is high enough so that for
each node on the cut that has a sensitive descendant has at least ` descendants. Let n
denote the number of contexts. Generalizing each context to its unique ancestor on the
cut preserves 1/`− 1/n-privacy against adversaries knowing the system.
Proof. Consider a sensitive context. The adversary’s prior belief is 1/n. Upon
observing a generalized context the adversary conditions his prior belief and
infers that the context must have been one of its descendants. The posterior
probability among these descendants remains uniform. By construction of the
cut it is at most 1/`. By Definition 6 this guarantees δ = (1/`− 1/n)-privacy.
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Similar guarantees were given for location-based services. Jensen et al. give
an excellent overview of techniques with privacy guarantees for LBS [52] fo-
cusing on the “single shot” scenario that does not protect privacy against ad-
versaries knowing temporal correlations. Damiani et al. [22] coarsen the map
so that each contains sensitive as well as non-sensitive locations. Bamba et
al. [5] provide both privacy and anonymity by dynamically enlarging the cloak-
ing area until privacy and anonymity requirements are met. Khoshgozaran and
Shahabi use a Hilbert curve encryption to keep queries private and users anony-
mous [60]. Another approach is to hide the true query by sending many fake
queries [61] or to send a fake query. Yiu and Jensen explain how to answer a
nearest neighbor query from results of a fake query [108]. The single shot guar-
antee assumes weak adversaries.
Later, in Chapter 3 much stronger adversaries knowing temporal correla-
tions and patterns in the user contexts. Previous work providing privacy against
adversaries aware of some temporal correlations [17, 35, 36, 40, 84] is closer to
these goals.
Gruteser and Liu [40] consider an adversary applying linear interpolation to
infer suppressed locations. They introduce uncertainty about sensitive locations
by creating zones so that each zone has multiple sensitive locations. If a user vis-
its a sensitive location all locations inside that zone are suppressed until a new
zone is entered. This approach does not prevent privacy breaches completely
but reduces them in comparison the naı¨ve approach. Cheng et al. [17] consider
an adversary knowing the maximum velocity of users. Given two consecutive
cloaked regions of a user the adversary can exclude points in the second re-
gion that are unreachable from any point in the first one. They protect against
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this attack but not against adversaries also knowing the system. This work is
improved by Ghinita et al. [35] using spatial cloaking and introducing delays.
However, the delay can leak information about the user’s exact location and is
thus vulnerable to an attack from an adversary knowing a little bit about the
distribution of the time between consecutive queries: If the delay is just long
enough to make every point in the second region accessible from every point in
the first region then it is likely that the second region has been artificially de-
layed. Parate and Miklau release not location but communication traces [86].
A trace is transformed so that the number of possible traces consistent with
the transformed trace is maximized subject to a constraint on utility. This tech-
nique does not give rise to a semantic privacy guarantee. In summary, the work
by [17, 35, 40, 86] does not provably protect privacy against adversaries know-
ing the system and temporal correlations beyond the max velocity.
To provably provide privacy against these adversaries, cryptographic pro-
tocols are employed [36, 84]. Using private information retrieval [69], Ghinita
et al. answer nearest neighbor queries [36]. Using on tessellation and private
equality testing [29], Narayanan et al. [84] find close-by friends. These strong
guarantees come at a high cost – answering a single query takes a few seconds.
This work cannot be used to release a privacy-preserving stream of contexts for
personalization of many applications. Instead each application has to carry out
the personalization on the user’s mobile device through expensive NN-queries.
This is a severe limitation: Applications have no access to any user context data.
Another line of work answers aggregate queries across users [89]. For per-
sonalization, though, we need context information about a single user and not
aggregate information across a group of users.
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To the best of our knowledge, our work presents the first system releasing
context streams that protects privacy against very strong adversaries knowing
the system and temporal correlations in the form of a Markov chain that go far
beyond the max velocity. Moreover, our contexts are not limited to location,
but can include the social state and other activities. This enables more powerful
personalizations.
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CHAPTER 3
PRIVATELY RELEASING USER CONTEXT STREAMS TO
PERSONALIZED MOBILE APPLICATIONS
3.1 Introduction
We propose a framework to sanitize user contexts streams. Our framework de-
cides for the user’s current context whether to release it to context-aware ser-
vices or to suppress it. We need to answer the question: when and what con-
text should be suppressed to preserve privacy? A naı¨ve approach, that we call
MaskSensitive, is to let the user specify sensitive contexts and to simply sup-
press those. This, however, does not necessarily prevent an adversary from
inferring sensitive contexts. One reason why an adversary can infer suppressed
sensitive contexts is that the suppression itself leaks information as illustrated
in Chapter 1. Thus, we want to guard against leakage attacks from adversaries
knowing the suppression system. Another way an adversary can infer a sensitive
context is by exploiting temporal correlations between contexts. Consider a user
who suppresses her location when she is at a remote hospital. This, however,
might not be sufficient: when she releases the use of a hospital finder app, the
adversary can infer where she is heading. In general, we want to guard against
inference attacks from adversaries knowing temporal correlations. Such adversaries
are realistic because human activities and contexts exhibit daily and weekly pat-
terns. For example, Jon is at work at 9am during the week and she always picks
up her children from daycare after returning from work. Previous work has
shown that human behavior and activities can be modeled well with a simple
Markov chain [48, 77]. We use the same approach and model the user behav-
30
ior as a Markov chain over contexts with transition probabilities that generates
the stream of contexts. A Markov chain captures frequencies of contexts and
temporal correlations. Adversaries can gain knowledge about patterns and fre-
quencies of contexts from observing a person to create a rough daily schedule
or by using common sense; for example, knowing that Jon works full time at
a bakery, the adversary can guess that she is most likely to be at work at 9am.
An adversary can also extract patterns from the sequence of contexts released
to applications. We consider powerful adversaries knowing the Markov chain
of a user.
In the presence of such adversaries, the aforementioned question needs to
be reformulated as when and what context should be suppressed in order to protect
privacy against adversaries knowing temporal correlations and also the system making
this decision? Here, privacy is defined following Definition 6 with respect to
a set of sensitive contexts. Users can decide on the sensitivity of contexts (for
example, including “at hospital” but not “walking the dog”) with the help of
special tools (see for example [94]). Guaranteeing privacy means to limit what
an adversary can learn about a user being in a sensitive context at some point in
time from the released sequence of contexts. By looking at the released contexts
and combining them with her background knowledge, an adversary should not
be able to learn that a user was/is/will be in a sensitive state. Our experiments
show that the MaskSensitive approach does not meet this requirement: more
than half of the masked sensitive states constitute privacy breaches, i.e., upon
observing the output generated by MaskSensitive, an adversary can use her
background knowledge about a user’s Markov chain to gain a lot of confidence
in the fact that the user is in a sensitive state. Thus, we need a better system.
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Contributions.
In this thesis, we propose MASKIT, a system that addresses the above ques-
tion with two novel privacy checks deciding in an online fashion whether to
release or suppress the current state of the user. The relative benefit of the two
privacy checks varies across users. We provide a hybrid privacy check for se-
lecting the better one for a given user.
Both checks provide privacy against very strong adversaries who know the
system and the Markov chain modeling a user and her frequent patterns. We
also consider weaker adversaries with less background knowledge about the
user model. Protecting against these adversaries is challenging because they
can learn and gain additional knowledge either from other sources or from the
released contexts.1 We explain how to adapt our checks to preserve privacy
against weaker adversaries as they learn.
We have evaluated the performance of MASKIT on a PC as well as on a smart
phone, with real public traces from 91 human subjects over the course of nine
months, representing user contexts over 266,000 hours.
There is large body of prior work on privacy-preserving publishing of lo-
cation streams. Most work does not consider adversaries knowing temporal
correlations. The only system that we are aware of that provably protects pri-
vacy in location streams against adversaries knowing the system and temporal
correlation [35] is limited to a single type of temporal correlation based on the
maximum velocity of a user. It is vulnerable to attacks from adversaries know-
ing frequencies (e.g., the user is never at home at 2pm) or other temporal corre-
lations (e.g., the distribution of time between two consecutive user locations or
1This observation lead to attacks in micro-data publishing [62, 100].
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the average velocity). Schemes based on cryptographic protocols [36, 84] pro-
vide a strong privacy guarantee, but they cannot release streams of user con-
texts. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to release user context
streams while protecting privacy of sensitive contexts against powerful adver-
saries knowing the system and various temporal correlations including typical
user behavior (the user gets up every day at 6am) and correlations (after go-
ing to the doctor the user is likely to go to the pharmacy). Moreover, previous
work offering privacy guarantees for streams focuses exclusively on locations.
Our work can handle more general contexts including the social state, the trans-
portation mode, and activities as we illustrate in our experiments.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Next, we lay out the
problem of privately releasing user context streams and describe the architec-
ture of MASKIT. Two alternative privacy checks for MASKIT and a hybrid of
the two are presented thereafter in Sections 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. An experimental
evaluation on real user context traces can be found in Sec. 3.7. We review related
work in Section 3.8 and conclude in Section 3.9.
3.2 Preliminaries
This section forms the background of the adversarial reasoning. We roughly
follow the notation of Manning and Schu¨tze [76].
Markov chains. Markov chains constitute the model of the users and the back-
ground knowledge of the adversaries. A Markov chain M has states with labels
C = {c1, . . . , cn}. The transition probability ati,j denotes the probability of tran-
sitioning from ci at time t− 1 to cj at time t. We use the term state to denote the
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label at a given time (e.g., at home at 9pm).
We denote by Xt the random variable generated from M taking on the value
of some label ci at time t. The independence property of Markov chains states
that for two random variables Xt−1, Xt
Pr[Xt = ci|X1, . . . , Xt−1] = Pr[Xt = ci|Xt−1]. (3.1)
A chain is not necessarily time-homogenous, i.e., the transition probability
from one context to another may depend on the time. We consider a model over
a fixed time period T . It starts at the “start” state in M and ends T steps later
in the “end” state. A way to view such a chain is as a DAG with T + 2 levels,
in which a state at level t has outgoing edges to states in level t + 1. At level 0
we have “start” and at level T + 1 we have “end”. See Fig. 3.4 for an example.2
Note that states in different levels might carry the same context label. Thus, we
can describe the Markovian process with transition matrices A(1), . . . , A(T+1):
a
(t)
i,j = Pr[Xt = cj|Xt−1 = ci]
The joint probability of a sequence of states is:
Pr[X1, . . . , XT ] =
T∏
t=1
a
(t)
Xt−1,Xt
In general, we can compute the probability of transitioning from state ci at time
t1 to state cj at time t2 efficiently:
Pr[Xt2 = cj|Xt1 = ci] = (eᵀiA(t1+1) · · ·A(t2))j (3.2)
where ei is the unit vector that is 1 at position i and 0 otherwise.
Hidden Markov Models. Hidden Markov models help us understand how ad-
versaries make inference about suppressed states. Each state has a distribution
2This is not necessarily the most compact presentation.
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over possible outputs from a set K = {k1, . . . , km}. The output at time t is a ran-
dom variable Ot. The random variable Ot is conditionally independent of other
random variables given Xt. We define emission matrices B(t) as:
b
(t)
i,k = Pr[Ot = k|Xt = ci]
For a given output sequence ~o = o1, . . . , oT , we compute the conditional proba-
bility that at time t the hidden state was ci:
Pr[Xt = ci|~o] = Pr[Xt = ci, o1, . . . , ot−1] Pr[ot, . . . , oT |Xt = ci]
Pr[~o]
We use the forward procedure α and the backward procedure β to compute this
ratio efficiently.
αi(t) = Pr[Xt = ci, o1, . . . , ot−1]
=
∑
j
Pr[Xt−1 = cj, o1, . . . , ot−2] Pr[Xt = ci|Xt−1 = cj] Pr[ot−1|Xt−1 = cj]
=
∑
j
αj(t− 1) Pr[Xt = ci|Xt−1 = cj] Pr[ot−1|Xt−1 = cj]
=
∑
j
αj(t− 1)a(t)j,ib(t−1)j,ot−1
We initialize αj(1) = a
(1)
“start”,j for all j.
βi(t) = Pr[ot, . . . , oT |Xt = ci]
=
∑
j
Pr[ot|Xt = ci] Pr[Xt+1 = cj|Xt = ci] Pr[ot+1, . . . , oT |Xt+1 = cj]
=
∑
j
Pr[ot|Xt = ci] Pr[Xt+1 = cj|Xt = ci]βj(t+ 1)
=
∑
j
b
(t)
i,ot
a
(t+1)
i,j βj(t+ 1)
We initialize βi(T + 1) = 1 for all i. Putting everything together:
Pr[Xt = ci|~o] = αi(t)βi(t)∑
j αj(t)βj(t)
(3.3)
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3.3 Problem Statement
System Model. We assume a system that models today’s sensor-equipped
smart phones running context-aware applications (e.g., those mentioned in
Sec. 3.1). Untrusted applications access user contexts through MASKIT and do
not have access to raw sensor data.3 For energy-efficient support of continu-
ous applications, MASKIT senses user contexts x1, x2, . . . periodically at discrete
points in time (like [8, 80]). Upon extracting a context xt at time t, MASKIT pro-
duces a privacy-preserving output ot. Continuously running applications can
subscribe to the full privacy-preserving context stream o1, o2, . . . MASKIT can
also serve applications issuing sporadic queries over the stream (e.g. asking for
the current context), although these applications are not the main focus of this
work.
To compute ot, MASKIT employs a check deciding whether to release or
suppress the current context xt. The check follows the “release or suppress”
paradigm and restricts the output ot to be either the true state xt or the sup-
pression symbol⊥, i.e., ot ∈ {xt,⊥}.4 We make this restriction because it reflects
standard access control mechanisms in existing phones and the modus operandi
of many location-based mobile applications [96]. This restriction makes it easy
to port existing applications to MASKIT—all that is necessary is the ability to
deal with suppressed states in the stream.
User Model. We assume that a user’s various contexts and transitions be-
tween them can be captured by a Markov chain M ; i.e., the user behaves like
a sample from M . Previous work has shown that human behavior and activ-
3Trusted applications, however, can access raw data and contexts directly if needed.
4Other output types (e.g. generalizations) are left for future work.
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driving  mee/ng 
driving  Coﬀee 
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6am        7am          8am         9am       10am      11am     12          …            5am    
Figure 3.1: Example user model.
ities extracted from smartphone sensors can be modeled well with a simple
Markov chain [48, 77]. Markov chains have also been used to model user be-
havior in other domains including computer-aided manufacturing [67], Web
search [11, 51] and search in entity relation graphs [14].
The states in M are labeled with contexts {c1, . . . , cn}. We consider a model
over a day with T time steps: the states in M represent all possible contexts of
a user in a day.5 Figure 3.1 shows an example. The transition probabilities are
uniform.
Adversary Model. We consider strong adversaries with full knowledge about
the Markov chain M of a user. We further assume that adversaries can access
the full output sequence generated by a general suppression system A. They
also know A6. In the following, we assume that the adversaries apply Bayesian
reasoning. They form their prior belief about the user being in context ci at time
t, denoted by Pr[Xt = ci], where the randomness comes from the process M
5To capture correlations across days, we can consider a larger model capturing a week or a
month.
6This type of knowledge got overlooked frequently with privacy-preserving micro-data [98,
102].
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generating X1, . . . , XT .
Proposition 1. The prior belief of an adversary (who knows a user’s chain M ) about
the user being in a sensitive context ci ∈ S at time t is equal to
Pr[Xt = ci] = (A
(1) · A(2) · · ·A(t))i.
Upon observing a released output sequence, they infer as much as possi-
ble about contexts and update their belief. The posterior belief, denoted by
Pr[Xt = ci|A(~x) = ~o] is computed by conditioning the prior belief on the ob-
served sequence ~o that was generated from the user’s sequence ~x by the system
A. The randomness comes from M and A. When clear which system A we are
referencing, we drop it and simply condition the posterior belief on ~o. More
details about the computation of beliefs can be found the next subsection.
Privacy Goal. Consider a user uwith a Markov chainM over contexts c1, . . . , cn.
The user declares a subset of these contexts S ⊂ {c1, . . . , cn} as sensitive (e.g.,
by using special tools [94]). Informally, a released sequence ~o preserves privacy
if the adversary cannot not learn much about the user being in a sensitive state
from ~o. That is for all sensitive contexts and all times we apply Definition 6 and
require the posterior belief about the user being in the sensitive context at that
time not to be too much larger than the prior belief.7
Example 1. In Figure 3.1 the user declared “Phone call” to be a sensitive context
marked in red. Note that in order to preserve privacy, it does not suffice to simply
suppress “Phone call”. To protect against an adversary knowing the Markov chain as
well as the system we can suppress “Coffee break”, “Phone call”, and “meeting”. This
7If the sensitivity of a context depends on the time then we can generalize this definition to
sensitive states. Extending our system is straight-forward.
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gives δ = 1/6-privacy, since the prior belief of X12 = “Phone call” is 1/2 and the pos-
terior belief is 2/3. Note, that if we ever released “Coffee break” then the posterior belief
of the sensitive state would be 1.
Utility Goal. We want to release as many states as possible, while satisfying
the privacy goal. We measure the utility of a system for a user with chain M as
the expected number of released states in an output sequence. The randomness
comes from M and the system.
The MASKIT System. Alg. 1 shows the MASKIT system. It takes as input the
user’s model M , sensitive contexts S, and the privacy parameter δ. MASKIT
learns M from observing the context stream of a user. The transition probability
ati,j can be estimated as the number of times the user went from ci at time t−1 to
cj at time t divided by the number of times the user went from ci at time t− 1 to
some other context at time t. The other two parameters (S, δ) can be configured
by the user to obtain the desired level of privacy. At its heart, there is a privacy
check deciding whether to release or suppress the current state. This privacy
check supports two methods initialize and okayToRelease. After the initialization,
MASKIT filters a stream of user contexts by checking for each context whether
it is okay to be released or needs to be suppressed. MASKIT releases an output
sequence “start”, o1, . . . , oT , “end” for a single day. We can use MASKIT repeat-
edly to publish longer context streams. It suffices to prove privacy of a single
day due to our assumption that there are no correlations across days. In the
following sections we present two checks for our framework. They differ based
on what information they make the decision whether to release or suppress the
current context. The probabilistic check pre-computes each context a probabil-
ity of suppression during the initialization phase. To determine if a context is
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procedure MASKIT(δ, Markov chain M , sensitive contexts S)
initialize(δ,M, S)
~o =“start”
for current time t ∈ [1, 2, . . . , T ] do
ci = USERGETCURRENTCONTEXT()
if okayToRelease(ci, t, ~o) then
ot = ci
elseot = ⊥
end if
~o← ~o, ot
Release ot
end for
~o← ~o, “end”
end procedure
Algorithm 1: System to generate δ-private streams.
okayToRelease the check flips a random coin and returns false with the context’s
suppression probability. Thus, the decision solely depends on the current con-
text. The simulatable check does nothing during the initialization. It determines
whether a context is okayToRelease in a only based on the released contexts so far
completely ignoring the current context. That way, an adversary can simulate
this decision.
3.3.1 Notation
We summarize our notation in Table 3.1.
3.4 Probabilistic Privacy Check
In this section we develop a probabilistic privacy check that specifies for each
state ci at time t′ a suppression probability pt
′
i with which this state is sup-
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t1, t, t2 ∈ {1 . . . , T} times t1 ≤ t ≤ t2
t′ ∈ {1 . . . , T} t′ current time
t′′ ∈ {1 . . . , T} t′′ last time a state has been released
c1, . . . , cn set context
X1, . . . , XT random variables generated from a Markovian process
a
(t)
i,j transition probability from ci to cj at time t
K = {k1, . . . , km} outputs
O1, . . . , OT random output variables generated from HMM
b
(t)
i,k output probability of k ∈ K at time t given Xt = ci
ot, . . . , oT ∈ KT output sequence
ei unit vector that has 1 at position i and 0 in other positions
Table 3.1: Symbols
start end
x
s
Figure 3.2: Example Markov Chain.
pressed. With probability 1 − pt′i , ci is released at time t′. Among all vectors of
suppression probabilities ~p that preserve δ-privacy, we seek one with the maxi-
mum utility. We measure utility as the expected number of released contexts:
utility(~p) =
∑
~o=o1,...,oT
Pr[~o]|{i|oi 6= ⊥}| =
∑
t′∈[T ],i∈[n]
Pr[Xt′ = ci](1− pt′i )
Example 2. Consider the Markov chain in Fig 3.2. Two states s, x are reachable
from the “start” state with equal probability of 1/2. Both immediately transition
to the “end” state. The sensitive context is s. To achieve δ = 1/4-privacy it suf-
fices for the probabilistic check to suppress s with probability 1 and x with probabil-
ity 1/3: The prior belief of X1 = s is 1/2. The posterior belief upon observing ⊥ is
Pr[X1 = s]p
1
s/(Pr[X1 = s]p
1
s + Pr[X1 = x]p
1
x) = 3/4. Suppressing s with probability
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< 1 breaches privacy. If s was ever released then the posterior belief would be 1 which
is more than δ larger than the prior belief. Also, if x was suppressed with probability
< 1/3 then the posterior belief of X1 = s upon observing⊥ would be more than δ larger
than the prior belief. Thus, p1s = 1, p1x = 1/3 preserves privacy and maximizes utility.
Usually, we expect to always suppress a sensitive state s and other states
with sufficiently high probability so that upon observing ⊥, an adversary is
uncertain whether the suppressed state is s.
The probabilistic privacy check is outlined in Algorithm 2, where initialize
formalizes the optimization problem of finding a suitable suppression proba-
bility vector ~p. The okayToRelease method simply uses this vector to release or
suppress current states. These two methods are used by the MASKIT system
described in Section 3.3.
In the remainder of the section, we focus on the optimization problem in
the initialize method. It makes use of the ISPRIVATE method that checks if a
suppression vector ~p preserves δ-privacy.
3.4.1 Details of the Check – ISPRIVATE
Following Definition 6 we compute whether a vector of suppression probabil-
ities ~p preserves δ-privacy as follows: We enumerate all possible output se-
quences ~o up to length T and iterate over all times t and all sensitive contexts
s to make sure that the posterior belief is at most δ larger than the prior belief.
The process is shown in the Procedure ISPRIVATE in Algorithm 2.
Details on computing beliefs. The user’s chain M together with the probabilis-
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procedure initialize((δ,M, S))
2: ~p← argmax~p utility(~p)
subject to ISPRIVATE(δ, ~p, S,M ) = true
4: end procedure
procedure okayToRelease(ci, t′, ·)
6: with probability pt
′
i return false
return true
8: end procedure
procedure ISPRIVATE(δ, ~p, S,M )
10: for each s ∈ S do
for t ∈ [T ] do
12: Compute prior Pr[Xt = s].
for output sequences ~o do
14: if Pr[~o] == 0 then continue
end if
16: Compute posterior Pr[Xt = s|~o].
if posterior− prior > δ then
18: return false
end if
20: end for
end for
22: end for
return true
24: end procedure
Algorithm 2: Probabilistic Privacy Check.
tic check using ~p form a hidden Markov model generating ~x as hidden states
and ~o as output states. The hidden Markov model extends M with emission
matrices. The probability of outputting ⊥ in state Xt = ci is pti. The probability
of outputting ci in state Xt = ci is 1− pti. All other outputs in state Xt = ci have
zero probability.
Proposition 2. An adversary who knows the Markov chain M of a user and the
probabilistic check with suppression probabilities ~p computes her posterior belief as
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Pr[Xt = s|~o] in the hidden Markov model defined by M and the emission matrices:
b
(t)
i,k = Pr[Ot = k|Xt = ci] =

pti if k = ⊥
1− pti if k = i
0 o.w.
Proof. By Proposition 1 the adversary computes her prior belief about the user
being in a sensitive context s at time t as Pr[Xt = s], where the randomness
comes from the Markov chain M . As explained in Section 3.3 the adversary
computes her posterior belief, denoted by Pr[Xt = s|MaskIt(~x) = ~o] by con-
ditioning the prior belief on the observed sequence ~o that was generated from
the user’s sequence ~x by the MASKIT using the probabilistic privacy check. The
randomness comes from M and the probabilistic check.
The hidden Markov model describes the random process of the probabilistic
check as it is used by MASKIT: If the user is in context ci at time t the probability
of MASKIT outputting ⊥ is pti, that is bi,⊥ = pti. The probability of releasing ci
is 1 − pti, that is bi,i = 1 − pti. The probability of outputting any other context
is zero. Thus, conditioning the prior belief on the hidden Markov model as
defined above outputting a sequence ~o is equivalent to conditioning the prior
belief on MaskIt(~x) = ~o.
We can efficiently compute this posterior belief using Equation (3.3).
44
z1
s1
y1
z2
s2
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endstart
Figure 3.3: δ-privacy is neither convex nor concave.
3.4.2 Details of the Check – Search Algorithm
We can solve the optimization problem of choosing the best suppression prob-
abilities by iterating over all vectors ~p and checking if ISPRIVATE(δ, ~p, S,M ) re-
turns true. For those passing the check we can compute their utility(~p) and return
the one with the maximum utility. This approach, however, is impractical: There
is an infinite number of suppression probabilities and even if we discretized the
space [0, . . . , 1] → {0, 1/d, 2/d, . . . , 1} there are still dn·T many vectors to check.
One might hope to apply efficient techniques for convex optimization. Convex-
ity and concavity of a function are defined as follows.
Definition 7. A function f is convex if for all ~p, ~q and for all Θ (0 ≤ Θ ≤ 1)
f(Θ~p+ (1−Θ)~q) ≤ Θf(~p) + (1−Θ)f(~q) (3.4)
A function f is concave if −f is convex.
Here, we the function we study is the privacy guarantee. We denote by
privacy(~p) the smallest δ value for which ~p preserves δ-privacy.
However, privacy is neither a convex nor a concave as the following example
illustrates.
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Example 3. We give an example of ~p, ~q and Θ for which Equation 3.4 does not hold.
Consider Figure 3.3 with uniform transition probabilities out of each state. The prior
belief of a X2 =s1 and X2 =s2 is 1/4. Let ~p be 1 for y1, y2, s1, s2 and 0 otherwise.
Let ~q be 1 for z1, z2, s1, s2 and 0 otherwise. It is easy to check that the posterior
belief of s1 and s2 is at most 1/2 and privacy(~p) = privacy(~q) = 1/4. Now consider
Θ = 1/2. Then Θ~p+ (1−Θ)~q is 1 for s1, s2 and 1/2 otherwise. To analyze the privacy
of this vector, consider the output y1, ⊥. The posterior belief of X2 = s1 is 2/3. Thus,
privacy(Θ~p + (1 − Θ)~q) is at least 2/3 − 1/4 = 5/12. However, if privacy was convex
then it would have to be at most 1/4. We conclude that privacy is not convex.
We also give an example of ~p, ~q and Θ illustrating that privacy is not concave. Con-
sider Figure 3.3. Let ~p be 1 or y1, z1, s1, s2 and 0 otherwise. Let ~q be 1 or y2, z2, s1, s2
and 0 otherwise. Given output y2, ⊥ for ~p (y1, ⊥ for ~q) the posterior belief of X2 =s2
(X2 =s1) is 1 and thus −privacy(~p) = −privacy(~q) = −3/4. Now consider Θ = 1/2.
Then Θ~p + (1 − Θ)~q is 1 for s1, s2 and 1/2 otherwise. From the calculation above we
already now that for this vector the posterior belief of X2 = s1 given y1, ⊥ is 2/3. By
symmetry, the posterior belief of X2 = s2 given y2, ⊥ is 2/3 as well. Now consider the
output ⊥,⊥. The posterior belief of X2 = s1 (or s2) is equal to 1/3. For other outputs
the posterior belief is 0. Thus, −privacy(Θ~p + (1 − Θ)~q) is equal to −5/12. However,
if privacy was concave then it would have to be at most −3/4. We conclude that privacy
is not concave.
Thus, we cannot simply apply techniques for convex optimization. How-
ever, we can dramatically reduce the search space by exploiting the monotonicity
property of privacy. To define monotonicity, we introduce a total ordering of
suppression probabilities.
Definition 8. We say vector ~q that dominates ~p, denoted by ~p  ~q, if for all i, t :
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pti ≤ qti .
The monotonicity property says that if we increase the suppression proba-
bility we can only improve privacy.
Theorem 3. Privacy is a monotone property: If ~p preserves δ-privacy then so does any
~q dominating ~p.
Proof. Consider vectors ~p, ~q so that ~q dominates ~p and is larger by  in exactly
one dimension: qt′i = pt
′
i + . Suppose that ~p preserves δ-privacy.
To simplify exposition, we introduce a notation. With two different suppres-
sion probabilities ~p, ~q, we use a subscript to specify which one is used in the
computation of a particular probability. For example, we write Pr~p[Xt = s|~o].
We might change one of the values ptj to v and write ~p[ptj = v] to denote the new
suppression probabilities.
In order to prove that also ~q preserves δ-privacy we need to show that the
maximum difference (over sensitive states s, time t, outputs ~o) between poste-
rior and prior belief does not increase when going from ~p to ~q. Fix a sensitive
state s and a time t. It suffices to show that the maximum (over outputs ~o) of
the posterior belief does not increase. In particular, we show that for all ~o either
Pr~p[Xt = s|~o] ≥ Pr~q[Xt = s|~o] or if that is not the case, then there exists an ~o′ such
that Pr~p[Xt = s|~o′] = Pr~q[Xt = s|~o′] ≥ Pr~q[Xt = s|~o]. We consider three cases:
Either ot′ = ci or ot′ = cj (for some j 6= i) or ot′ = ⊥.
ot′ = cj for j 6= i: Recall that according to Proposition 2 the posterior belief of
Xt = s|~o is computed in the hidden Markov model defined by M and
the emission matrices. Changing pt′i only changes bt
′
i,⊥ and b
t′
i,i. All other
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emission probabilities remain unchanged. As we can see from Equa-
tion (3.3) and the definition of α and β the changed emission probabili-
ties are not part of the computation of Pr[Xt = s|~o]. Thus, we have that
Pr~p[Xt = s|~o] = Pr~q[Xt = s|~o].
ot′ = ci: In that case increasing pt
′
i has no effect on the probability of being in a
sensitive state given ~o.
Pr
~p
[Xt = s|~o] = Pr~p[Xt = s, ~o]
Pr~p[~o]
=
pt
′
i Pr~p[pt′i =1]
[Xt = s, ~o]
pt
′
i Pr~p,[pt′i =1]=1
[~o]
=
Pr~q[qti=1][Xt = s, ~o]
Pr~q[qti=1][~o]
=
qt
′
i Pr~q[qt′i =1]
[Xt = s, ~o]
qt
′
i Pr~q[qt′i =1]
[~o]
= Pr
~q
[Xt = s|~o]
ot′ = ⊥: If Pr~p[Xt = s|~o] ≥ Pr~q[Xt = s|~o] we are done. So consider the case where
κPr~p[Xt = s|~o] = Pr~q[Xt = s|~o] for some κ > 1. To complete the proof, we
show that for ~o′ = ~o except for o′t′ = i: Pr~p[Xt = s|~o′] = Pr~q[Xt = s|~o′] ≥
Pr~q[Xt = s|~o]. The first equality is a result of the calculations above. Thus
to suffices to show the following claim:
Claim 1.
Pr
~p
[Xt = s|~o′] ≥ Pr
~q
[Xt = s|~o]. (3.5)
We have that
Pr
~q
[Xt = s|~o] = κ · Pr
~p
[Xt = s|~o]
⇔
Pr~p[Xt = s, ~o] + Pr~p[pt′i =1]
[Xt = s,Xt′ = i, ~o]
Pr~p[~o] + Pr~p[pt′i =1]
[Xt′ = i, ~o]
= κ · Pr~p[Xt = s, ~o]
Pr~p[~o]
⇔1 +
Pr~p[pt′i =1]
[Xt = s,Xt′ = i, ~o]
Pr~p[Xt = s, ~o]
= κ
(
1 +
Pr~p[pt′i =1]
[Xt′ = i, ~o]
Pr~p[~o]
)
⇔
Pr~p[pt′i =1]
[Xt = s,Xt′ = i, ~o]
Pr~p[pt′i =1]
[Xt′ = i, ~o]
=
(κ− 1) Pr~p[Xt = s, ~o]
Pr~p[pt′i =1]
[Xt′ = i, ~o]
+ κ
Pr~p[Xt = s, ~o]
Pr~p[~o]
We use this to prove the Claim (3.5). We rewrite the left-hand side.
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Pr~p[Xt = s, ~o′]
Pr~p[~o′]
=
Pr~p[pt′i =1]
[Xt = s,Xt′ = i, ~o]
Pr~p[pt′i =1]
[Xt′ = i, ~o]
=
(κ− 1) Pr~p[Xt = s, ~o]
Pr~p[pt′i =1]
[Xt′ = i, ~o]
+ κ
Pr~p[Xt = s, ~o]
Pr~p[~o]
≥κPr
~p
[Xt = s|~o] = Pr
~q
[Xt = s|~o]
We arrive at the right-hand side of Claim (3.5) which completes the proof.
Furthermore, utility is an anti-monotone property, i.e. we can only decrease
utility if we increase suppression probabilities.
Observation 1. Utility is an anti-monotone property: Any vector dominating ~p cannot
have more utility than ~p.
Proof. Consider any vectors ~p and ~q so that ~q dominates ~p. Recall that the utility
is defined as the expected number of released contexts in the output. We have
that
utility(~p) =
∑
t′∈[T ],i∈[n]
Pr[Xt′ = ci](1− pt′i )
≤
∑
t′∈[T ],i∈[n]
Pr[Xt′ = ci](1− qt′i ) = utility(~q)
Here, the inequality follows from the definition of dominance: For all i, t′: qt′i ≥
pt
′
i . Thus, 1− qt′i ≤ 1− pt′i .
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Our privacy definition has the monotonicity property in common with other
definitions such as k-anonymity [91] and `-diversity [75].8 This monotonicity
property allows us to adapt existing efficient search algorithms. We can adapt
the greedy approach of MONDRIAN [70] proposed for k-anonymization by start-
ing with the vector (1, . . . , 1) and gradually reducing the suppression probabil-
ities until reducing any suppression probability further would violate privacy.
We end up with a minimal vector. There might be other minimal vectors with
more utility, though. To find those we can use the algorithm ALGPR [3] that
only relies on the monotonicity of privacy and the anti-monotonicity of utility.
3.4.3 Privacy
It is easy to see that the probabilistic check preserves δ-privacy if ISPRIVATE cor-
rectly determines if the suppression probabilities preserve privacy. ISPRIVATE
is correct because it follows the definition of privacy considering an adversary
knowing the probabilistic check and the Markov chain of the user.
Lemma 1. MASKIT preserves δ-privacy instantiated with the probabilistic check.
Proof. According to Definition 6 MASKIT preserves δ-privacy if for all possible
outputs ~o, all times t and all sensitive contexts s ∈ S the posterior belief is at
most δ larger than the prior belief. This is exactly, what ISPRIVATE determines
for a particular vector of suppression probabilities ~p. During initialize, the prob-
abilistic check chooses a particular vector of suppression probabilities ~p that has
been determined privacy-preserving by ISPRIVATE. This vector is used later to
8In their case monotonicity is defined over the lattice of full-domain generalizations of the
micro-data.
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answer calls of okayToRelease from MASKIT. It follows that MASKIT preserves
privacy.
3.4.4 Utility
The following lemma analyzes the utility of using ALGPR in the search of
privacy-preserving suppression probabilities that maximize utility.
Lemma 2. ALGPR [3] using ISPRIVATE solves the optimization problem from
initialize: It finds suppression probabilities that maximize utility among all suppression
probabilities that preserve δ-privacy.
Proof. ALGPR has been shown to solve the following optimization problem
arg max
~p:pti∈{0/d,...,d/d}
P(~p) subject to Q(~p) = true
where P is an anti-monotone property and Q is a monotone property [3]. In our
case, we set P to utility, which is anti-monotone by Observation 1 and we set Q
to isPrivate, which is monotone by Theorem 3.
However, there might be other privacy checks (making the decision not
based on the current context) with more utility.
3.4.5 Efficiency
The initialize method of the probabilistic privacy check is expensive. It calls one
of the search algorithms, which in turn makes many calls to ISPRIVATE, each
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of which can take exponential time in the number of states due to the itera-
tion over possible output sequences. In particular, MONDRIAN calls ISPRIVATE
O(Tn log(d)) times when using binary search. The number of calls to ISPRIVATE
from ALGPR isO(Tn log(d)) times the number of minimally privacy-preserving
vectors plus the number of maximally non-privacy-preserving vectors [3]. We
now explore optimizations to improve the running time of ISPRIVATE to be
polynomial. Across calls to ISPRIVATE, we explain how to re-use partial com-
putations.
Speeding Up ISPRIVATE. To improve the running time of ISPRIVATE we exploit
the independence property of Markov chains (3.1). Instead of iterating over all
possible output sequences ~o in Line (13) in Algorithm 2 to compute the posterior
belief of Xt = s given ~o, it suffices to consider output subsequences ot1 , . . . , ot2
of the form ci,⊥, . . . ,⊥, cj with t1 ≤ t ≤ t2. We replace Line (13) with
1: Let O = {ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥|t1 ≤ t, ot1 ∈ {c1, . . . , cn, “start”}}
2: O∪= {ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥, ot2|t1 ≤ t ≤ t2 ∧ ot1 , ot2 ∈ {c1, . . . , cn, “start”, “end”}}
3: for Partial output sequence ~o ∈ O do
4: . . .
5: end for
The next proposition states that any possible sequence completing a possible
partial output sequence ot1 , . . . , ot2 results in the same conditional probability of
Xt = s. Thus, the speed-up avoids some redundant checks.
Proposition 3. Let s be a sensitive context, t1, t, t2 be time stamps in [0, . . . , T + 1]
such that t1 ≤ t ≤ t2. Consider a partial output sequence ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥, ot2 with
ot1 , ot2 ∈ {c1, . . . , cn, “start”, “end”} with non-zero probability. For any possible out-
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put sequence completing this sequence o0, . . . , ot1−1, ot2+1, . . . , oT+1 we have that
Pr[Xt = s|o0, . . . , oT+1] = Pr[Xt = s|ot1 , . . . , ot2 ]
Proof. It suffices to prove that in our hidden Markov model Xt is condition-
ally independent of the output variables O1, . . . , Ot1−1, Ot2+1, . . . , OT given
Xt1 , . . . , Xt2 . Two sets of variables X,Y are conditionally independent given
a third set of variables Z ifX andY are d-separated given Z [34]. This is the case
if in any trail (path ignoring the directions of the edges) between a node in X
and a node inY there exists a node Z such that
• Z has two incoming arrows on the trail · · · → Z ← . . . and neither Z nor
any of its descendants are in Z, or
• Z does not have two incoming arrows on the trail, that is · · · → Z ← . . . ,
and is in Z
This is the case for our HMM. Any node in O1, . . . , Ot1−1 has to go through Xt1
to reach Xt. Similarly, any node in Ot2+1, . . . , OT has to go through Xt2 to reach
Xt.
The next proposition states that any possible sequence preceding ot1 ,⊥ . . . ,⊥
results in the same conditional probability of Xt = s. Thus, the speed-up avoids
some redundant checks.
Proposition 4. Let s be a sensitive context, t1, t be time stamps in [0, . . . , T + 1]
such that t1 ≤ t. Consider a partial output sequence ~o = ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥ with
ot1 ∈ {c1, . . . , cn, “start”} with non-zero probability. For any possible output sequence
preceding this sequence o0, . . . , ot1−1 we have that
Pr[Xt = s|o0, . . . , ot1−1, ~o] = Pr[Xt = s|~o]
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Proof. It suffices to prove that in our hidden Markov model Xt is condition-
ally independent of the output variables O1, . . . , Ot1−1, given Xt1 . Any node in
O1, . . . , Ot1−1 has to go through Xt1 to reach Xt. Thus, Xt and O1, . . . , Ot1−1 are
d-separated given Xt1 implying independence [34].
To compute Pr[Xt = s|ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥, ot2 ] with ci = ot1 and cj = ot2 , we adapt
Equation (3.3): We set αi(t1) = 1, αl(t1) = 0 (for l 6= i) and βj(t2) = 1 − pj ,
βl(t2) = 0 (for l 6= j). Finally, we can test if Pr[ot1 , . . . , ot2 ] > 0 by testing the
following equivalent condition (1) p(t1)i , p
(t2)
j < 1, (2) Pr[Xt1 = ci] > 0 and (3) cj
is reachable from ci at time t1 by a path of length t2− t1 through states that have
non-zero probability of being suppressed.
Lemma 3. The running time of the refined ISPRIVATE with Line (13) replaced with
Lines (1 to 3) is polynomial in the number of contexts n and the number of time-steps
T in the Markov chain M .
Proof. ISPRIVATE iterates over all s ∈ S, all times in T , and all output sequences
of the form ci,⊥, . . . ,⊥, cj and computes prior and posterior beliefs. Thus, at
most n3T 3 times beliefs are computed. Each belief computation takes at most
n2T time. The α, β values can be cached and re-used across belief computations.
Overall, the running time is polynomial in the n and T .
Lemma 4. Replacing Line (13) replaced with Lines (1 to 3) in ISPRIVATE does not
change the result of ISPRIVATE.
Proof. Consider a call to the original version of ISPRIVATE. We distinguish the
case where it returns false from the case where it returns true. In both cases, we
show that the new version of ISPRIVATE has the same return value.
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• return false: This means that there exists a sensitive state s at time t and an
output ~o so that the posterior belief of Xt = s given ~o is more than δ larger
than the prior belief of Xt = s. Let t1 denote the latest output in ~o before
or at t so that ot1 6= ⊥. We distinguish two cases:
– ot′ = ⊥∀t′ ≥ t1: The new version of ISPRIVATE computed the poste-
rior belief Pr[Xt = s|ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥], where the number of ⊥ following
ot1 is the same as in ~o. By Proposition 4 this is equal to Pr[Xt = s|~o].
Thus, also the new version of ISPRIVATE returns false.
– otherwise: Let t2 denote the earliest output in ~o after or at t so that
ot2 6= ⊥. The new version of ISPRIVATE computed the posterior
belief Pr[Xt = s|ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥, ot2 ]. Proposition 3 states that Pr[Xt =
s|ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥, ot2 ] is equal to Pr[Xt = s|~o′ = o′0, . . . , o′T+1] for all pos-
sible completions ~o′ of ~ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥, ot2 . Let t′ denote the length of ~o,
i.e., ~o = o0, . . . , ot′ . We consider two cases:
∗ t′ = T + 1: In this case it follows immediately from Proposition 3
that Pr[Xt = s|~o] = Pr[Xt = s|ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥, ot2 ]. Thus, also the
new version of ISPRIVATE returns false.
∗ otherwise:
Pr[Xt = s|~o]
=
∑
ot′+1,...,oT+1
Pr[Xt = s|~o, ot′+1, . . . , oT+1] Pr[ot′+1, . . . , oT+1|~o]
=
∑
ot′+1,...,oT+1
Pr[Xt = s|ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥, ot2 ] Pr[ot′+1, . . . , oT+1|~o] By Prop. 3
= Pr[Xt = s|ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥, ot2 ]
Again, it follows that also the new version of ISPRIVATE returns
false.
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• return true: Suppose for contradiction that the new version returns false.
Then there exists s, t, t1, t2, ~o ∈ O so that the posterior belief, Pr[Xt = s|~o],
is more than δ larger than prior belief Pr[Xt = s].
– ~o = ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥: The fact that Pr[~o] > 0 implies that there exists
o1, . . . , ot1−1 so that Pr[o0, . . . , ot1−1, ~o] > 0. By Proposition 4, Pr[Xt =
s|o0, . . . , ot1−1, ~o] = Pr[Xt = s|~o]. This output sequence would have
caused the original version of ISPRIVATE to return false, since it iter-
ates over all output sequences and it would have found this particu-
lar one to result in a posterior belief more than δ larger than the prior
belief. We arrive at a contradiction since the original version of ISPRI-
VATE did not return false. We conclude that the new version returns
true.
– otherwise: In this case ~o = ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥, ot2 with ot2 6= ⊥. The fact
that Pr[ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥, ot2 ] > 0 implies that there exists o0, . . . , ot1−1 and
ot2+1, . . . , oT+1 so that Pr[o0, . . . , oT+1] > 0. By Proposition 3, Pr[Xt =
s|o0, . . . , oT+1] = Pr[Xt = s|ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥, ot2 ]. This output sequence
would have caused the original version of ISPRIVATE to return false,
since it iterates over all output sequences and it would have found
this particular one to result in a posterior belief more than δ larger
than the prior belief. We arrive at a contradiction since the original
version of ISPRIVATE did not return false. We conclude that the new
version returns true.
Speeding Up the Search Algorithm. Both search algorithms, MONDRIAN and
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ALGPR, start from high suppression probabilities ~p that preserve privacy and
use binary search over each probability to see how much it can be decreased
without breaching privacy. We can re-use the results from checking privacy of
~p in order to check privacy of ~q dominating ~p. If ~p passes the check then so does
~q. This fact is already exploited by the two search algorithms. However, we
observe that we can get an additional speed-up in these algorithms by caching
intermediate results if ~p failed ISPRIVATE.
Lemma 5. Let P (~p) (for P assed) denote the set of triplets 〈t, s, ~o〉 that passed the check,
i.e., did not result in false in Line (18) in ISPRIVATE(δ, ~p, S,M). For ~q dominating ~p,
it suffices to check triplets not in P (~p), i.e., the result of ISPRIVATE(δ, ~q, S,M) will not
change if the posterior belief of triples in P (~p) is not computed and not verified to be at
most δ larger than the prior belief.
Proof. Consider ~q dominating ~p. We distinguish two cases based on the return
value of ISPRIVATE(δ, ~q, S,M). For both cases we show that the output remains
the same if triples in P (~p) are not checked in ISPRIVATE(δ, ~q, S,M).
return true: If ISPRIVATE(δ, ~q, S,M) returns true then this will also be the case
when checking fewer triplets each of which could potentially result in a
return value of false.
return false: If ISPRIVATE(δ, ~q, S,M) returns false then there is a triplet 〈t, s, ~o〉
which causes it to return false in Line (18). If this triplet is not in P (~p) then
this triplet will still be checked (when skipping triplets in P (~p)) and cause
the return value to be false. Otherwise, we have that ~q dominates ~p and
Pr~q[Xt = s|~o] > Pr~p[Xt = s|~o]. The proof of Theorem 3 states that then
there exists an ~o′ so that Pr~p[Xt = s|~o′] = Pr~q[Xt = s|~o′] ≥ Pr~q[Xt = s|~o].
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By definition of P (~p) the triplet 〈t, s, ~o′〉 is not in P (~p). Thus, it will still
be checked (even when skipping triplets in P (~p)). This triplet will fail the
check causing a return value of false, since already Pr~q[Xt = s|~o]−Pr[Xt =
s] > δ and Pr~q[Xt = s|~o′] ≥ Pr~q[Xt = s|~o].
3.4.6 Main Results
Algorithm 3 shows the improved probabilistic privacy check. The following
theorem analyzes privacy, utility and efficiency of this check.
Theorem 4. Privacy: MASKIT preserves δ-privacy instantiated with the probabilistic
check in Algorithm 3. Utility: The probabilistic check specifies for each state a proba-
bility with which the state should be suppressed in okayToRelease. It finds suppression
probabilities in initialize that maximize utility among all suppression probabilities that
preserve δ-privacy. This is done by employing ALGPR [3] using ISPRIVATE. Effi-
ciency: Calling initialize with ALGPR [3] results in at most O(Tn log(d)) times the
number of minimally privacy-preserving vectors plus the number of maximally non-
privacy-preserving vectors many calls to ISPRIVATE. Each call to ISPRIVATE in Algo-
rithm 3 has a running time polynomial in the number of contexts and time-steps. A call
to okayToRelease takes constant time.
Proof. We analyze MASKIT using the probabilistic check.
• Privacy: Lemma 1 states that the original privacy check from Algorithm 2
preserves δ-privacy when employed in MASKIT. The two changes made in
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procedure initialize((δ,M, S))
2: P = ∅
~p← arg max~p utility(~p)
4: subject to ISPRIVATE(δ, ~p, S,M ) = true
end procedure
6: procedure okayToRelease(ci, t′, ·)
with probability pt′i return false
8: return true
end procedure
10: procedure ISPRIVATE(δ, ~p, S,M )
for each t ∈ [T ], s ∈ S do
12: Compute prior Pr[Xt = s] with Proposition 1.
Let O = {ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥|t1 ≤ t, ot1 ∈ {c1, . . . , cn, “start”}}
14: O ∪= {ot1 ,⊥, . . . ,⊥, ot2|t1≤ t≤ t2 ∧ ot1 , ot2∈{c1, . . . , cn, “start”, “end”}}
for Partial output sequence ~o ∈ O do
16: if Pr[~o] == 0 then continue
end if
18: if ∃~q such that ~q  ~p and 〈~p, t, s, ~o〉 ∈ P then continue
end if
20: Compute posterior Pr[Xt = s|~o] with Proposition 2 and Eq. (3.3).
if posterior− prior > δ then
22: return false
else
24: P ← P ∪ {〈~p, t, s, ~o〉}
end if
26: end for
end for
28: return true
end procedure
Algorithm 3: Improved Probabilistic Privacy Check.
Algorithm 3 to speed-up the check do not change the result of ISPRIVATE,
see Lemmata 4 and 5.
• Utility: Lemma 2 states that the original privacy check from Algorithm 2
employing ALGPR [3] finds suppression probabilities in initialize that max-
imize utility among all suppression probabilities that preserve δ-privacy.
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Again, the two changes made in Algorithm 3 to speed-up the check do not
change the result of ISPRIVATE, see Lemmata 4 and 5.
• Efficiency: Lemma 3 shows that using the first speed-up each call to ISPRI-
VATE has a running time polynomial in the number of contexts and time-
steps. ALGPR has been shown to make O(Tn log(d)) times the number of
minimally privacy-preserving vectors plus the number of maximally non-
privacy-preserving vectors to ISPRIVATE [3]. Finally, okayToRelease flips
a coin with a bias specified by the suppression probabilities, which takes
constant time.
3.5 Simulatable Privacy Check
At current time t′ our simulatable check uses Algorithm 4 to decide whether to
release or suppress the current state. This decision is made in a simulatable way9,
i.e., only based on information available to the adversary at that time, namely,
the Markov chain M and the output sequence o1, . . . , ot′−1. The current state is
ignored. The simulatable check decides to release the current state if for any
possible state cj at time t′, releasing cj does not violate privacy.
9The notion of simulatability goes back to query auditing [83].
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procedure initialize((δ,M, S)) return
2: end procedure
procedure okayToRelease(·, t′, ~o)
4: for each possible state j at time t′ given ~o do
for each s ∈ S do
6: for t ∈ [T ] do
Compute prior Pr[Xt = s] .
8: Compute posterior Pr[Xt = s|〈~o, cj〉].
if posterior− prior > δ then
10: return false
end if
12: end for
end for
14: end for
return true
16: end procedure
Algorithm 4: Simulatable privacy check.
3.5.1 Details of the Check
Generation of Possible States. To compute all possible states at time t′ given
~o, let t′′ denote the time of the last output 6= ⊥. State cj is a possible state if it
is reachable from ot′′ within t′ − t′′ steps: (eot′′A(t
′′+1) · · ·A(t′))j > 0, where eot′′
denotes the ot′′ th unit vector that has 1 at position ot′′ and 0 in other positions.
Details on computing beliefs. The following proposition describes how an
adversary computes her posterior belief.
Proposition 5. Consider an output sequence ~o = o1, . . . , ot′ computed by the simulat-
able check. Consider a time t. Let t1 be the last time before or at t at which a context was
released. Let t2 be the earliest time after t at which a context was released. If no such
time exists, set t2 = T +1 and oT+1 = “end”. The adversary’s posterior belief (knowing
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M and the simulatable check) about a user being in a sensitive context s at time t is
Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 , Xt2 = ot2 ].
where the randomness comes from M .
The proof follows from the simulatability of the check and the independence
property of Markov chains.
Proof. Consider any output ~o = o1, . . . , ot′ and any output t. Let t1, t2 be as
specified in the proposition. Further, set tˆ1, . . . , tˆl denote the times at which
otˆi 6= ⊥. We denote by X the set of sequences ~x that agree with the output on
the released states (i.e., xtˆi = otˆi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l).
Claim 2. Any sequence ~x ∈ X would have generated the same output ~o if used as input
to the simulatable check.
We prove this claim by induction on the length of the output t′′, 1 ≤ t′′ ≤ t′.
Consider any sequence ~x ∈ X .
t′′ = 1: For the base case, observe that the suppression decision is made without
any information on ~x. Therefore, the decision is the same for all inputs. If
the decision is to suppress then the output o1 will be equal to ⊥ for all
inputs. On the other hand, if the decision is to release the state at time
t′′ = 1 then by definition tˆ1 = 1 and the output will be x1 = otˆ1 = o1.
t′′ ← t′′ + 1: For the inductive step, suppose the released output for ~x up until
t′′ ≥ 1 is equal to o1, . . . , ot′′ . The decision of whether to suppress or release
the next state at time t′′ + 1 is made only based on this output. If the
decision is to suppress then indeed the output will be ⊥ = ot′′+1. If the
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decision is to release the state at time t′′ + 1 then there exists some i such
that tˆi = t′′ + 1 and the output will be xt′′+1 = otˆi = ot′′+1.
Hence, for any x ∈ X the simulatable check outputs ~o. This is never the case for
all other outputs.
Claim 3. For any x 6∈ X the check never outputs ~o.
To prove this claim, consider any x 6∈ X . By definition of X , there exists
a time t′′ so that xt′′ 6= ot′′ and ot′′ 6= ⊥. Since, the simulatable check either
suppresses a context or releases the true context it would never output ot′′ when
the true context is xt′′ .
Putting both claims together we have that
Pr[~o|~x] =

1 x ∈ X
0 otherwise
(3.6)
Thus, the posterior belief of a Bayesian adversary who conditions the prior
belief on the output ~o is
Pr[Xt = s|~o] =
∑
~x:xt=s
Pr[~x|~o]∑
~x Pr[~x|~o]
=
∑
~x:xt=s
Pr[~o|~x] Pr[~x]/Pr[~o]∑
~x Pr[~o|~x] Pr[~x]/Pr[~o]
Due to Bayes Theorem
=
∑
~x:xt=s
Pr[~o|~x] Pr[~x]∑
~x Pr[~o|~x] Pr[~x]
=
∑
~x∈X:xt=s 1 · Pr[~x]∑
~x∈X 1 · Pr[~x]
By Equation (3.6)
= Pr[Xt = s|Xtˆ1 , . . . , Xtˆl ]
Among the states Xtˆ1 , . . . , Xtˆl the two states Xt1 and Xt2 are the closest before
and after Xt. Due to the independence property (3.1) given Xt1 and Xt2 the
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random variable Xt = s is independent of the other random variables Xtˆi . In
our Markov chain any trail from a node in Xtˆ1 , . . . , Xtˆl has to go through either
Xt1 or Xt2 to reach Xt by definition of Xt1 and Xt2 . Thus, Xtˆ1 , . . . , Xtˆl and Xt are
d-separated given Xt1 , Xt2 which implies conditional independence. Hence, the
posterior belief is equal to Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 , Xt2 = ot2 ].
Corollary 1. We can compute the posterior belief of Xt = s given ~o as:
Pr[Xt = s|~o] = Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ] Pr[Xt2 = ot2|Xt = s]
Pr[Xt2 = ot2|Xt1 = ot1 ]
We use Equation (3.2) to efficiently compute the transition probability between two
states.
Proof. We rewrite the posterior belief using the independence property of
Markov chains and Proposition 5.
Pr[Xt = s|~o] = Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 , Xt2 = ot2 ] By Prop. 5
=
Pr[Xt = s,Xt1 = ot1 , Xt2 = ot2 ]
Pr[Xt1 = ot1 , Xt2 = ot2 ]
=
Pr[Xt2 = ot2|Xt1 = ot1 , Xt = s] Pr[Xt = s,Xt1 = ot1 ]
Pr[Xt2 = ot2|Xt1 = ot1 ] Pr[Xt1 = ot1 ]
=
Pr[Xt2 = ot2|Xt = s] Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ] Pr[Xt1 = ot1 ]
Pr[Xt2 = ot2|Xt1 = ot1 ] Pr[Xt1 = ot1 ]
By Eq. 3.1
=
Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ] Pr[Xt2 = ot2|Xt = s]
Pr[Xt2 = ot2|Xt1 = ot1 ]
This completes the proof.
3.5.2 Privacy
Our check preserves privacy.
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Lemma 6. MASKIT preserves δ-privacy instantiated with the simulatable check in
Algorithm 4.
Informally, this is the case because we only publish a state if it does not
increase the probability of any sensitive states too much.
Proof. Consider a sensitive context s and a time t and an output ~o produced by
the simulatable check. We argue that the posterior belief of Xt = s given ~o is at
most δ larger than the prior belief. Theorem 5 states that the posterior belief of
Xt = s given ~o is equal to Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 , Xt2 = ot2 ], where t1, t2 denote
the time of the two released states closest to t. (If no such time t2 exists, we
set t2 = T + 1 and ot2 =“end”.) We distinguish two cases based on whether
t2 = T + 1.
• t2 < T + 1: In this case, the check verified that this posterior belief is not
too large before releasing ot2 at time t2.
• t2 = T + 1: In this case, consider the decision to release t1: If t1 = 0 then
the prior belief is equal to the posterior belief. Otherwise, when ot1 was
released the check verified that the posterior belief of Xt = s given Xt1 =
ot1 and XT+1 =“end” is not too large.
3.5.3 Utility
The simulatable check is locally optimal as the following lemma states.
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Lemma 7. If the next state is published despite the indication of the privacy check to
suppress it (improving the utility) then there is a chance that future states will inevitably
breach privacy.
Proof. Consider a context ci at time t′ that the simulatable check suppresses after
having outputted o1, . . . , ot′−1. This means there exists a possible state cj at time
t′ given o1, . . . , ot′−1 and there exists s ∈ S, t so that
Pr[Xt = s|o1, . . . , ot′−1, cj]− Pr[Xt = s] > δ.
We consider two cases:
• t ≤ t′: In this case, we have by Proposition 5 that for any output sequence
completing o1, . . . , ot′−1, cj the posterior belief of Xt = s is the same and
we have a privacy breach.
• t > t′: In this case, the output o1, . . . , ot′−1, cj already constitutes a privacy
breach. We further show that independent of the following release or sup-
pression decisions based on the outputs so far, we can find possible inputs
xt′+1, . . . , xT so that the output o1, . . . , oT breaches privacy.
Claim 4. Let ~o denote the output sequence so far. If the decision is to release the
next state at time t2 we can always find a possible context ck at time t2 so that
Pr[Xt = s|~o] ≤ Pr[Xt = s|~o, ck].
Let t1 denote the last released output and cj = ot1 . We consider three cases
based on the order of t1, t, t2.
– t1 > t: In this case, by Proposition 5 we have that for any possible
output sequence completing ~o the posterior belief of Xt = s is the
same and we have a privacy breach.
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– t1 ≤ t2 ≤ t : Suppose for contradiction that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n we have
that
Pr[Xt = s|Xt2 = ck] < Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ] (3.7)
This means that,
Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ] =
Pr[Xt = s,Xt1 = cj]
Pr[Xt1 = cj]
=
∑
k Pr[Xt = s,Xt1 = ot1 , Xt2 = ck]
Pr[Xt1 = ot1 ]
=
∑
k
Pr[Xt = s|Xt2 = ck] Pr[Xt2 = ck|Xt1 = ot1 ] By Eq. (3.1)
<
∑
k
Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ] Pr[Xt2 = ck|Xt1 = ot1 ] By Ass. (3.7)
= Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ]
We arrive at a contradiction. We conclude that there exists a k so that
Pr[Xt = s|Xt2 = ck] ≥ Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ]
By Proposition 5 this means that Pr[Xt = s|~o] ≤ Pr[Xt = s|~o, ck].
– t1 ≤ t ≤ t2 : Suppose for contradiction that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n we have
that
Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 , Xt2 = ck] < Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ] (3.8)
We rewrite the left-hand side:
Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 , Xt2 = ck] =
Pr[Xt = s,Xt1 = ot1 , Xt2 = ck]
Pr[Xt1 = ot1 , Xt2 = ck]
=
Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ] Pr[Xt2 = ck|Xt = s]
Pr[Xt2 = ck|Xt1 = ot1 ]
We re-state our Assumption (3.8):
Pr[Xt2 = ck|Xt = s] < Pr[Xt2 = ck|Xt1 = ot1 ] (3.9)
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We rewrite the right-hand side of our Assumption (3.8):
Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ]
=
Pr[Xt = s,Xt1 = cj]
Pr[Xt1 = cj]
=
∑
k Pr[Xt = s,Xt1 = ot1 , Xt2 = ck]
Pr[Xt1 = ot1 ]
=
∑
k
Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ] Pr[Xt2 = ck|Xt = s] By Eq. (3.1)
<
∑
k
Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ] Pr[Xt2 = ck|Xt1 = ot1 ] By Ass. (3.9)
= Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ]
We arrive at a contradiction. We conclude that there exists a k so that
Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 , Xt2 = ck] ≥ Pr[Xt = s|Xt1 = ot1 ]
By Proposition 5 this means that Pr[Xt = s|~o] ≤ Pr[Xt = s|~o, ck].
From Claim 4 it follows that if the simulatable check indicated that the
current state ought to be suppressed, but instead it was released, then we
can construct a sequence of possible inputs so that privacy is breached.
Privacy is breached no matter how the following release or suppress de-
cisions are made as long as they are made only by considering the output
released so far. For example, even when suppressing all following states
privacy is still breached.
However, the privacy check might not globally maximize the total number
of released states. At times it might be wiser to suppress a state even when
the check indicates that publishing it will not breach privacy. Moreover, there
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might be other privacy checks (making the decision not based on the previously
released states) with more utility.
3.5.4 Efficiency
Lemma 8. The running time of each call to okayToRelease of the simulatable check is
polynomial in the number of contexts n and time-steps T .
Proof. okayToRelease iterates over s ∈ S, t ∈ [T ] and all possible states at time
t′ and computes prior and posterior beliefs. Thus, at most n2T beliefs are com-
puted. The computation of a prior belief according to Proposition 1 takes time
O(n2T ). The computation of a posterior belief according to Corollary 1 using
Equation 3.2 takes time O(n2T ). Overall the running time is O(n4T 2). Note that
the running time can be improved by caching beliefs.
We can speed up the check by noticing that many checks in Line (9) in Algo-
rithm 4 are carried out over and over again for consecutive calls of okayToRelease
from the system. Some of these checks are redundant.
Lemma 9. Consider MASKIT using the simulatable check. At current time t′, let t′′
denote the time of the last output 6= ⊥ before t′. In Line (6) of Algorithm 4 only iterating
t over t′′ + 1, . . . , T does not change the output of okayToRelease.
Proof. Consider t′, t′′ as in the Lemma. Let o1, . . . , ot′−1 denote the output se-
quence so far. We argue that
Claim 5. For t ≤ t′′ we have that for all s the posterior belief of Xt = s given
o1, . . . , ot′−1 is at most δ larger than the prior belief.
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procedure initialize((δ,M, S)) return
2: end procedure
procedure okayToRelease(·, t′, ~o)
4: Let t′′ be the last time at which ot′′ 6= ⊥.
for each possible state j at time t′ given ~o do
6: for each s ∈ S do
for t ∈ [t′′ + 1, . . . , T ] do
8: Compute prior Pr[Xt = s] .
Compute posterior Pr[Xt = s|〈~o, cj〉].
10: if posterior− prior > δ then
return false
12: end if
end for
14: end for
end for
16: return true
end procedure
Algorithm 5: Improved simulatable privacy check.
To prove the claim, let t1 denote the earliest time after or at t at which
a context was released. When ot1 was released it was verified that Pr[Xt =
s|o1, . . . , ot1 ] − Pr[Xt = s] ≤ δ. Otherwise, the context at time t1 would never
have been released. Due to Proposition 5 we have that the output after t1 does
not affect the posterior belief of Xt = s given ~o for all s. In particular, Pr[Xt =
s|o1, . . . , ot′′ ] = Pr[Xt = s|o1, . . . , ot1 ]. Thus, Pr[Xt = s|o1, . . . , ot′′ ]−Pr[Xt = s] ≤ δ
and the claim follows.
From the claim it follows immediately, that skipping over t ∈ [1, . . . , t′′] does
not change the return value of okayToRelease.
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3.5.5 Main Results
Algorithm 5 shows the improved simulatable privacy check. The following the-
orem analyzes privacy, utility and efficiency of this check.
Theorem 5. We analyze MASKIT using the simulatable check. Privacy: MASKIT
preserves δ-privacy instantiated with the simulatable check in Algorithm 5. Utility:
The simulatable check greedily releases states. Efficiency: Calling initialize takes no
time. A call to okayToRelease takes polynomial time in the number of contexts and
time-steps.
Proof. We analyze the simulatable check.
• Privacy: Lemma 1 states that the original privacy check from Algorithm 4
preserves δ-privacy when employed in MASKIT. The change made in Al-
gorithm 5 to speed-up the check does not change the result of ISPRIVATE,
see Lemma 9.
• Utility: Lemma 7 states that Algorithm 4 releases a state whenever it is
safe to do so. This is not affected by the speed-up which does not change
the return value of okayToRelease, see Lemma 9.
• Efficiency: Lemma 8 states that the running time of Algorithm 4 is poly-
nomial in the number of contexts n and time-steps T . The change made in
Algorithm 5 further improves the running time.
71
3.6 Comparative Analysis
3.6.1 Utility
A natural question is which of the two checks (probabilistic or simulatable) pro-
vides more utility. We study this question from an analytical point of view in
this section and from an experimental point of view in Sec. 3.7. The relative ben-
efit of the two checks depends on a user’s Markov chain and the sensitive con-
texts. We give an example of a Markov chain where the simulatable check per-
forms better than the probabilistic check and one where the probabilistic check
performs better than the simulatable check.
Probabilistic check better.
Example 4. Consider the example Markov chain in Figure 3.4(a). The transition
probabilities are uniform across the outgoing edges of a node. States s1, s2 are
sensitive. Suppose we want δ = 1/4-privacy. The simulatable check suppresses
X1. The probabilistic check, however, only suppresses the sensitive contexts.
This suffices to protect privacy. The prior belief of X1 = si is 1/4 and the poste-
rior belief given ⊥ is 1/2.
This example illustrates a weakness of the simulatable check: It makes the
suppression decision without looking at the current state. If there is a chance
of currently being in a sensitive state that has a prior belief < 1 − δ then the
simulatable check always suppresses the current state. The probabilistic check
considers the current state and in such a case does not necessarily have to sup-
press it.
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start end
x1
s1
x2
s2
start
w4
w3
w2
w5
w1
w6
y2
y1
y3
s1
s2
x2
x1
x3
z1
z2
end
(a) Probabilistic Better (b) Simulatable Better
Figure 3.4: Two Markov chains.
Simulatable check better.
Example 5. Consider the example Markov chain in Figure 3.4(b). States s1, s2
are sensitive. Suppose we want δ = 1/3-privacy. The simulatable check outputs
one of these sequences: 〈start, w1, x1 ⊥,⊥〉, 〈start, w2, x1 ⊥,⊥〉, 〈start, w3, x2,
y2, z1 〉, 〈start, w3, x2, y2, z2 〉, 〈start, w4, x2, y2, z1 〉, 〈start, w4, x2, y2, z2 〉,
〈start, w5, x3 ⊥,⊥〉, 〈start, w6, x3 ⊥,⊥〉. The expected number of released states
is 8/3. The utility of the probabilistic check is smaller than that.
Claim 6. For the probabilistic check the utility of all minimally privacy-preserving
suppression probabilities is at most 7/3.
To prove this claim, observe that the suppression probabilities of s1, s2 have
to be 1 because otherwise the output with o3 = s1 or s2 increases the posterior
belief to 1 which exceeds the prior belief (1/6) by more than δ. We first note that
in addition all of w1, w2, x1 have to output ⊥ with probability 1 or both z1 and
y1 have to output ⊥ with probability 1. Otherwise, a possible output sequence
includes one of w1, w2, x1 and z1 which gives away that the user must have
been in s1 or a possible output sequence includes one of w1, w2, x1 and⊥which
increases the probability that the user was in s1 by more than δ. Similarly, all
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of w4, w5, x3 or both z2, y3 have to be always suppressed. Consider the case
where z1, y1, z2, y3 are always suppressed. Here, the utility is 7/3, which is
less than that of the simulatable check. The same is true if you consider always
suppressing w1, w2, x1 and w4, w5, x3 where again the utility is 7/3. In order
to guarantee privacy the suppression probabilities would have to be increased
further. Lastly, consider the case where z1, y1 and w4, w5, x3 (z2, y3 and w1,
w2, x1, resp.) are being suppressed. Again, this does not guarantee privacy but
any dominating suppression probabilities will have utility no better than 7/3.
In summary, any privacy-preserving suppression probabilities will have utility
less than that of the simulatable check.
This example illustrates a weakness of the probabilistic check: Its decision
ignores the previously released states. It might have to suppress a state because
there exists some ~o in Line (13) for which otherwise the posterior belief of some
sensitive state is too high. Now, if this ~o is inconsistent with the outputs released
so far it might be okay to release the state. For example, if the output released
so far is 〈start, w3〉 then everything following can be released. The simulat-
able algorithm makes decisions based on the released states so far and can thus
achieve higher utility.
Hybrid Privacy Check. How can we analytically determine which one of the
two checks is more suitable for a particular user? We explain how to compute
the utility of both checks. Then it is easy to pick the better one. Recall from
Sec. 3.3 that the utility is defined as the expected number of released states in an
output.
For the probabilistic check with suppression probabilities ~p we compute the
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utility as:
utilityProb(M) =
∑
i,t
(1− pti) Pr[Xt = ci].
For the simulatable check we introduce a short-hand, suppi(t), for the number
of suppression symbols immediately following the release of ci at time t.
supp(i, t) = arg max
t2
t2 − t s.t. ∀t′2 : t < t′2 ≤ t2 :
okayToRelease( · , t′2, 〈o1, . . . , ot−1ci,⊥t
′
2−t−1〉) == false,
where o1, . . . , ot−1 is some output sequence that is consistent with ot = ci. If
no such sequence exists, then ot can never be ci and we define supp(i, t) to be 0.
Using suppi(t) we can compute recursively the expected number of suppressions
following the release of Xt = ci:
E[|{t2|ot2 = ⊥, t < t2 ≤ T}||ot = ci] = γi(t)
=suppi(t) +
∑
j
Pr[Xt+suppi(t)+1 = cj|Xt = ci]γj(t+ suppi(t) + 1)
Our base case is γj(T + 1) = 0 for all j. Overall, the utility of the simulatable
check is
utilitySimulatable(M) = T − γ“start”(0).
Our hybrid check computes the utility of both the simulatable and the proba-
bilistic check and chooses the one with the higher utility.
Theorem 6. The hybrid check correctly computes the utility of the simulatable and the
probabilistic check employed by MASKIT.
Proof. Recall that the utility is defined as the expected number of released states
in an output sequence. The randomness comes from M and the check. For
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the probabilistic check with suppression probabilities ~p the computation of the
utility closely follows this definition:
utilityProb(M) =
∑
~o
Pr[~o]|{i|oi 6= ⊥}|
=
∑
i,t
Pr[Xt = ci] · Pr[Ot = ⊥|Xt = ci]
=
∑
i,t
(1− pti) Pr[Xt = ci]
For the simulatable check we first show that the notion of suppi(t) is well
defined, i.e., that the number of suppressed states following the release of ci at
time t depends only on i, t and not on anything else.
Claim 7. Consider two output sequences ~o, ~o′ both of length t − 1. If both sequences
agree on the most recently released context then for all i, j
okayToRelease(ci, t, ~o) == okayToRelease(cj, t, ~o)
To prove the claim first note that okayToRelease is independent of its first
input argument. It remains to argue, why its decision only depends on the last
released context. Let t′′ denote the most recent time most for which ot′′ 6= ⊥. We
have that ot′′ , . . . , ot−1 is equal to o′t′′ , . . . , o
′
t−1. By Proposition 5 for all contexts
ck, all s ∈ S and all t′ ≥ t′′
Pr[Xt′ = s|~o, ck] = Pr[Xt′ = s|ot′′ , . . . , ot−1, ck]
= Pr[Xt′ = s|o′t′′ , . . . , o′t−1, ck] = Pr[Xt′ = s|~o′, ck].
Thus, for all contexts ck, all s ∈ S and all t′ ≥ t′′ we have that
okayToRelease(ci, t, ~o) returns false in Line (11) in Algorithm 5 if and only
okayToRelease(ci, t, ~o) returns false. By Lemma 9 for all contexts ck, all s ∈ S
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and all t′ < t′′ we have that
Pr[Xt′ = s|~o, ck]− Pr[Xt′ = s] ≤ δ and
Pr[Xt′ = s|~o′, ck]− Pr[Xt′ = s] ≤ δ
We conclude that for all s, t′ okayToRelease(ci, t, ~o) returns false in Line (11) in
Algorithm 5 if and only okayToRelease(ci, t, ~o) returns false. Thus their return
value is equal.
Thus, suppi(t) is well defined as the number of suppressed states follow-
ing the release of ci at time t. Its computation is correct: It chooses one possi-
ble output sequence o1, . . . , ot−1 consistent with ot = ci and counts how often
okayToRelease returns ⊥ given o1, . . . , ot−1, ci and a growing number of ⊥. Note
that by Claim 7 the choice of o1, . . . , ot−1 is arbitrary. We conclude that suppi(t)
indeed computes the number of suppression symbols immediately following
the release of ci at time t.
γi(t) correctly computes the number of suppressions following the release
of Xt = ci by adding to suppi(t) the sum over all possible next releases of their
probability times the number of suppressions following them.
Finally, utilitySimulatable(M) correctly computes the utility by subtracting from
T the expected number of suppressed states.
3.6.2 Efficiency
In the MASKIT system, initialize is computed once offline, while okayToRelease
is computed online whenever a new context is extracted. Our privacy checks
77
present different tradeoffs between offline and online computation. The simu-
latable check does not require any initialization; all its computational overhead
is incurred during the filtering. If MASKIT has to go live and create a stream
immediately then the simulatable check is the only option. The probabilistic
and hybrid checks, conversely, perform most of the computation offline dur-
ing initialize and are suitable when the offline computation can be performed
by a server. With a server we can also speedup the simulatable check by pre-
computing supp(i, t). We experimentally measure the computational costs in
Sec. 3.7.
3.7 Experiments
3.7.1 Setup
Dataset. We evaluate our system using the Reality Mining dataset [26]10 that
contains continuous data on daily activities of 100 students and staff at MIT,
recorded by Nokia 6600 smartphones over the 2004-2005 academic year. The
trace contains various continuous information such as a user’s location (at gran-
ularity of cell towers), proximity to others (through Bluetooth), activities (e.g.,
making calls, using phone apps), transportation mode (driving, walking, sta-
tionary), etc. over different times of the day. We consider 91 users who have at
least 1 month of data. The total length of all users’ traces combined is 266,200
hours. The average, minimum, and maximum trace length of a user is 122 days,
30 days, and 269 days, respectively. For each user, we train a Markov chain on
10http://reality.media.mit.edu/dataset.php.
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the first half of her trace; the remaining half is used to for evaluation.
Most of our experiments use location contexts of all 91 users (as location
represents the most complete and fine-grained context in the dataset). The av-
erage, minimum, and maximum number of locations per user is 19, 7, and 40,
respectively. We also report an experiment with contexts based on users’ activ-
ities and transportation modes to demonstrate the generality of MASKIT. This
experiment is limited to 23 users for whom this information is available in the
dataset.
Systems. We compare MASKIT using the simulatable check, the probabilistic
check (with a granularity of d = 10) and the hybrid check with the naı¨ve ap-
proach, called MaskSensitive, which suppresses all sensitive states.
Privacy Configuration. Unless otherwise stated, we choose δ = 0.1. We experi-
ment with two different ways of choosing sensitive contexts. Unless otherwise
stated, we choose sensitive contexts uniformly at random for each user. Alter-
natively, we choose the home location of a user as the sensitive context.
Measures. We measure utility as the fraction of released states in the second
half of the trace. We measure the privacy breaches as the fraction of sensitive
states for which the posterior belief is more than δ larger than the prior belief.
Note, that MASKIT will always assure that there are no privacy breaches. For
MaskSensitive an adversary computes her posterior belief as follows: Consider
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Check initialize okayToRelease
PC PC Phone
Simulatable - 36 ms 128 ms
Probabilistic 15 min < 1 ms < 1 ms
Hybrid 18 min ≤ 36 ms ≤ 128 ms
Table 3.2: Average processing times.
a hidden Markov model defined by M with emission probabilities
b
(t)
i,k = Pr[Ot = k|Xt = ci]
=

1 if k = ⊥ and ci ∈ S or k = i and ci 6∈ S
0 o.w.
This hidden Markov model correctly describes the behavior of MaskSensitive.
An adversary who knows M and MaskSensitive computes her posterior belief
simply as Pr[Xt = s|~o] in this hidden Markov model. We can efficiently com-
pute this posterior belief using Eq. (3.3). We say that the privacy of the user’s
sensitive state s ∈ S at time t is breached by the output ~o of MaskSensitive if the
adversary’s posterior belief, Pr[Xt = s|~o], is more than δ larger than her prior
belief Pr[Xt = s]. We measure the privacy breaches as the number of sensi-
tive states in the user’s sequence that are breached divided by the length of the
user’s sequence.
Hardware. Most of our experiments are run on an Intel Xeon 2.33 GHz ma-
chine. To measure the overhead of MASKIT when run on a smart phone, we
also conduct experiments on a Samsung Focus SGH-i917 phone with the Win-
dows Phone 7.5 operating system.
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(a)MaskSensitive (b) Probabilistic (c) Simulatable (d) Hybrid
Non-sensitive
Sensitive
Figure 3.5: Comparison of various privacy checks
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Figure 3.6: Utility of two privacy checks for various users
3.7.2 Results
Efficiency. Before we explore the privacy-utility trade-off, we want to shed light
onto the efficiency of various checks. We measure the average time it takes
for MASKIT to initialize the various privacy checks and to filter the trace, see
Table 3.2. We note that on average the suppression decision takes at most 128
ms on the phone. If we exclude the slowest 5% of the users this average goes
down to 46 ms. This is a negligible overhead compared to the context extraction
time of a few to tens of seconds [8, 80].
The probabilistic and the hybrid check have an expensive initialization even
after implementing the speed-up discussed in Sec. 3.4 (without which the run-
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ning time would be exponential). This initialization can be offloaded to a remote
server. Overall, the performance of MASKIT is practical for smart phones.
Privacy Breaches. Figure 3.5 reports results from an experiment where we
choose 3 sensitive contexts for each user at random.11 We report the average
fraction of released and suppressed states by various checks. MaskSensitive
suppresses the sensitive states accounting for 24% of all states. However, this
does not prevent an adversary knowing the Markov chain and MaskSensitive
from inferring sensitive states: 54% of the suppressed sensitive states consti-
tute privacy breaches. For these sensitive states the adversary’s posterior belief
exceeds her prior belief by more than δ. This illustrates the value of having a
formal privacy guarantee: With MASKIT no such privacy breaches can happen.
We can see that our privacy checks suppress not just sensitive states but also
non-sensitive states. (Interestingly, they manage to release some sensitive states
without breaching privacy. Those are states with a high prior belief ≥ 1− δ.)
The question is: what is the price in terms of utility that we have to pay for a
formal privacy guarantee? As the graph shows, the probabilistic check and the
simulatable check sacrifice only 31% and 13% of the utility of MaskSensitive.
This appears to be a price well worth the privacy guarantee.
Hybrid.
From Figure 3.5(b) and (c), one might get the impression that the simulatable
check is superior to the probabilistic check. Despite having a higher average
utility across users, the simulatable check is not better for all users. Figure 3.6
shows the utility of both checks for each of the 91 users in our dataset. While for
11Recall that states specify time and context. Thus, there are a lot more than 3 sensitive states
in the trace.
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Figure 3.7: Privacy-utility tradeoff
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Figure 3.8: Utility for a varying number of sensitive contexts.
roughly 58% of the users the simulatable check is better, for 42% of the users the
probabilistic check is better. The goal of the hybrid check is to choose the better
check for each user. In our experiment, for 95% of the users the hybrid check
picks indeed the check suppressing fewer states in the trace. The hybrid check
makes mistakes only for users for which the fraction of suppressed states in the
trace differs significantly from the expected fraction of suppressions. Note that
by the law of larger numbers, for longer traces the fraction of suppressions will
be more concentrated around the expectation decreasing the number of mis-
takes of the hybrid. Overall, the hybrid check achieves an average utility of
75.8% (see Figure 3.5(d)) which is much higher than both the utility of the prob-
abilistic and the simulatable check and almost matches that of MaskSensitive
(76.4%).
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Figure 3.9: Activity contexts
In fact, our hybrid checks provides more utility than MaskSensitive when
we increase the number of sensitive states (not shown). Here, unlike MaskSen-
sitive our hybrid check releases some of the sensitive states without breaching
privacy and suppresses fewer states in total. MaskSensitive provides the high-
est utility relative to the hybrid check when there is only one sensitive context
per user; nevertheless, our hybrid check provides a utility of 84% in this case,
which is within 8% of MaskSensitive’s utility (91%). This shows that the price
for a provable privacy guarantee is minor.
Privacy-Utility Tradeoff. We now vary the target privacy by varying the value
of δ. We conduct two sets of experiments: in the first set, we choose one sen-
sitive context for a user at random; in the second set, we choose the sensitive
context for a user to be her home. When we increase privacy (by decreasing
δ), we expect utility to decrease. As we can see from Figure 3.7, for both sets
of experiments, the overall decrease in utility is small. This implies that we
can afford strong privacy guarantees (by choosing a smaller value of δ) without
sacrificing too much utility.
Varying the Number of Sensitive Contexts. In this experiment we study the
effect that an increase in the number of sensitive contexts has on the utility.
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We picked a subset of 25 users with a number of contexts between 15 and 20.
The effect of increased sensitivity will be more (less, resp.) drastic for users
with fewer (more, resp.) contexts. Figure 3.8 shows the effect on utility as the
user considers more contexts sensitive. While the utility decreases for all three
checks, the rates of decrease differ; the hybrid’s utility decreases slowest.
Beyond Location. The experiments so far used location as a context. To show
that MASKIT can operate with other types of context, we now consider user con-
texts that are combinations of the user’s activities (making a phone call, send-
ing sms, using an application in the phone) and her transportation mode (sit-
ting, walking, riding a bus or car).12 As in Figure 3.7(left), we choose a single
sensitive context for each user at random. Figure 3.9 shows the privacy-utility
tradeoff for the activity contexts—the results are very similar to the results for
location contexts.
3.8 Related Work
Great progress has been made in the area of location-based services (LBS) to
protect anonymity of users and privacy of their locations.
We compare previous work along the dimensions of privacy guarantees, ef-
ficiency, accuracy, and their applications.
Privacy issues with user location data has been studied in various applica-
tions. Gruteser and Liu [40] distinguish between applications mining a log ag-
gregated across users, sporadic queries, and tracking services. Our work aims
12The transportation mode is inferred from survey responses.
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to serve applications falling into the last category by providing a stream of user
contexts.
Prior work offers various guarantees. The most prevalent guarantees focus
around the notion of anonymity and privacy. This thesis focuses on privacy. The
guarantees further differ in their assumptions about the power of adversaries.
Here, the adversary does not know the location of all users. In fact, it is the
goal to not leak information about a user being in a sensitive location to the ad-
versary. Privacy of sensitive locations is not achieved by the widely employed
naı¨ve approach [96], that masks sensitive locations or sensitive patterns [46].
One class of adversaries is aware of the algorithm and can reverse-engineer the
algorithm to infer information. Another class of adversaries is aware of some
temporal correlations which is considered by [17, 35, 40, 86]. However, the knowl-
edge of temporal correlation is either extremely limited [17, 35, 40, 86] or the
technique is limited to very specific queries and does not allow to release con-
text streams [36, 84].
Related Work in Micro-Data Publishing. The privacy concepts in LBS were
inspired by privacy concepts in micro-data publishing such as k-anonymity [91]
and `-diversity [75, 78]. Although the nature of the data is different, challenges
similar to those faced by MASKIT arise when adversaries know the system [98,
102] or correlations [101, 97, 63]. Most work assumes adversarial background
knowledge in the form of facts with a few exceptions that consider adversaries
who have a probabilistic model [72, 99] or infer one from the released data [62,
100] similar to the adversaries considered in MASKIT.
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3.9 Conclusions
We addressed the problem of privately releasing user context streams. Our sys-
tem, MASKIT, employs a privacy check that decides whether to release or sup-
press the current user context. We presented two privacy checks that both prov-
ably provide privacy against powerful adversaries knowing the system and
temporal correlations in the stream. They differ, though, in their utility for a
user. Our hybrid determines the one with the higher utility. To also protect
against weaker adversaries, who can learn and become stronger, we adapted
our privacy checks. Our experimental evaluation on real context traces demon-
strates that we do not have to sacrifice much utility in order to guarantee pri-
vacy.
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CHAPTER 4
PRIVACY-AWARE TARGETING OF ADVERTISING
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we develop a privacy-preserving targeted advertising frame-
work.
4.1.1 Motivation
By targeting advertisements, an advertiser can use users’ contexts and activities,
along with their browsing and click history, to show ads preferentially to the
users who are more likely to be influenced by the ads. For example, if a user
who likes Italian food (inferred from her past browsing history) is found to be
walking (inferred from the accelerometer sensor data) alone (inferred from the
audio data) around lunch time, she can be shown ads of popular (inferred from
other users’ past locations) Italian restaurants within walking distance of her
current location (inferred from the GPS). Such highly targeted advertising can
significantly increase the success of an ad campaign in terms of the number of
resulting views, clicks or purchases on an advertised web page. This approach
of context-aware personalization is not limited to advertising; it can also be used
for personalizing local searches of close-by businesses.
However, such personalization raises serious privacy concerns. Personal-
ized services rely on private and possibly sensitive information about a user’s
preferences and current and past activities. Such information might allow for
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identification of the user and her activities, and hence the user may not be will-
ing to share information useful for personalization. In the previous example,
the user may not be willing to reveal the fact that she is out of the office during
business hours. Moreover, clicks on ads personalized based on private data can
also leak information about the user [41, 64].
A personalized ad delivery system has three main components involving
private user data: statistics gathering to learn personalization rules by interpret-
ing users’ contexts and clicks as implicit relevance feedback, ad delivery to select
the best ad for a user based on her current context, and billing advertisers to col-
lect money for impressions or clicks. Each component leads to privacy concerns
that must be addressed to ensure end-to-end privacy. In this chapter, we focus
on the second component. The first component is discussed in Chapter 5. We
refer the reader to [95] for a private billing component.
4.1.2 Contributions
We first formalize the task of delivering personalized ads from a server to a
client as an optimization problem with three important variables: (1) privacy,
i.e. how much an adversary can learn about a user being in a sensitive con-
text (Definition 6), (2) communication efficiency, i.e., how few ads are sent to
the client, and (3) utility, i.e., how useful the displayed ads are to the user in
terms of revenue and relevance. We show in Section 4.2 that it is impossible
to maximize all three design goals simultaneously. We present a framework in
Section 4.3 that allows to tradeoff the variables. In particular, it allows to spec-
ify constraints on privacy and communication efficiency and seeks to maximize
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utility. This optimization problem is NP-hard. However, we present an efficient
greedy algorithm for hybrid personalization with tight approximation guaran-
tees.
We have evaluated our framework with a large trace of location-aware
searches in Microsoft Bing for mobile (Section 4.4). Our experimental results
illustrate trade-offs between privacy, communication efficiency and utility and
show that even though these are conflicting goals, reasonable levels of all these
three goals can be achieved simultaneously.
Note that our results can be applied to personalize not just online advertising
but also other online services based on users’ fine-grained contextual informa-
tion including local search. For concreteness, we consider advertising through-
out the chapter.
4.2 The Framework
Our framework has three classes of participants: The users who are served ads
(also referred to as clients) in their mobile contexts, the advertisers who pay for
clicks on their ads, and the ad service provider (also referred to as the server) who
decides which ads to display and who is paid for clicks by the advertisers.
IPrivacy Guarantees. Our two components of ad delivery and statistics gather-
ing use private data differently—ad delivery uses a user’s current context, while
statistics gathering uses historical context and click data from many users. For
statistics gathering, we provide a version of differential privacy [24] which is a
very strong privacy guarantee. However, it seems to be incompatible with per-
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sonalization that requires a single user’s current context. Therefore, in the spirit
of many existing personalization systems and the modus operandi in many mo-
bile applications [31, 52, 66, 105], we ensure user privacy with respect to a set of
sensitive contexts by limiting what an adversary can learn about a user being in
a sensitive context (following Definition 6).
The information disclosure about a user in context c can be limited by gen-
eralizing the user’s context obtaining cˆ and only sending cˆ to the server, e.g.
instead of revealing that the user is skating in Central Park, the user only dis-
closes to be exercising in Manhattan. The generalization of context is done over a
hierarchy described later. For a context c that can be generalized to cˆ we write
c→ cˆ.
To help a user define a set of sensitive contexts, we can use existing tools
from the UI community (e.g. [94]). Following Theorem 2, we can protect user
privacy against adversaries knowing the system by generalizing the context.
4.2.1 Desiderata for Ad Delivery
Our desiderata include goals of the individual participants as well as general
system requirements. Informally, we have the three orthogonal goals: Privacy,
efficiency, and revenue/relevance.
I Privacy: The system needs to ensure user privacy with respect to a set of
sensitive contexts by limiting what the server can learn about a user being in a
sensitive context (following Definition 6).
I Efficiency: The ad serving system should be efficient both in terms of commu-
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nication and computational cost—the user wants ads fast and without draining
much battery power on her mobile device, while the ad service provider wants
to run her system at low operating cost. For simplicity, we focus on communi-
cation cost between the server and a client since it is the most dominant cost of
serving ads to mobile devices. Our results can be extended to consider compu-
tational cost of the server and the client as well.
I Revenue and Relevance: The ad service provider seeks to maximize rev-
enue. The user is only interested in relevant ads. The goal of the ad service
provider is to display an ad from a given set of ads A that maximizes the ex-
pected revenue. For a click on ad a the ad service provider is being paid pa
from the advertiser. Clearly, not all users click on an ad. We denote by CTR(a|c)
the context-dependent click-through-rate, i.e., the fraction of users who actually
clicked on it in context c among those who were served the ad in context c. The
expected revenue of displaying an ad a to a user in context c is pa ·CTR(a|c). We
view clicks as an indicator for relevance: users who are interested in an ad click
on it. Maximizing relevance means maximizing the expected number of clicks
by displaying to a user in context c the ad a with the highest context-dependent
CTR(a|c), which is related to the goal of maximizing the expected revenue.
4.2.2 Trade-offs
Our three design parameters—privacy, efficiency, and relevance—are conflict-
ing. Without a trusted third party, optimizing all three design goals simultaneously
is impossible. Consider the task of showing only one ad to the user. Then, in case
of maximum privacy (i.e., the user does not send any information about her
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context) and highest communication efficiency (i.e., the server may only return
a single ad), the server needs to choose the ad without any knowledge of the
user’s context. Whatever the server does, yields suboptimal relevance and rev-
enue, as long as there is an ad whose CTR depends on the context. If we want
to improve the relevance, either the user needs to send some information to the
server, or the server needs to send more than one ad for the user to perform
personalization on the client.
If we drop any of our three design goals the problem becomes easy. If there
were no concerns about privacy, we could use a server-only scheme, where the
user sends her context c to the ad service provider, who serves the ad that max-
imizes the expected revenue, i.e., pa · CTR(a|c). This is a very efficient scheme
that maximizes revenue. If there were no efficiency concerns, we could use a
client-only scheme, where the server simply sends all ads A so that the user can
pick the ad that maximizes expected revenue. It has been estimated that due to
ad churn this requires sending 2GB of compressed ads per month [42]. Alterna-
tively, we could use expensive cryptographic protocols for private information
retrieval [32]. No user information is disclosed to the server and optimal rev-
enue is achieved, but performance is bad. Finally, if there were no financial
incentive and no interest in relevant ads, one could stop serving ads altogether
to avoid any concerns regarding efficiency and privacy. In practice, one has to
find reasonable trade-offs between the three design goals.
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ĉ  = “exercising” 
c  = “driving to my  
weekly Yoga class in SF” 
Figure 4.1: Example use of our framework.
4.2.3 Our Optimization Goal
In our framework, the user gets to decide what information about her context
to share with the server. Based on this information the server selects some k ads
A ⊂ A that are sent to the user. Here, the parameter k determines the commu-
nication cost. Computational cost can also be folded into k if needed. The user
then picks an ad a∗ ∈ A to display. The set of ads and the ad to display should
be chosen in a way that maximizes revenue. Figure 4.1 shows an example of an
execution of our framework.
Our flexible framework can be optimized for various objective functions
over privacy, efficiency, and revenue. For concreteness, we now assume that
there are constraints on both δ-privacy (with sensitive contexts determined by
users) and communication cost (determined based on current network load and
response times); we seek to maximize revenue under these constraints. We will
discuss alternative objective functions later in this section.
Client-Side Computation
For a given set of ads A chosen by the server, a client in context c maximizes the
revenue by selecting the ad
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a∗ = arg max
a∈A
pa · CTR(a|c).
Server-Side Computation
The server needs to determine the best k ads to send to the user given only the
partial information cˆ it has. There are many possible contexts c that generalize
to cˆ the user could be in. For a context c the expected revenue is maximized by
arg maxa∈A pa · CTR(a|c) which the server can compute assuming he knows the
context-dependent click-through-rates. Suppose further that the server knows
the frequency of each context. Then the server can reason about the probability
with which the user is in a context c for all descendant leaves c → cˆ. The ex-
pected revenue is then the sum of the expected revenue of the descendant leaves
c weighted by their probability Pr[c|cˆ]. Hence, with this limited information the
expected revenue of a set of ads A for a generalized context cˆ is
E[Revenue(A|cˆ)] =
∑
c:c→cˆ
Pr[c|cˆ] ·max
a∈A
pa · CTR(a|c).
It is the server’s task to select the set A∗ of k ads from A that maximizes the
expected revenue, given only the generalized context cˆ of the user, i.e.,
A∗ = arg max
A⊂A:|A|=k
E[Revenue(A|cˆ)]
Finding these k ads is NP hard as we will show in the next section. However,
we can employ approximation techniques to efficiently select a set of k ads with
revenue close to the optimal revenue.
Instantiations of the Framework
Our framework encompasses client-only personalization by setting cˆ to the most
generalized context that does not leak any information about the client’s true
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context. In this case the personalization takes place exclusively on the client
side. Our framework also encompasses server-only personalization by setting
k = 1 in which case the client simply displays the ad sent by the server with-
out further personalization. However, higher revenue can be achieved in our
framework when the server sends back k > 1 results.
Extensions
Alternative Objective Functions. So far, we treated both the privacy and the
communication cost k as hard constraints and tried to maximize revenue under
these constraints. Instead, one might consider the communication cost as a vari-
able and include it in an objective function that maximizes the value of (revenue
−αk).
Additional Constraints. While high revenue and high relevance of ads are re-
lated goals, they are not the same. Suppose the ad service provider receives a
request from a user in context c. Suppose further there are two ads a1, a2 with
CTR(a1|c) = 0.1,CTR(a2|c) = 0.9 and pa1 = $0.1, pa2 = $0.01. Ad a1 has higher
expected revenue but a2 is more relevant. While displaying a1 maximizes short-
term revenue it might not be the best long-term strategy. Recent work has found
that the time users spend viewing ads depends on the predictability of the qual-
ity of the ads [13]. Our framework can reconcile relevance and short-term and
long-term revenue goals by adding a constraint on CTRs of displayed ads as
proxies for relevance.
96
4.3 Optimization Algorithms
In this section we explain how client and server can efficiently compute their
parts of the optimization. We consider a specific instantiation of the optimiza-
tion problem where the user fixes her privacy requirement; the client and the
server then try to maximize revenue for a given bounded communication com-
plexity k. At the end of the section we discuss extensions and alternatives.
The client can quickly compute the equation in Sec. 4.2.3, since the number
of ads from which the client picks one is small (≤ k).
However, the server’s task—to select a set of k ads from A that maximize
the expected revenue given only the generalized context cˆ of the user—is much
more demanding. In fact, a reduction from the maximum coverage problem
shows:
Proposition 6. For a generalized context cˆ it is NP-hard to select the revenue-
maximizing set of k ads A∗ such that:
A∗ = arg max
A⊂A:|A|=k
∑
c:c→cˆ
Pr[c|cˆ] ·max
a∈A
pa · CTR(a|c)
Proof. We prove this by a reduction from the maximum coverage problem. In
the maximum coverage problem we are given a collection of sets S over some
finite universe U and our goal is to find a subset of these sets S of size at most k
that maximizes the number of covered elements in the universe
∣∣⋃
s∈S s
∣∣.
We set the set of contexts equal to the universe U . For each context c ∈ U
we set Pr[c] = 1/|U |, and Pr[c|cˆ] therefore to be uniform across the descendant
leaves. For each set s in the collection S we create an ad a so that for the elements
c in s we set CTR(a|c) = 1 and 0 for all other elements. We set pa = 1 for all ads.
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Greedy(ads A, generalized context cˆ, threshold k)
Init A = ∅
while |A| < k do
for a ∈ A do
ba ← E[Revenue(A ∪ {a}|cˆ)]− E[Revenue(A|cˆ)]
end for
A← A ∪ {argmaxaba}
end whilereturn A.
Algorithm 6: Greedy algorithm for selecting ads maximizing the expected
revenue.
Consider a generalized context cˆ that generalizes all contexts c. Then for a given
setA of k ads, the expected revenue is 1/|U |∗∑c maxa∈ACTR(a|c), which is equal
to the number of covered elements by the corresponding set of sets S divided by
the universe size. Thus an optimal solution to the ad selection problem yields
an optimal solution to the maximum coverage problem.
Moreover, the maximum coverage problem cannot be approximated within
e
e−1 − o(1) assuming P 6= NP [30].
4.3.1 Approximation Algorithm
Algorithm 6 shows a greedy algorithm, called Greedy, that constructs a set A
of k ads incrementally. It starts with A empty and in each round, the ad that
increases the expected revenue the most is added to A.
Interestingly, the output of this simple greedy algorithm approximates the
optimal value to within a factor of (1 − 1/e). The greedy algorithm is known
to provide such a guarantee for the maximum coverage problem [49], but our
problem is considerably more complex: In the coverage problem a set either
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fully covers an element or not. In our case an ad a can partially “cover” a context
c that can be generalized to cˆ. Thus a new analysis is required. We extend the
analysis of Hochbaum et al. [49]. We first define a benefit function of adding a set
A′ to a set A:
B(A,A′) = E[Revenue(A ∪ A′|cˆ)]− E[Revenue(A|cˆ)].
We analyze the benefit function
Fact 3. The benefit function is submodular, i.e., for all sets of ads A1 ⊆ A2 and for all
A, B(A1, A) ≥ B(A2, A).
Proof. Fix an exact context c. A1 ⊆ A2 implies that
E[Revenue(A1|c)] ≤ E[Revenue(A2|c)] (4.1)
Now consider an ad a′ that is added to both sets. If a′ is the arg maxa∈A2∪{a′} pa ·
CTR(a|c) then sdf,
E[Revenue(A2 ∪ {a′}|c)] = pa · CTR(a′|c) = E[Revenue(A1 ∪ {a′}|c)] (4.2)
Equations 4.1 and 4.2 imply B(A1, {a′}) ≥ B(A2, {a′}). On the other hand,
if a′ is not the arg maxa∈A2∪{a′} pa · CTR(a|c), then E[Revenue(A2 ∪ {a′}|c)] =
E[Revenue(A2|c)]. Therefore, the benefit B(A2, {a′}) is 0, which is a lower bound
of the function B and hence at most B(A1, {a′}). Thus the submodularity holds
for adding the singleton set {a′}. Submodularity for adding a larger set A fol-
lows by rewriting the benefit of adding A as the sum of adding each ad a ∈ A
one-by-one. Finally, submodularity follows for a generalized context c˜ since its
revenue is a sum of positively weighted revenues of exact contexts.
However, due to the complex nature of our problem, the submodularity
property alone does not imply our approximation guarantee.
99
Let a1, . . . , ak be the k ads chosen by Greedy in the order they were chosen. To
simplify the analysis, we define the benefit of the ith ad to be bi and the expected
revenue after adding the first l ads to be b(l) =
∑l
i=1 bi. Similarly, let a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
k
be the k optimal ads in any fixed order. We define the benefit of the ith ad to be
b∗i and the expected revenue after adding the first l ads to be b∗(l) =
∑l
i=1 b
∗
i .
Lemma 10. ∀l ∈ [k]: bl ≥ b∗(k)−b(l−1)k .
Proof. The benefit of adding a∗1, . . . , a∗k to a1, . . . , al−1 is at least b∗(k)− b(l − 1):
B({a1, . . . , al−1}, {a∗1, . . . , a∗k})
= E[Revenue({a1, . . . , al−1} ∪ {a∗1, . . . , a∗k}|cˆ)]− E[Revenue({a1, . . . , al−1}|cˆ)
≥ E[Revenue({a∗1, . . . , a∗k}|cˆ)]− E[Revenue({a1, . . . , al−1}|cˆ)
= b∗(k)− b(l − 1)
It is also equal to
∑k
i=0 B({a1, . . . , al−1} ∪ {a∗1, . . . , a∗i−1}, {a∗i }). Thus, it fol-
lows from an averaging argument that ∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k : B({a1, . . . , al−1} ∪
{a∗1, . . . , a∗i−1}, {a∗i }) ≥ b
∗(k)−b(l−1)
k
. By submodularity this implies that
∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k : B({a1, . . . , al−1}, {a∗i }) ≥
b∗(k)− b(l − 1)
k
.
Since the greedy algorithm in round l selected the ad al that maximizes
B({a1, . . . , al−1}, ·), the benefit of that ad, bl, has to be at least b∗(k)−b(l−1)k which
completes the proof.
We use this lemma to show:
Lemma 11. ∀l ∈ [k]: b(l) ≥ (1− (1− 1/k)l)b∗(k).
Proof. Proof by induction on l.
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l = 1. Lemma 10 tells us that b1 ≥ b∗(k)k = (1− (1− 1/k)1)b∗(k).
l→ l + 1.
b(l + 1) = b(l) + bl+1
≥ b(l) + b
∗(k)− b(l)
k
Due to Lemma 10
=
b∗(k)
k
+ b(l)(1− 1/k)
≥ b
∗(k)
k
+ (1− (1− 1/k)l)b∗(k)(1− 1/k) By induction hypothesis
=
b∗(k)
k
+ ((1− 1/k)− (1− 1/k)l+1)b∗(k)
= (1− (1− 1/k)l+1)b∗(k)
The main theorem on the approximation guarantee follows.
Theorem 7. The greedy algorithm approximates the optimal value to within a factor of
(1− 1/e).
Proof. By Lemma 11 we have that b(k) ≥ (1− (1− 1/k)k)b∗(k). As a function of
k, (1 − (1 − 1/k)k) is decreasing and approaches (1 − 1/e). Hence, it is always
greater than (1− 1/e).
4.3.2 Extensions
Alternate Objective Functions. As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, an objective
function may include communication cost as well. We then seek a number k
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and a set of k ads A that maximize E[Revenue(A)]− αk, i.e.,
max
k
max
A⊂A:|A|=k
∑
c:c→cˆ
Pr[c|cˆ] ·max
a∈A
pa · CTR(a|c)− αk (4.3)
One straightforward way to handle such an objective function is to run Greedy
for all values of k and pick the outcome that maximizes our new objective func-
tion. We refer to this algorithm as Greedy′. We only need to run it once for k = |A|
and keep track of the order in which the ads are chosen a1, . . . , a|A|. Due to the
greedy nature of the algorithm, we have that running the greedy algorithm for
smaller values of k yields a prefix of length k: a1, . . . , ak.
Proposition 7. Let k∗, A∗ denote the optimal solution of Equation (4.3). The algo-
rithm Greedy′ runs Greedy with k = |A| obtaining a1, . . . , a|A| and outputs k′ =
arg maxk′ E[Revenue({a1, . . . , ak′})] − αk′ and {a1, . . . , ak′}. Algorithm Greedy′ has
the following approximation guarantee:
(1− 1/e)Revenue(A∗)− αk∗ = Greedy′
Proof. By Theorem 7 we have that (1−1/e)Revenue(A∗) ≤ Revenue({a1, . . . , ak∗}).
Thus,
(1− 1/e)Revenue(A∗)− αk∗ ≤ Revenue({a1, . . . , ak∗})− αk∗
≤ max
k
Revenue({a1, . . . , ak})− αk
= Greedy′
completing the proof.
We can further reduce the number of iterations in the Greedy algorithm. All
we have to do is to replace the while condition in Algorithm 6 by a new one that
checks whether the current value of E[Revenue(A)] − α · |A| is increasing. This
speed-up exploits the submodularity of the benefit function.
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Theorem 8. Let k∗, A∗ denote the optimal solution of Equation (4.3). The algorithm
Greedy′′ runs Greedy for as long as E[Revenue(A)] − α · |A| is increasing and outputs
the last set of ads A. Algorithm Greedy′′ has the following approximation guarantee:
(1− 1/e)Revenue(A∗)− αk∗ = Greedy′′
The number of iterations of the while-loop of Greedy′′ is at most 1 +
arg maxk′ E[Revenue({a1, . . . , ak′})]− αk′.
Proof. Using Proposition 7 it suffices to show that Greedy′′ = Greedy′. We argue
that as we increase k, the expected revenue of {a1, . . . , ak} increases until at some
point it starts to decrease and never increases again. Suppose in round k′ the
expected revenue of A = {a1, . . . , ak′} minus α · k′ is not increasing any longer,
i.e.,
E[Revenue({a1, . . . , ak′})]− αk′ ≤ E[Revenue({a1, . . . , ak′−1})]− α(k′ − 1).
At this point the benefit of adding ak′ is at most α. Due to submodularity, the
benefit of any future ad being added to A can only be smaller and thus will
never lead to an increase of the objective function. This means that Greedy′′
finds indeed k′ = arg max1≤k′≤|A| E[Revenue({a1, . . . , ak′})]−αk′ and {a1, . . . , ak′}.
Hence, the output of Greedy′′ is the same as that of Greedy′.
Note, that the number of iterations of Greedy′ is |A| while that of Greedy′′ is
only at most one larger than the output k′.
Additional Constraints. We can incorporate a constraint on ad relevance by
setting the CTR to zero whenever it is below a certain threshold. Then, no ad
with CTR below this threshold will ever be displayed at the client.
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Restaurants Groceries 
Mexican Cafes Cheese Fruit & Veggies European 
French Italian … 
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Figure 4.2: Hierarchy over businesses.
Advertisers’ Control. Our algorithm can incorporate additional restrictions
posed by advertisers on the contexts in which their ads are being displayed.
Very much like advertisers for sponsored results in Web search can bid on key-
words in a query, our advertisers can bid on contexts of users. To make sure the
ad is only displayed on these contexts, we can make the payment pa context-
dependent and set it to 0 for all but the contexts the advertiser bids on.
4.4 Experiments
4.4.1 Experimental Setup
Dataset. Ideally, we would like to evaluate our algorithms with real usage logs
from a context-aware ad service. However, since no such real systems exist, we
emulate such a system by using a log of location-aware searches in Microsoft
Bing for mobile.1 The log has a schema: 〈user-ID, query, user-location, business-
ID〉. Each record in the log describes an event of a user issuing a query from a
location and then clicking on a business. The log consists of 1,519,307 records.
In our evaluation we focus on clicks to “Food & Dining” businesses, which con-
1http://m.bing.com
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stitute the largest category of businesses in the log. We also filter out any user
with fewer than three clicks in the log, as we cannot generate an interest profile
for such a user. This leaves us with 116,432 unique user-IDs. We use the first
90% of the log as training data and the remainder to evaluate our framework
and to compute targeted ads (i.e., businesses).
Context. We use the above log to emulate a context-aware ad service as follows.
We assume that each business with id i has an ad with the same id i, and hence
our goal is to deliver target business-IDs to the users. Ideally, we would like to
use contexts extracted from the sensor readings of smart phones for personal-
ization. However, this information is not present in our log and we therefore
limit our evaluation to contexts consisting of the following set of attributes.
I Location: The user’s location as latitude and longitude.
I User Interest: A multi-set of the business-IDs the user clicked on previously.
I Query: The search query the user sends.
Attribute Generalization. To limit information disclosure, we let users gener-
alize context attributes according to fixed hierarchies.
I Location: We use five levels of generalization for user location, depending on
how many decimal points we truncate from her latitude and longitude. More
specifically, Level-i location, for i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 of a user is her latitude and
longitude, after keeping all, 4, 3, 2, 1, and 0 decimal points respectively.
I Interest: We generalize user interest using a fixed hierarchy for the businesses,
as shown in Figure 4.2. In Level-0, Level-1, and Level-2, the interest set
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contains business categories, generalized business categories, and only the most
general business category (“Food and Dining”), respectively, of the user’s clicks.
I Query: Again, we use the business hierarchy to generalize the query at three
levels. Level-0 is the exact query issued by the user, Level-1 is the business
category of the clicked business, and Level-2 is the generalized category of
the business.
For all attributes, Level-i is more general, and hence more privacy-
preserving, than Level-j for i > j. As a short-hand, we use (x, y, z) to denote
(Level-x location, Level-y interest, Level-z query).
Context Hierarchy. We combine the attribute hierarchies into a context hier-
archy. We generalize one attribute at a time using the following sequence:
(0, 0, 0) → (0, 0, 1) → (0, 1, 1) → (1, 1, 1) → (1, 2, 1) → (2, 2, 1) → (3, 2, 1) →
(3, 2, 2)→ (4, 2, 2). As an example, consider the context at level (0, 0, 0)
〈(61.22913, -149.912044), [B-ID2011, B-ID124], “Starbucks”〉.
Generalizing each attribute one level yields, at level (1, 1, 1),
〈(61.2291, -149.9120), [Peruvian Restaurants, Wine], “Coffee”〉.
Click-Through-Rates. The optimization framework requires the distribution of
contexts, Pr[c], and the context-dependent click-through rates, CTR(a|c). Pr[c]
can be estimated as the number of times a user reported to be in context c di-
vided by the total number of reported contexts. For an ad a and a context c,
CTR(a|c) can be estimated as the number of times a user in context c reported to
have clicked on a divided by the number of times a user in context c reported to
have viewed a.
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Figure 4.3: Effect of generalization of queries
Note that the above statistics can be estimated well for contexts with a lot
of user data (e.g., clicks). However, we consider context attributes beyond lo-
cation (unlike location-based services) and one big challenge is that sufficient
click data may not be available for a large number of contexts. For such rare or
new contexts, the estimates can be noisy or may not exist. One option would
be to simply not show any ads to a user in a rare context. However, this would
seriously harm utility since there is typically a long tail of rare contexts. Instead,
we suggest estimating Pr[c] and CTR(a|c) for a rare context c based on contexts
similar to c for which we have enough click data. Here similarity is defined
through the context hierarchy. Coming back to our example from Section 4.2, if
we do not have enough click data for users who were skating in Central Park,
we might use clicks from users in close-by locations who were doing some sort
of physical activity (c˜) to estimate the statistics for the context c. This helps us
increase coverage of targeted ads, albeit at the possible cost of lower quality
ads. We can trade-off coverage and relevance by adding a constraint on CTR for
displayed ads as discussed in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.2.
We show how generalization helps personalization with sparse data. Fig-
ure 4.3 shows the frequency distributions in log-log scale of queries (Fig-
ure 4.3(a)), and their generalizations (Figures 4.3(b) and (c)), in our dataset. The
query distribution has a power-law shape in which a small fraction of unique
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queries account for a large fraction of the query log. We can see that roughly
100,000 queries appear only once each in our data. For these queries it is im-
possible to personalize the search results because we have not seen the same
query before. However, if we generalize queries to the categories of the busi-
nesses they are referring to we can reduce this number by an order of magni-
tude. Similarly, we can deal with the sparsity of the other context attributes by
generalizing them. This is how we increase coverage.
Metrics. We use the following two metrics for our prediction.
I Precision: The fraction of targeted ads in our framework on which users
actually click. Precision is an indicator of relevance.
I Coverage: The fraction of contexts for which our framework computes and
displays a targeted business.
The higher the precision and coverage values, the better the performance of
our framework. We report average precision and coverage for 1,000 random
contexts from the testing data; the averages become fairly stable after 1,000 pre-
dictions.
Parameters. Unless otherwise stated, we use the following default configura-
tion. For limited information disclosure, we use (4, 2, 2) generalization. We set
the upper bound on communication complexity, k, to be 10, the threshold on
click-through rate to be 0.3, and the threshold on support to be 2.
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4.4.2 Evaluating Trade-offs
Effect of CTR Threshold. The CTR threshold trades off precision and coverage.
Figure 4.4 shows this trade-off. For a high value of the CTR threshold, an ad
will be shown only if it is highly relevant. Thus, this increases the precision of
our algorithm and improves the relevance of the displayed ads. On the other
hand, a high threshold reduces the number of ads displayed and with that the
number of clicks and the revenue. Interestingly, as we can see, high levels of both
precision (0.48) and coverage (0.47) can be achieved simultaneously.2
Effect of Communication Complexity. Figure 4.5 shows the effect of increasing
the communication complexity k (i.e. having the server return more ads to the
client) on precision and coverage. We expect both to improve with increasing k
since the client can choose an ad from a larger set. The graph shows further that
increasing k has diminishing returns. In the beginning the precision and coverage
increase quickly with every additional ad being sent, however, as more ads are
sent, the increase in precision and coverage becomes smaller.
2Precisions and coverages close to 0.5 are considered high in predicting user clicks. Our
numbers are higher than the ones reported for other personalization techniques [107].
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Effect of Information Disclosure. Figure 4.6 shows the precision and coverage
(for various CTR thresholds) of our framework with various levels of gener-
alization. As expected, precision and coverage of our framework increases as
more specific context information is sent to the server. Interestingly, limited pri-
vacy does not hurt utility in a significant way; as shown in the graph, precision and
coverage values are very close for limited privacy (shown as (1, 1, 1)) and no
privacy (shown as (0, 0, 0)).
Trading-off Constraints. To see how communication overhead affects the per-
formance of our framework, we increase k from 10 to 50 in Figures 4.6(a) and
(b). The graphs show that privacy can be improved without hurting utility by a small
increase in the communication cost. For example, when k = 10, a privacy level of
(4, 2, 2) does not achieve a precision of at least 0.85 and a coverage of at least 0.3.
But it does, when increasing k to 50. Overall, we conclude that reasonable lev-
els of limited information disclosure, efficiency, and relevance can be achieved
simultaneously.
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4.4.3 Comparison with Other Strategies
Server-only Personalization. Here, the server performs personalization based
on the limited private information it has and sends only one ad to the client.
As shown in Figure 4.5, this strategy gives a precision of 0.12. We can do much
better with our optimization: When instead sending 5 ads and letting the client
pick the most relevant one, the precision rises by 35%.
Client-only Personalization. Here, the client sends only the query to the server,
which then sends k ads matching the query to the client. The client chooses the
best ad based on the exact user context. Precision and coverage of this strategy
are also shown in Figure 4.6 with the label ”Client-side”. As shown, our opti-
mization can provide better utility than the client-only strategy. For example,
for a target precision of 0.75, the client-side strategy can achieve coverage of 0.2,
while our framework with (1, 1, 1) generalization can achieve a coverage of 0.4.
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4.5 Related Work
Personalization has been successfully implemented in a varieties of areas in-
cluding Web search and advertising. Recent work has raised privacy concerns
about personalization based on private information because a click on an ad or
Web page can leak some private information about the user [41, 64]. Therefore,
privacy-preserving personalization has recently received a lot of attention not
just in the academic community but also in the media.3
Location-Based Services. Most privacy-preserving location-based services
(e.g., [81]) follow a hybrid approach in which, given a generalized context, the
server returns a superset of the results [52], which can lead to high communi-
cation cost. Notable exceptions approximate the results and allow to trade off
efficiency and accuracy [21, 59, 108]. We follow the same goals of LBS: privacy,
utility and efficiency. While LBS focus on nearest neighbor queries measuring
utility as proximity, our work focuses on target advertisements measuring util-
ity as revenue or ad relevance. Previous techniques cannot be applied to this
problem.
Targeted Advertising. Before we discuss previous work on privacy-aware tar-
geted advertising, let us briefly review how existing search engines personalize
ads to be displayed alongside a search result. Advertisers bid money on key-
words. For an incoming query, the subset of ads bidding on keywords in the
query is determined. From this subset the ads with the highest bids multiplied
by their quality score are chosen. The most important factor of the quality score
is the click-through-rate. The context considered encompasses the exact query
3http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/technology/23facebook.html
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and also geographic information available from the user submitting the query.
Other factors of the quality score are the quality of the landing page and that
page’s loading time.4 Our work builds on this approach by incorporating pri-
vate data from sensors on mobile phones into the context and adding privacy
guarantees to the overall scheme.
Closest to our privacy-aware ad serving framework are the works of [31, 42,
55]. Repriv [31] verifies that applications only access the limited information
about a user that was granted and proposes techniques for client only personal-
ization. Privad [42] and the work by Juels [55] anonymize user profiles. Neither
work explains how ads should be chosen based on limited user information by
the ad server and based on more private information on the client. Thus, there
is a potential benefit of integrating our framework into these systems to trade
off privacy, efficiency and utility.
Personalized Search. A user’s interest profile is established based on her brows-
ing history and search results are being re-ranked based on how well the con-
tent of the page matches her interest. The re-ranking can either be done by the
user [92] or the search engine [66, 105]. If the re-ranking is done by the search
engine, then users can decide how much information they are willing to share
about their profile (by using techniques in [66, 105]). Our approach to person-
alization is very different than these existing approaches: we personalize at the
granularity of contexts, instead of individual users (i.e., the same user will see
different results/ads under different contexts) and we personalize jointly at the
server and the client.
4See for instance http://adwords.blogspot.com/2008/08/
quality-score-improvements.html
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CHAPTER 5
A DISTRIBUTED PROTOCOL FOR GATHERING
PRIVACY-PRESERVING AGGREGATE STATISTICS OF MOBILE USERS
In this chapter we present an efficient distributed count protocol, that preserves
privacy.
This protocol can be used to learn how to target ads. Personalized ads
are chosen based on historical information about which ads users in a context
clicked on, i.e., context-dependent click-through rates or CTRs of ads. However,
estimating CTRs constitutes a big privacy challenge: users are often unwilling
to reveal their exact context and clicks. We need to address this challenge in
order to ensure end-to-end privacy of the overall ad service.
One might use a privacy-preserving aggregation protocol [23, 89, 93] to com-
pute such statistics. These protocols do not rely on a trusted server and preserve
privacy even if some of the users are malicious. However, a unique aspect of
dealing with a large population of mobile users is that a small fraction of users
can become unavailable during the course of computing CTRs. For example, a
user may turn off her mobile device any time or may want to answer an aggre-
gation query only at a convenient time when her phone is being charged and
connected through a local WiFi network. Another user might decline to partici-
pate in the exchange of certain messages in the protocol. Yet another user might
leave or join the community of mobile users. Existing protocols [23, 89, 93] do
not efficiently handle such dynamics (more details in Section 5.4), making them
unsuitable for estimating CTRs from mobile users. Then, how can we, in an effi-
cient and privacy-preserving way, gather statistics over a dynamic population?
114
We answer this with a novel aggregation protocol to compute CTRs without
a trusted server that can handle dynamics. To the best of our knowledge, our
protocol is the first differentially-private protocol that computes accurate aggre-
gations efficiently even when a fraction of participants become unavailable or
behave maliciously.
5.1 Desiderata
We have the following goals in computing statistics.
I Privacy in the Absence of a Trusted Server. We do not assume the avail-
ability of a trusted server to collect all user data to compute statistics. Without
a trusted server, we need a distributed aggregation protocol that protects user
privacy, even under adversarial scenarios such as when a fraction of the partic-
ipants behave maliciously, send bogus messages, or collude with each other. In
particular, we seek (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy of the distributed pro-
tocol (Definition 5). This requirement sets our work apart from previous work
on publishing privacy-preserving count statistics of a search log that all assume
a trusted third party (see [12] and the references therein).
I Scalability. We need to scale the computation to a large number of users and
contexts.
I Robustness to a Dynamic User Population. With a large number of transient
mobile phone users, not all of them are available and willing to engage in all
rounds of our protocol. Users decide which queries they are willing to answer
and when (e.g., when the phone is being charged and connected through a WiFi
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network). Therefore, our protocol should be able to deal with a dynamic user
population without sacrificing privacy or scalability.
5.2 Preliminaries and Assumptions
The main mechanism we employ to build a scalable and robust protocol is to use
two servers: one responsible for key distribution and the other responsible for
aggregation. For concreteness, the key distribution could be done by verisign
and the aggregation by the advertising network. The idea of using two servers
to build secure protocols has been used previously [2, 32, 42] in different appli-
cations; we use it here for privacy-preserving aggregation. We assume secure,
reliable, and authenticated communication channels between servers and users.
In addition, we make the following two key assumptions, similar to those made
in previous works [89, 93].
1. Honest-but-Curious Servers. The two servers honestly follow the protocol. They
are curious but do not collude with anyone.
2. Honest Fraction of Users. At most a t fraction of users are malicious or unavailable
during the protocol. This means, at least a fraction of 1 − t users are available and
honestly follow the protocol. The honest users can be curious but they do not collude
with anyone.
The distributed sum protocol relies on a homomorphic encryption scheme.
We here work with an ideal model of the encryption scheme. In the following
analysis we assume perfect security, i.e. that the ciphertext leaks no information
at all about the message it encrypts. Technically, though, our privacy guarantee
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now depends on the computational limits of the adversary and the assumptions
used to prove the encryption scheme secure.
Definition 9. Let (E,D) be a homomorphic encryption scheme. This scheme is cor-
rect, i.e., for all plain texts p, p′ : D(E(p)) = p. It is secret, i.e., Pr[E(p) = m] =
Pr[E(p′) = m]. Lastly, it is homomorphic, i.e., E(p) + E(p′) = E(p+ p′).
5.3 Previous Work
Previous work on distributed counting protocols [23, 89, 93] provides strong
privacy guarantees. However, they are inefficient when the user population
changes quickly. This is problematic in our setting with a large number of tran-
sient mobile users.
Early work by Dwork et al. [23] exchanges a large number of messages that
is quadratic in the number of users. This is prohibitively expensive in our set-
ting. Follow-up work by Rastogi et al. [89] and Shi et al. [93] reduces the number
of messages to be linear in the number of users. Briefly, both the protocols start
with a setup phase in which an honest server generates secrets and distributes
them to users such that the secrets of all users add up to a constant (e.g., 0 as
in [93]). After this setup phase, a series of count queries can be computed in a
privacy-preserving manner assuming that all available users in the setup phase
participate in the aggregation phase. However, when a single user becomes un-
available, no further queries can be answered until a new setup is performed or
the user returns. Thus, for a query to be successfully answered, the setup phase
followed by the aggregation phase must be repeated until they both run on the
same stable set of users. In Section 5.6.2, we empirically show that even under
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Protocol 1 Robust, distributed count computing a privacy-
preserving version of the sum over all private user bits bi
Count(σ2, t)
1. Each user i samples ri from N (σ2/((1− t)N − 1)).
2. Each user i sends mi = E(bi + ri) to Server 2.
3. Server 2 sums up all incoming messagesmi. It forwards S =
∑
mi
to Server 1.
4. Server 1 decrypts s and releases the result D(s).
modest assumptions on user dynamics, these protocols require impractically
high numbers of setup phases for each query.
5.4 A Robust, Privacy-Preserving, Distributed Aggregation
Protocol
Protocol 1 describes our protocol Count(t, σ2). Each user ui for i = 1, . . . , N holds
a bit bi. The protocol computes a noisy version of the sum
∑
bi.1 The parameter
t is an upper bound on the fraction of malicious or unavailable users, and σ2
is the amount of noise. If the upper bound t is violated and more users turn
out to be malicious or unavailable, the privacy guarantee degrades and/or the
protocol needs to be aborted before Step 4 and restarted (with a larger value
for t). As t increases, the share of noise each participant adds to her or her bit
increases.
1In practice, we would use a discretized version of Gaussian noise and do all computations
modulo some large number q as done in [93]. In Steps 1, user i would pick her noise ri from
0, . . . , q − 1.
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5.4.1 Correctness
Let us consider the case where all participants behave as specified. Then Server
2 releases
D(s) = D(
∑
i
E(bi + ri))
= D(E(
∑
i
bi + ri)) By homomorphism Def. 9
=
∑
i
bi + ri By correctness Def. 9,
which is the sum of the users’ private values plus some noise added to protect
their privacy.
5.4.2 Efficiency
Count matches the communication complexity of the most efficient previous so-
lutions [89, 93].
Lemma 12. The number of messages exchanged in Count is linear in the number of
users.
Proof. Each user sends two messages. Server 2 sends one message. Overall, the
number of messages exchanged is 2N + 1.
Note that messages across Count computations can be batched.
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5.4.3 Robustness
Unlike previous protocols [89, 93], Count successfully terminates as long as at
least (1− t)N users send messages to Server 2. When Count is executed multiple
times, it suffices that for each execution, at least (1− t)N possibly different users
participate. Thus, our protocol can deal with unavailable users much more ef-
ficiently than previous protocols. Unlike these previous protocols, our protocol
does not expect the secrets of participating users to add up to a predefined con-
stant.
5.4.4 Privacy
Following Definition 5, we show that the output of the protocol preserves pri-
vacy.
Theorem 9. Consider  ≤ 1 and σ2 ≥ 2 ln(4/δ)/2. Protocol Count(σ2, t) guarantees
(, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy of the users in the presence of up to a fraction of
t unavailable or malicious users.
Proof. There are many participants involved in the protocol: Server 1, Server 2,
and users U . We now consider privacy with respect to the various participants
in the protocol according to Definition 5. In their analysis we will make use of
the following building blocks C,A to construct M ′, R as in the definition.
The users U can be divided into honest users Uh and malicious users Um.
We denote by U ′h the subset of honest users that are available. By our assump-
tion about the honest fraction there are at least (1 − t)N honest and available
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users users, i.e. |U ′h| ≥ (1 − t)N . This assures the following claim: Consider an
algorithm C that adds |U ′h| times noise N (σ2/((1− t)N − 1)) to
∑
l∈U ′h bl.
Claim 8. Algorithm C with σ ≥√2 ln(4/δ)/ preserves (, δ)-privacy.
We note that since Gaussian distributions are closed under linear transfor-
mations (Fact 1) we have that adding |U ′h| times noise N (σ2/((1 − t)N − 1)) is
equivalent to adding noise N (|U ′h|σ2/((1 − t)N − 1)). By our honest fraction
assumption, |U ′h| ≥ (1− t)N − 1 and thus this adds noise with variance greater
than σ2. We note that the L2-sensitivity is 1. By Theorem 1 it follows that C with
σ ≥√2 ln(4/δ)/ preserves (, δ)-privacy.
Let A denote the algorithm with which malicious users compute their mes-
sages mUm . There might be multiple adversaries controlling different sets of
users. Algorithm A combines these.
• non-participant or honest and unavailable user: Consider an honest and
unavailable user or a non-participant who is not colluding with any par-
ticipant. For non-participants colluding with participants we refer to the
analysis of the respective participants. We denote by V the complete view
which is simply the output. We use algorithm C as algorithm M ′ in the
privacy Definition 5.
We use the algorithm R(v, LUm) that outputs v +
∑
mi∈A(LUm ) D(mi).
Claim 9. V and R(C(LU ′h), LUm) are identically distributed.
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We have that
V ∼ D
∑
i∈U ′h
E(bi +N (σ2/((1− t)N − 1))) +
∑
mi∈A(LUm )
mi

∼
∑
i∈U ′h
(
bi +N (σ2/((1− t)N − 1))
)
+
∑
mi∈A(LUm )
D(mi) By Def. 9
∼ C(LU ′h) +
∑
mi∈A(LUm )
D(mi)
∼ R(C(LU ′h), LUm)
Thus privacy is preserved according to Definition 5 with respect to non-
participants and unavailable users.
• honest and available user u: User u has as input her own bit bu. We denote
by V the complete view including the user’s messages mu and the output.
Consider an algorithm C′ that adds |U ′h−1| times noiseN (σ2/((1−t)N−1))
to
∑
l∈U ′h,l 6=u bl.
Claim 10. Algorithm C′ with σ ≥√2 ln(4/δ)/ preserves (, δ)-privacy.
We note that since Gaussian distributions are closed under linear transfor-
mations (Fact 1) we have that adding |U ′h−1| times noiseN (σ2/((1−t)N−
1)) is equivalent to adding noiseN (|Uh′−1|σ2/((1− t)N−1)). By our hon-
est fraction assumption, |Uh′ − 1| ≥ (1 − t)N − 1 and thus this adds noise
with variance at least σ2. We note that the L2-sensitivity is 1. By Theorem 1
it follows that C′ with σ ≥√2 ln(4/δ)/ preserves (, δ)-privacy.
We use the algorithmR(v, LUm∪{u}) that samplesXu ∼ N (σ2/((1−t)N−1))
and outputs v +
∑
mi∈A(LUm ) D(mi) + bu +Xu and mu = E(bu +Xu).
Claim 11. V and R(C′(LU ′h\{u}), LUm∪{u}) are identically distributed.
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LetXi be a random variable distributed according toN (σ2/((1− t)N−1)).
We have that
V ∼ D
 ∑
i∈U ′h\{u}
E(bi +Xi) + E(bu +Xu) +
∑
mi∈A(LUm )
mi
 , E(bu +Xu)
∼
∑
i∈U ′h\{u}
(bi +Xi) + E(bu +Xu) +
∑
mi∈A(LUm )
D(mi), E(bu +Xu) By Def. 9
∼ C′(LU ′h\{u}) + bu +Xu +
∑
mi∈A(LUm )
D(mi), E(bu +Xu)
∼ R(C′(LU ′h\{u}), LUm∪{u})
Thus, privacy is preserved according to Definition 5 with respect to honest
and available users.
• Malicious user j ∈ Um: Let A denote the adversary controlling user j. This
adversary might also control other malicious users U ′m ⊂ Um. Let V denote
the messages received and sent from users in U ′m during the execution of
Count on input L.
Again, we use algorithm C as algorithm M ′ in the privacy Definition 5.
We denote by A′ the algorithm used by adversary A controlling U ′m. Let
A′′ denote the algorithm with which malicious users not in U ′m com-
pute their messages mUm\U ′m . We use the algorithm R(v, LUm) = v +∑
mi∈A′(LU′m )
D(mi) +
∑
mi∈A′′(LUm\U′m )
D(mi),A
′(LU ′m).
Claim 12. V and R(C(LUh), LUm) are identically distributed.
LetXi be a random variable distributed according toN (σ2/((1− t)N−1)).
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We have that
V ∼ D
∑
i∈U ′h
E(bi +Xi) +
∑
mi∈A′(LU′m )
mi +
∑
mi∈A′′(LUm\U′m )
mi
 ,A′(LU ′m)
∼
∑
i∈U ′h
bi +Xi +
∑
mi∈A′(LU′m )
D(mi) +
∑
mi∈A′′(LUm\U′m )
D(mi),A
′(LU ′m) By Def. 9
∼ C(LU ′h) +
∑
mi∈A′(LUm )
D(mi) +
∑
mi∈A′′(LUm\U′m )
D(mi)),A
′(LU ′m)
∼ R(C(LU ′h), LUm)
Thus, privacy is preserved according to Definition 5 with respect to mali-
cious users.
• Server 1: Server 1 sees the sum of all messages mi and sends out the de-
crypted sum. We denote by V the view of Server 1 during the execution
of Count on input L which is
∑
jmj of the available users and the decryp-
tion thereof. Again, we use algorithm C as algorithm M ′ in the privacy
Definition 5.
We use the algorithm R(v, LUm) that outputs E(v) +
∑
mi∈A(LUm ) mi, v +∑
mi∈A(LUm ) D(mi).
Claim 13. V and R(C(LU ′h), LUm) are identically distributed.
We start by analyzing the distribution of V which is X,D(X) for X ∼∑
i∈U ′h E(bi + N (σ
2/((1 − t)N − 1))) + ∑mi∈A(LUm ) mi. The distribution
of R(C(LU ′h), LUm) is Y,D(Y ) where Y ∼ E(C(LU ′h)) +
∑
mi∈A(LUm ) mi by
Definition 9 of the homomorphic encryption scheme. Thus, it suffices to
show that X, Y are identically distributed. This is the case by definition of
C. Hence, privacy is preserved according to Definition 5 with respect to
Server 1.
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• Server 2: Server 2 receives the messagesmi, sends out the sum of them and
sees the decrypted sum. We denote this view by CountV . Again, we use
algorithm C as algorithm M ′ in the privacy Definition 5.
Let pi denote arbitrary plaintexts. We use the algorithm R(v, LUm)
that outputs A(LUm), 〈E(pi)|i ∈ U ′h〉,
∑
i∈U ′h E(pi) +
∑
mi∈A(LUm ) mi, v +∑
mi∈A(LUm ) D(mi).
Claim 14. V and R(C(LU ′h), LUm) are identically distributed.
We start by analyzing the distribution of V .
We have that
V ∼A(LUm), 〈E(Xi + bi)|i ∈ U ′h〉,∑
mi∈A(LUm )
mi +
∑
i∈U ′h
E(Xi + bi),
D
 ∑
mi∈A(LUm )
mi +
∑
i∈U ′h
E(Xi + bi)

Now, let us consider the distribution of R(C(LU ′h), LUm). Let M
′
U ′h
be a set
of random variables where M ′i is distributed according to E(pi).
R(C(LU ′h), LUm) ∼ A(LUm), 〈E(pi)|i ∈ U ′h〉,∑
mi∈A(LUm )
mi +
∑
i∈U ′h
E(pi),
D
 ∑
mi∈A(LUm )
mi
+ C(LU ′h)
Since the encryption scheme is homomorphic and correct, we have that
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the third components are identically distributed for R and Count:
D
 ∑
mi∈A(LUm )
mi +
∑
i∈U ′h
E(Xi + bi)

∼D
 ∑
mi∈A(LUm )
mi
+ ∑
i∈U ′h
bi +N (σ2/((1− t)N − 1))
∼D
 ∑
mi∈A(LUm )
mi
+ C(LU ′h).
Hence, it suffices to show that the first two components given the third
component are identically distributed for R and Count. In particular, it
suffices to show that 〈E(pi)|i ∈ U ′h〉 given the third component is identi-
cally distributed to 〈E(Xi + bi)|i ∈ U ′h〉. This is the case due to our security
assumption of (E,D) that states that the distribution over ciphertexts is
identical for different plaintexts.
Hence, privacy is preserved according to Definition 5 with respect to
Server 2.
5.4.5 Additional Privacy Guarantee
Our protocol also provides an additional guarantee in case either Server 2 is
corrupted by an adversary (but not colluding with any user or the other server).
Theorem 10. If Server 2 (but not Server 1) is corrupted by an adversary, we guarantee
that the adversary will not be able to learn information that breaches privacy.
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The proof follows from the fact that Server 2 sends only the very last mes-
sage of the protocol upon which no further action is taken. Thus, even is she is
malicious, she can change her message sent but not influence other participants’
messages.
This guarantee is meaningful with regard to an adversary seeking to learn
private information. We do not guarantee that a malicious adversary cannot
breach privacy: an adversary corrupting Server 2 could release the secret key
used for the homomorphic encryption scheme, which would allow the honest-
but-curious Server 1 to decrypt messagesmi obtaining bi+ri. This would breach
user privacy.
5.4.6 Extension to Aggregation of Real Values
Count computes a noisy sum over private bits. It can also be used to sum up real
numbers. Moreover, it can be used to answer a sequence of sum queries with
bounded L2-sensitivity by setting σ according to Theorem 1.
Theorem 11. For users with real values b(1)i , . . . , b
(d)
i Protocol Count(σ2, t) can be used
repeatedly to compute
∑
b
(1)
i , . . . ,
∑
b
(d)
i with noise added to protect privacy. Let s de-
note the L2-sensitivity of
∑
b
(1)
i , . . . ,
∑
b
(d)
i . Consider  ≤ 1 and σ2 ≥ 2s2 ln(4/δ)/2.
The protocol guarantees (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy in the presence of up to
a fraction of t unavailable or malicious users.
Proof. There are many participants involved in the protocol: Server 1, Server 2,
and users U . We now consider privacy with respect to the various participants
in the protocol according to Definition 5. In their analysis we will make use of
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the following building blocks C,A to construct M ′, R as in the definition.
The users U can be divided into honest users Uh and malicious users Um. We
denote by L(k) the input values b(k)i of all users i. We consider the case where the
outputs are computed sequentially, although our privacy analysis extends to the
case when the sums are computed concurrently. We denote by U
′(k)
h the subset
of honest users that are available in round k to compute the noisy sum of b(k)i . By
our assumption about the honest fraction there are at least (1− t)N honest and
available users users, i.e. |U ′(k)h | ≥ (1 − t)N . This assures the following claim:
Let X(k)i denote a random variable distributed according to N (σ2/((1 − t)N −
1)). Consider an algorithm C that adds |U ′h| times noise N (σ2/((1 − t)N − 1))
to sum
∑
l∈U ′(k)h
b
(k)
l for 1 ≤ k ≤ d and outputs the results, i.e. output O(k)C =∑
i∈U ′(k)h
X
(k)
i + b
(k)
i .
Claim 15. Let s denote the L2-sensitivity of the sums. Algorithm C with σ ≥
s
√
2 ln(4/δ)/ preserves (, δ)-privacy.
We note that since Gaussian distributions are closed under linear transfor-
mations (Fact 1) we have that adding |U ′(k)h | times noise N (σ2/((1− t)N − 1)) is
equivalent to adding noise N (|U ′(k)h |σ2/((1 − t)N − 1)). By our honest fraction
assumption, |U ′(k)h | ≥ (1− t)N−1 and thus this adds noise with variance greater
than σ2. By Theorem 1 and the fact that the sums L2-sensitivity is bounded by
s, it follows that C with σ ≥ s√2 ln(4/δ)/ preserves (, δ)-privacy.
Let A denote the algorithm with which malicious users compute their mes-
sages mUm . Note that there might be multiple adversaries controlling differ-
ent sets of users. Algorithm A combines these. The adversaries can compute
messages based on the private inputs of the users they are controlling and the
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previously released outputs.
We now consider privacy with respect to the various participants.
• non-participant: Consider a non-participant who is not colluding with any
participant. For non-participants colluding with participants we refer to
the analysis of the respective participants. We denote by V the complete
view which are the d outputs. We use algorithm C as algorithm M ′ in the
privacy Definition 5.
We use the algorithm R(v(1)L(1)Um , . . . , v
(d)L
(d)
Um
) that in order to produce the
kth output O(k)R computes v
(k) +
∑
mi∈A(L(1)Um ,...,L
(d)
Um
,O
(1)
R ,...,O
(k−1)
R )
D(mi).
Claim 16. Count(L(1), . . . , L(d))V and R(C(L
(1)
U
′(1)
h
, . . . , L
(d)
U
′(d)
h
), L
(1)
Um
, . . . , L
(d)
Um
)
are identically distributed.
We have that for Count(L(1), . . . , L(d))V the kth output O
(k)
Count is distributed
as follows
O
(k)
Count ∼ D

∑
i∈U ′(d)h
E(b
(k)
i +X
(k)
i ) +
∑
mi∈A(L
(1)
Um
,...,L
(d)
Um
,
O(1),...,O(k−1))
mi

∼
∑
i∈U ′(k)h
(
b
(k)
i +X
(k)
i
)
+
∑
mi∈A(L
(1)
Um
,...,L
(d)
Um
,
O(1),...,O(k−1))
D(mi)) By Def. 9
Similarly, for R(C(L(1)
U
′(1)
h
, . . . , L
(d)
U
′(d)
h
), L
(1)
Um
, . . . , L
(d)
Um
) the kth output O(k)R is
distributed as follows
O
(k)
R ∼ O(k)C +
∑
mi∈A(L(1)Um ,...,L
(d)
Um
,O
(1)
R ,...,O
(k−1)
R )
D(mi)
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By definition of C we have that
O
(k)
C ∼
∑
i∈U ′(k)h
(
b
(k)
i +N (σ2/((1− t)N − 1))
)
.
From induction on k it follows that O(k)Count ∼ O(k)R .
Thus privacy is preserved according to Definition 5 with respect to non-
participants.
• honest user u: User u has as input her own values b(1)u , . . . , b(d)u . We denote
by V the complete view including the user’s messages m(k)u and the out-
puts O(k)Count. Let the bit a
(k)
u denote whether the user is available in round
k.
Consider an algorithm C that adds |U ′(k)h − a(k)u | times noise N (σ2/((1 −
t)N − 1)) to∑
l∈U ′(k)h ,l 6=u
b
(k)
l for 1 ≤ k ≤ d.
Claim 17. Algorithm C with σ ≥ s√2 ln(4/δ)/ preserves (, δ)-privacy.
We note that since Gaussian distributions are closed under linear transfor-
mations (Fact 1) we have that adding |U ′(k)h − a(k)u | times noise N (σ2/((1−
t)N − 1)) is equivalent to adding noise N (|U ′(k)h − a(k)u |σ2/((1 − t)N − 1)).
By our honest fraction assumption, |U ′(k)h − a(k)u | ≥ (1 − t)N − 1 and thus
this adds noise with variance at least σ2. We note that the L2-sensitivity
is bounded by s. By Theorem 1 it follows that C with σ ≥ s√2 ln(4/δ)/
preserves (, δ)-privacy.
We use algorithm C as algorithm M ′ in the privacy Definition 5.
We use the algorithm R(v(1)L(1)Um , . . . , v
(d)L
(d)
Um
) that, in order to produce the
kth output O(k)R , samples X
(k)
u ∼ N (σ2/((1− t)N − 1)) and computes
v(k) + a(k)u (X
(k)
u + b
(k)
u ) +
∑
mi∈A(L(1)Um ,...,L
(d)
Um
,O
(1)
R ,...,O
(k−1)
R )
D(mi)
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and the message
E(k)u =

E(b
(k)
u +X
(k)
u ) if a
(k)
u = 1
⊥ otherwise
For notational convenience we define x+⊥ = x and E(⊥) = D(⊥) = ⊥.
Claim 18. Count(L(1), . . . , L(d))V and R(C(L
(1)
U
′(1)
h
, . . . , L
(d)
U
′(d)
h
), L
(1)
Um
, . . . , L
(d)
Um
)
are identically distributed.
We have that for Count(L(1), . . . , L(d))V the kth output O
(k)
Count and the k
th
message by u, m(k)u , are distributed as follows
O
(k)
Count,m
(k)
u
∼ D

∑
i∈U ′(k)h \{u}
E(b
(k)
i +X
(k)
i ) + E
(k)
u +
∑
mi∈A(L
(1)
Um
,...,L
(d)
Um
,
O(1),...,O(k−1))
mi
 , E(k)u
∼
∑
i∈U ′(k)h \{u}
b
(k)
i +X
(k)
i + a
(k)
u (b
(k)
u +X
(k)
u ) +
∑
mi∈A(L
(1)
Um
,...,L
(d)
Um
,
O(1),...,O(k−1))
D(mi), E
(k)
u By Def. 9
Similarly, for R(C(L(1)
U
′(1)
h
, . . . , L
(d)
U
′(d)
h
), L
(1)
Um
, . . . , L
(d)
Um
) the kth output O(k)R and
the kth message by u, m(k)u , are distributed as follows
O
(k)
R ,m
(k)
u ∼ O(k)C + a(k)u (X(k)u + b(k)u ) +
∑
mi∈A(L(1)Um ,...,L
(d)
Um
,O
(1)
R ,...,O
(k−1)
R )
D(mi), E
(k)
u
By definition of C we have that
O
(k)
C ∼
∑
i∈U ′(k)h \{u}
(
b
(k)
i +N (σ2/((1− t)N − 1))
)
.
From induction on k it follows that O(k)Count ∼ O(k)R .
Thus, privacy is preserved according to Definition 5 with respect to honest
users.
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• Malicious user j ∈ Um: Let A denote the adversary controlling user j. This
adversary might also control other malicious users U ′m ⊂ Um of up to tN
users. We denote by V the view of these users with the outputs of the
protocol and the messages sent by them.
Again, we use algorithm C as algorithm M ′ in the privacy Definition 5.
We denote by A′ the algorithm used by the adversary controlling
U ′m. Let A′′ denote the algorithm with which malicious users not
in U ′m compute their messages mUm\U ′m . We use the algorithm
R(v(1)L
(1)
Um
, . . . , v(d)L
(d)
Um
) that in order to produce the kth outputO(k)R and the
messagesm(k)U ′m computes v
(k)+
∑
mi∈A′′(L(1)Um\U′m ,...,L
(d)
Um\U′m
,O
(1)
R ,...,O
(k−1)
R )
D(mi)+∑
mi∈A′(L(1)U′m ,...,L
(d)
U′m
,O
(1)
R ,...,O
(k−1)
R )
D(mi), A′(L
(1)
U ′m
, . . . , L
(d)
U ′m
, O
(1)
R , . . . , O
(k−1)
R ).
Claim 19. Count(L(1), . . . , L(d))V and R(C(L
(1)
U
′(1)
h
, . . . , L
(d)
U
′(d)
h
), L
(1)
Um
, . . . , L
(d)
Um
)
are identically distributed.
We have that for Count(L(1), . . . , L(d))V the kth output O
(k)
Count and the mes-
sages m(k)U ′m are distributed as follows
O
(k)
Count,mU ′m
∼D

∑
i∈U ′(k)h
E(b
(k)
i +X
(k)
i ) +
∑
mi∈A′′(L
(1)
Um\U′m
,...,
L
(d)
Um\U′m
,O(1),...,O(k−1))
mi +
∑
mi∈A′(L
(1)
U′m
,...,
L
(d)
U′m
,O(1),...,O(k−1))
mi
 ,
A′(L(1)U ′m , . . . , L
(d)
U ′m
, O(1), . . . , O(k−1))
∼
∑
i∈U ′(k)h
b
(k)
i +X
(k)
i +
∑
mi∈A′′(L
(1)
Um\U′m
,...,
L
(d)
Um\U′m
,O(1),...,O(k−1))
D(mi) +
∑
mi∈A′(L
(1)
U′m
,...,
L
(d)
U′m
,O(1),...,O(k−1))
D(mi))),
A′(L(1)U ′m , . . . , L
(d)
U ′m
, O(1), . . . , O(k−1)) By Def. 9
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Similarly, for R(C(L(1)
U
′(1)
h
, . . . , L
(d)
U
′(d)
h
), L
(1)
Um
, . . . , L
(d)
Um
) the kth output O(k)R and
the messages m(k)U ′m are distributed as follows
O
(k)
R ,mU ′m
∼ O(k)C +
∑
mi∈A′′(L
(1)
Um\U′m
,...,
L
(d)
Um\U′m
,O
(1)
R ,...,O
(k−1)
R )
D(mi) +
∑
mi∈A′(L
(1)
U′m
,...,
L
(d)
U′m
,O
(1)
R ,...,O
(k−1)
R )
D(mi),A
′(L(1)U ′m , . . . , L
(d)
U ′m
, O
(1)
R , . . . , O
(k−1)
R )
By definition of C we have that
O
(k)
C ∼
∑
i∈U ′(k)h
(
b
(k)
i +N (σ2/((1− t)N − 1))
)
.
From induction on k it follows that O(k)Count ∼ O(k)R .
Thus, privacy is preserved according to Definition 5 with respect to mali-
cious users.
• Server 1: Server 1 sees the sum of all messages m(k)i and sends out the
decrypted sum. We denote by V the complete view which is
∑
jm
(k)
j of
the available participants and the decryption thereof. Again, we use algo-
rithm C as algorithm M ′ in the privacy Definition 5.
We use the algorithm R(v(1)L(1)Um , . . . , v
(d)L
(d)
Um
) that in order to produce the
kth view computes
S
(k)
R = E(v
(k)) +
∑
mi∈A(L(1)Um ,...,L
(d)
Um
,O
(1)
R ,...,O
(k−1)
R )
mi,
O
(k)
R = v
(k) +
∑
mi∈A(L(1)Um ,...,L
(d)
Um
,O
(1)
R ,...,O
(k−1)
R )
D(mi)
Claim 20. Count(L(1), . . . , L(d))V and R(C(L
(1)
U
′(1)
h
, . . . , L
(d)
U
′(d)
h
), L
(1)
Um
, . . . , L
(d)
Um
)
are identically distributed.
133
We start by analyzing the distribution of Count(L)V in round k which is
Y (k), D(Y (k)) by Definition 9 for
Y (k) ∼
∑
i∈U ′(k)h
E(b
(k)
i +N (σ2/((1−t)N−1)))+
∑
mi∈A(L(1)Um ,...,L
(d)
Um
,D(Y (1)),...,D(Y (k−1))
mi.
The distribution of R(v(1)L(1)Um , . . . , v
(d)L
(d)
Um
) is Z(k), D(Z(k)) where
Z(k) ∼ E(O(k)C ) +
∑
mi∈A(L(1)Um ,...,L
(d)
Um
,D(Z(1)),...,D(Z(k−1)))
mi
by Definition 9. Thus, it suffices to show that Y (k), Z(k) are iden-
tically distributed. By definition of C we have that O(k)C ∼∑
i∈U ′(k)h
(
b
(k)
i +N (σ2/((1− t)N − 1))
)
. From induction on k the claim fol-
lows. Hence, privacy is preserved according to Definition 5 with respect
to Server 1.
• Server 2: Server 2 receives the messages, sends out the sum of them and
sees the decrypted sum. We denote this view by V . Again, we use algo-
rithm C as algorithm M ′.
Let p(k)i denote arbitrary plaintexts. We use algorithmR(v
(1)L
(1)
Um
, . . . , v(d)L
(d)
Um
)
to produce the kth messages M (k)R , sum over these messages S
(k)
R as well as
the output O(k)R as
M
(k)
R ∼ A(L(1)Um , . . . , L(d)Um , O(1)R , . . . , O(k−1)R ), 〈E(p(k)i )|i ∈ U
′(k)
h 〉
S
(k)
R ∼
∑
mi∈A(L(1)Um ,...,L
(d)
Um
,O
(1)
R ,...,O
(k−1)
R )
mi + E(v
(k))
O
(k)
R ∼ D
(
S
(k)
R
)
Claim 21. Count(L(1), . . . , L(d))V and R(C(L
(1)
U
′(1)
h
, . . . , L
(d)
U
′(d)
h
), L
(1)
Um
, . . . , L
(d)
Um
)
are identically distributed.
134
We start by analyzing the distribution of Count(L(1), . . . , L(d))V in the kth
round. We have that the view of the kth round is
M
(k)
Count ∼ A(L(1)Um , . . . , L(d)Um , O(1)Count, . . . , O(k−1)Count ), 〈E(b(k)i +X(k)i )|i ∈ U
′(k)
h 〉,
S
(k)
Count ∼
∑
mi∈A(L(1)Um ,...,L
(d)
Um
,O
(1)
Count,...,O
(k−1)
Count )
mi +
∑
i∈U ′(k)h
E(b
(k)
i +X
(k)
i ),
O
(k)
Count ∼ D
(
S
(k)
Count
)
Since the encryption scheme is homomorphic and correct, we can prove
by induction on k that the third components are identically distributed for
R and Count:
O
(k)
Count ∼
∑
mi∈A(L(1)Um ,...,L
(d)
Um
,O
(1)
Count,...,O
(k−1)
Count )
D (mi) +
∑
i∈U ′(k)h
b
(k)
i +X
(k)
i
∼
∑
mi∈A(L(1)Um ,...,L
(d)
Um
,O
(1)
R ,...,O
(k−1)
R )
D(mi) +O
(k)
C
∼ O(k)R .
Hence, it suffices to show that the first two components given the third
component are identically distributed for R and Count. For the second
component this is the case by Definition 9. For the first component, it
follows from our security assumption of (E,D) that states that the distri-
bution over ciphertexts is identical for different plaintexts.
The claim then follows by induction on k. Hence, privacy is preserved
according to Definition 5 with respect to Server 2.
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5.5 Employing Count to compute CTRs
The optimization framework for delivering targeted advertisements in Chap-
ter 4 uses various statistics; in this chapter we describe how to obtain those.
Specifically, we develop protocols for computing the probability distribution
over contexts, Pr[c], and the context-dependent click-through rates, CTR(a|c).
Pr[c] can be estimated as the number of times a user reported to be in context c
divided by the total number of reported contexts. For an ad a and a context c,
CTR(a|c) can be estimated as the number of times a user in context c reported to
have clicked on a divided by the number of times a user in context c reported to
have viewed a. These estimations are based on count queries; hence we focus
on privacy-preserving computation of count queries in the rest of the chapter.
Note that the above statistics can be estimated well for contexts with a lot of
user data (e.g., clicks). However, we consider context attributes beyond location
(unlike location-based services such as [5, 17, 18, 33, 35, 56, 81, 39, 104, 106]) and
one big challenge is that sufficient click data may not be available for a large
number of contexts. For such rare or new contexts, the estimates can be noisy
or not even be defined. One option would be to simply not show any ads to a
user in a rare context. However, this would seriously harm utility since there is
typically a long tail of rare contexts (as is the case in Web search, movie, music
and Web browsing [38]). Instead, we suggest estimating Pr[c] and CTR(a|c) for
a rare context c based on contexts similar to c for which we have enough click
data. Coming back to our example from Section 4.2, if we do not have enough
click data for users who were skating in Central Park (c), we might use clicks
from users in close-by locations who were doing some sort of physical activity
(c˜) to estimate the statistics for the context c. This helps us increase coverage
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Count ≥ 
min_support 
Count  <  
min_support 
Figure 5.1: Hierarchy H over contexts.
of targeted ads, albeit at the possible cost of lower quality ads. We can trade-
off coverage and relevance by adding a constraint on CTR for displayed ads as
discussed in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.2.
5.5.1 Possible Solutions
One possible way to employ Count to obtain privacy-preserving statistics for
various contexts is to compute noisy counts for all possible contexts and all pos-
sible ads. Another alternative approach, with better utility, would be to use
multi-dimensional histograms [103, 44]. However, all these approaches have a
running time at least linear in the number of possible contexts, rendering them
infeasible. Moreover, a large part of the computation is wasteful, since, as men-
tioned before, statistics computed for rare contexts are almost meaningless.
To address this problem, we opt for a simple top-down approach that can
efficiently deal with sparse data by identifying and pruning the computations
for rare contexts. The solution requires using a context hierarchy that specifies
similarity of contexts. Such a top-down algorithm has been used recently to find
frequent signatures by gradually expanding the prefix of signatures with high
noisy counts [79]. We adapt it to compute CTRs over a context hierarchy.
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5.5.2 Context Hierarchy
To define similarity over contexts, we reuse the hierarchies over which users
generalize their context attributes. The context hierarchy is built by merging
various attribute hierarchies; a concrete example can be found in Section 4.4.1.
This hierarchy tells us, for each generalized context, which attribute to general-
ize next.2 Given some rare context, we can generalize it until we have a suffi-
cient number of clicks for the generalized context. With these clicks we estimate
the CTRs. The parameter min support specifies how many clicks are sufficient
for robust estimates. Figure 5.1 shows a hierarchy H over contexts with leaf
nodes being exact contexts and intermediate nodes being generalized contexts.
It shows a cut-off through the hierarchy so that all (generalized) contexts above
the cut-off have at least min support many clicks in the training data for descen-
dant contexts. The contexts below the threshold need to be generalized before
estimating on their CTRs.3
5.5.3 A Top-Down Algorithm
To compute privacy-preserving CTRs for the generalized contexts in the hier-
archy H , algorithm TopDown starts at the root and moves down the hierar-
chy. For each traversed node v and for each ad a, it estimates CTR(a|v) by
calling Count to compute how often users in a descendant context of v have
clicked (or only viewed) a. The results of this computation is referred to as
2It is recommend but not required that users generalize the contexts they send to the server
to a node in the hierarchy.
3Note, that there are other ways to define similarity, for example using the lattice structure
imposed by the attributes’ hierarchies. Our experimental results show only a minor effect on
quality when using a fixed combined hierarchy as opposed to a lattice structure.
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clicksa,v (no clicksa,v, resp.). The estimated click-through-rate is then sim-
ply ĈTR(a|v) = clicksa
clicksa,v+no clicksa,v
. TopDown also computes the total number of
times a descendant of v appears in the ad log and adds noise to this count. If the
count is above min support then the algorithm recurses on v’s children, other-
wise all descendants are pruned. We note that the accuracy of Estimates can be
further improved by using the post-processing techniques of Hay et al. to make
sure the counts of all children add up to the parent’s count [45]. To bound the
sensitivity and to guarantee differential privacy, we limit the number of entries
per user in the ad log. Estimates deletes from the ad log all butm random entries
per user and then calls TopDown.
We now analyze the privacy and efficiency of our algorithm.
Proposition 8 (Efficiency). Let b denote the maximum number of ads bidding on the
same context. We denote by height(H) the height of the hierarchy and by branch(H) the
maximum number of children for a node in H . Consider a version of Estimates using
an exact counting procedure. The number of counts is bounded by (b + branch(H)) ·
height(H) ·N ·m/min support.
For the original version of Estimates the number of counts can be higher when a
node’s noisy count is at least min support while its true count is less than at least
min support. However, the probability of this is bounded by
e−(min support−c)
2((1−t)N−1)2/(2σ2)σ
((1− t)N − 1)(min support− c)√2pi .
Proof. Consider a version of Estimates using an exact counting procedure. In that
case there are at most N ·m/min support many nodes at each level with a count
of at least min support. Each of these nodes can issue counts for all ads bid-
ding on this node (at most b) and all children (at most branch(H)). Overall the
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Estimates(context-driven ad log, noise scale λ, threshold min support, contri-
bution bound m, hierarchy H)
for each user do
Delete all but m views or clicks on ads and their contexts of this user from
the ad log.
end for
return TopDown(ad log, root(H), λ, min support)
Algorithm 7: Privacy-preserving Estimates.
number of counts is bounded by (b+branch(H))·height(H)·N ·m/min support.
Now, with the noisy version a count of a node can falsely appear to be at
least min support when it really is c which is less than min support. However,
by Fact 1 this probability is equal to the probability that a standard Gaussian
variable with zero mean and 1 variance exceeds the value (min support−c)((1−
t)N − 1)/σ. This probability can be bounded using Fact 2 by
e−(min support−c)
2((1−t)N−1)2/(2σ2)σ
((1− t)N − 1)(min support− c)√2pi .
The proposition states that Estimates can be much more efficient than the
other possible solutions discussed in Section 5.5.1 whose running time is
linear in the number of contexts. The number of contexts can be up to
branch(H)height(H). If this number is much larger than the number of users then
Estimates can be more efficient.
To improve the efficiency when using Count in Estimates, we can batch all the
messages in one level in the hierarchy.
In Estimates we employ Count to obtain noisy estimates of clicksa,v,
no clicksa,v, and countv.
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TopDown(context-driven ad log, node v in the hierarchy, noise scale λ, thresh-
old min support)
countv = Count (# of appearances of node v appears)
release countv
if countv > min support then
A′ = set of ads with bids on context of v
for a ∈ A′ do
clicksa,v = Count (# of clicks on a in v in ad log)
no clicksa,v = Count (# of views of a w/o clicks in v)
release ĈTR(a|v) = clicksa,v
clicksa,v+no clicksa,v
end for
for each child w of v do return TopDown(ad log, w , λ, min support)
end for
end if
Algorithm 8: Top-Down computation of noisy statistics.
Corollary 2 (Privacy). Consider any  ≤ 1. Let σ2 be at least
6height(H)m2 log(4/δ)/2. When Estimates employs Count(t, σ2) as a subroutine
for counting clicksa,v, no clicksa,v, countv, it guarantees (, δ)-probabilistic dif-
ferential privacy. A fraction of t unavailable or malicious users during each call of
Count(t, σ2) can be tolerated.
Proof. Consider two neighboring click logs L,L′ where L′ is obtained from L by
adding or deleting the data of a single user. Consider the hierarchyH consisting
of height(H) levels where level i contains 2i many nodes. We denote by cl,j (c′l,j ,
respectively) the count of the jth node at level l in L (L′, respectively). We denote
by cl,j,a,1 (c′l,j,a,1) the count of the clicks on a in the j
th node at level l and by cl,j,a,0
(c′l,j,a,0) the count of the views of a in the j
th node at level l that did not result in
clicks in L (L′, respectively).
Within a level of the hierarchy the L2-sensitivity of each count is at most m.
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Overall the square of the L2-sensitivity is at most
height(H)−1∑
l=0
2l∑
j=1
(cl,j − c′l,j)2 +
∑
a
(cl,j,a,1 − c′l,j,a,1)2 + (cl,j,a,0 − c′l,j,a,0)2 (5.1)
≤
height(H)−1∑
l=0
3 ·m2 (5.2)
= 3height(H)m2 (5.3)
Thus, the L2-sensitivity is bounded by
√
(3height(H)m. From Theorem 11 it
follows that choosing σ2 ≥ 3height(H)m22 log(4/δ)/2 guarantees (, δ) proba-
bilistic differential privacy.
5.6 Experiments
5.6.1 Experimental Setup
We use the same dataset of the location-aware searches of 116,432 users over the
course of a month in Microsoft Bing for mobile as in Section 4.4.1. Recall that
the user context is comprised of location, user interest, and the user query.
Metrics. To evaluate the accuracy of our Count protocol we apply it to extract
CTRs that we use in turn to target advertisements. We compare the quality of
the targeted advertisements in terms of precision and coverage with that of the
targeted advertisements computed based on the non-privacy-preserving CTRs.
We report average precision and coverage for 1,000 random contexts from the
testing data; the averages become fairly stable after 1,000 predictions.
Parameters. Unless otherwise stated, we use the following default configura-
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Figure 5.2: Differentially-private estimates.
tion. For limited information disclosure, we use (4, 2, 2) generalization. We set
the upper bound on communication complexity, k, to be 10, the threshold on
click-through rate to be 0.3, and the threshold on support to be 2. We fixed
δ = 0.02 and the maximum number of contributions per user, m = 4. Moreover,
we found it beneficial to limit how far TopDown goes down in the hierarchy.
Such a limit reduces the amount of noise added to each count. This is important
for training data as small as this. Therefore, we chose an aggressive limit of 1.
5.6.2 Privacy-Preserving CTRs
Efficiency. When we run Estimates on the log, a user has to send roughly 1MB
on average. Many of the count queries can be batched. On average, a user par-
ticipates in two batches for all CTR computations. We feel this communication
cost is acceptable.
Accuracy. Figure 5.2(a) shows how precision and coverage of our framework
degrades when we increase the differential privacy guarantee (by decreasing
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Figure 5.3: Varying user population.
). As a point of comparison, the figure also draws the precision and cover-
age curve when using the exact, non-private statistics ( = ∞). We can see
that to achieve a precision of 0.6, the coverage of our framework using non-
private statistics is much higher than the coverage of our framework using the
-differentially private statistics (i.e., 0.3 vs 0.1). This is the price we have to pay
for a privacy guarantee. The exact value of the privacy parameter  (1 vs. 0.5)
has a minor effect on the utility. We expect the cost of privacy to decrease with
a larger user population. Moreover, we can avoid such negative impact on util-
ity by paying the price of privacy in terms of communication overhead k—as
shown in Figure 4.6, the utility can be improved by using a higher value of k.
Robustness. Figure 5.2(b) shows the effect of varying t (fraction of mali-
cious/unavailable users) on precision and coverage for  = 1.0. We see that
the parameter t has only a mild effect. Even when 75% of the users could be
unavailable or malicious (t = 0.75) the utility is almost the same as when all
users are available and honest.
To compare the robustness of our Count protocol with existing works, we
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model users’ unavailability as a simple random process. Suppose a phase de-
notes the time it takes for the server to send a message to all users or for all
users to send messages to the server. Let p denote the probability that a user
is unavailable to participate in a given phase. We compare various protocols
in terms of the average number of phases required to complete a query, as it
indicates the latency and communication complexity of a protocol.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the effects of unavailability on communication com-
plexity. We compare our algorithm with two existing protocols: RASTOGI [89]
and SHI [93]. We run 1000 queries and report the average number of phases
per query for different protocols. As shown, all the protocols cost close to their
optimal number of phases when the probability of being unavailable (p) and the
number of users (N ) are small. However, unlike our protocol, the costs for SHI and
RASTOGI increase exponentially withN and p (note the log scale of the graphs). For
p ≥ 0.0001 (corresponding to less than only 10 seconds a day) in (a) or N ≥ 1000
(much fewer than users of popular online services) in (b) the protocols become
impractical. This shows that unlike our protocol, SHI and RASTOGI are imprac-
tical for online services with dynamic users.
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CHAPTER 6
PRIVATELY RELEASING COUNT STATISTICS FROM SEARCH LOGS
6.1 Introduction
Civilization is the progress toward a society of privacy. The savage’s whole existence is
public, ruled by the laws of her tribe. Civilization is the process of setting man free from
men. — Ayn Rand.
My favorite thing about the Internet is that you get to go into the private world of
real creeps without having to smell them. — Penn Jillette.
Search engines play a crucial role in the navigation through the vastness of
the Web. Today’s search engines do not just collect and index webpages, they
also collect and mine information about their users. They store the queries,
clicks, IP-addresses, and other information about the interactions with users in
what is called a search log. Search logs contain valuable information that search
engines use to tailor their services better to their users’ needs. They enable the
discovery of trends, patterns, and anomalies in the search behavior of users, and
they can be used in the development and testing of new algorithms to improve
search performance and quality. Scientists all around the world would like to
tap this gold mine for their own research; search engine companies, however, do
not release them because they contain sensitive information about their users,
for example searches for diseases, lifestyle choices, personal tastes, and political
affiliations.
The only release of a search log happened in 2007 by AOL, and it went into
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the annals of tech history as one of the great debacles in the search industry.1
AOL published three months of search logs of 650,000 users. The only measure
to protect user privacy was the replacement of user–ids with random numbers
— utterly insufficient protection as the New York Times showed by identifying
a user from Lilburn, Georgia [7], whose search queries not only contained iden-
tifying information but also sensitive information about her friends’ ailments.
The AOL search log release shows that simply replacing user–ids with ran-
dom numbers does not prevent information disclosure. Other ad–hoc methods
have been studied and found to be similarly insufficient, such as the removal
of names, age, zip codes and other identifiers [53] and the replacement of key-
words in search queries by random numbers [68].
In this chapter, we compare formal methods of limiting disclosure when
publishing frequent keywords, queries, and clicks of a search log. The meth-
ods vary in the guarantee of disclosure limitations they provide and in the
amount of useful information they retain. We first describe two negative re-
sults. We show that existing proposals to achieve k-anonymity [90] in search
logs [1, 82, 47, 50] are insufficient in the light of attackers who can actively in-
fluence the search log. We then turn to differential privacy [25], a much stronger
privacy guarantee; however, we show that it is impossible to achieve good util-
ity with differential privacy.
We then describe Algorithm ZEALOUS2, developed independently by Ko-
rolova et al. [65] and us with the goal to achieve relaxations of differential pri-
vacy. Korolova et al. showed how to set the parameters of ZEALOUS to guaran-
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AOL_search_data_scandal describes the inci-
dent, which resulted in the resignation of AOL’s CTO and an ongoing class action lawsuit
against AOL resulting from the data release.
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tee (, δ)-indistinguishability [23], and we here offer a new analysis that shows
how to set the parameters of ZEALOUS to guarantee (, δ)-probabilistic differen-
tial privacy [74] (Section 6.4.2), a much stronger privacy guarantee as our analyt-
ical comparison shows.
Our chapter concludes with an extensive experimental evaluation, where we
compare the utility of various algorithms that guarantee anonymity or privacy
in search log publishing. Our evaluation includes applications that use search
logs for improving both search experience and search performance, and our
results show that ZEALOUS’ output is sufficient for these applications while
achieving strong formal privacy guarantees.
We believe that the results of this research enable search engine compa-
nies to make their search log available to researchers without disclosing their
users’ sensitive information: Search engine companies can apply our algorithm
to generate statistics that are (, δ)-probabilistic differentially private while re-
taining good utility for the two applications we have tested. Beyond publishing
search logs we believe that our findings are of interest when publishing frequent
itemsets, as ZEALOUS protects privacy against much stronger attackers than
those considered in existing work on privacy-preserving publishing of frequent
items/itemsets [73].
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We start with some
background in Section 6.2. Our negative results are presented in Section 6.3.
We then describe Algorithm ZEALOUS and its analysis in Section 6.4. We com-
pare indistinguishability with probabilistic differential privacy in Section 6.5.
Section 6.6 shows the results of an extensive study of how to set parameters
in ZEALOUS, and Section 6.7 contains a thorough evaluation of ZEALOUS in
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comparison with previous work. We conclude with a discussion of related work
and other applications.
6.2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the problem of publishing frequent keywords,
queries, clicks and other items of a search log.
6.2.1 Search Logs
Search engines such as Bing, Google, or Yahoo log interactions with their users.
When a user submits a query and clicks on one or more results, a new entry is
added to the search log. Without loss of generality, we assume that a search log
has the following schema:
〈USER-ID, QUERY, TIME, CLICKS〉,
where a USER-ID identifies a user, a QUERY is a set of keywords, and CLICKS
is a list of urls that the user clicked on. The user-id can be determined in vari-
ous ways; for example, through cookies, IP addresses or user accounts. A user
history or search history consists of all search entries from a single user. Such a
history is usually partitioned into sessions containing similar queries; how this
partitioning is done is orthogonal to the techniques in this chapter. A query pair
consists of two subsequent queries from the same user within the same session.
We say that a user history contains a keyword k if there exists a search log en-
try such that k is a keyword in the query of the search log. A keyword histogram of
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a search log S records for each keyword k the number of users ck whose search
history in S contains k. A keyword histogram is thus a set of pairs (k, ck). We
define the query histogram, the query pair histogram, and the click histogram anal-
ogously. We classify a keyword, query, consecutive query, click in a histogram
to be frequent if its count exceeds some predefined threshold τ ; when we do not
want to specify whether we count keywords, queries, etc., we also refer to these
objects as items.
With this terminology, we can define our goal as publishing frequent items
(utility) without disclosing sensitive information about the users (privacy). We
will make both the notion of utility and privacy more formal in the next sections.
6.2.2 Disclosure Limitations for Publishing Search Logs
In this chapter we work with k-anonymity (see Section 2.1.2) and differential
privacy and its relaxations (see Section 2.2.1).
6.2.3 Utility Measures
We will compare the utility of algorithms producing sanitized search logs both
theoretically and experimentally.
Theoretical Utility Measures
For simplicity, suppose we want to publish all items (such as keywords, queries,
etc.) with frequency at least τ in a search log; we call such items frequent items;
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we call all other items infrequent items. Consider a discrete domain of items D.
Each user contributes a set of these items to a search log S. We denote by fd(S)
the frequency of item d ∈ D in search log S. We drop the dependency from S
when it is clear from the context.
We define the inaccuracy of a (randomized) algorithm as the expected num-
ber of items it gets wrong, i.e., the number of frequent items that are not in-
cluded in the output, plus the number of infrequent items that are included in
the output. We do not expect an algorithm to be perfect. It may make mistakes
for items with frequency very close to τ , and thus we do not take these items in
our notion of accuracy into account. We formalize this “slack” by a parameter
ξ, and given ξ, we introduce the following new notions. We call an item d with
frequency fd ≥ τ + ξ a very-frequent item and an item d with frequency fd ≤ τ − ξ
a very-infrequent item. We will measure the inaccuracy of an algorithm then only
using its inability to retain the very-frequent items and its inability to filter out
the very infrequent items.
Definition 10 ((A, S)-inaccuracy). Given an algorithm A and an input search
log S, the (A, S)-inaccuracy with slack ξ is defined as
E[|{d ∈ A(S)|fd(S) < τ − ξ} ∪ {d 6∈ A(S)|fd(S) > τ + ξ}|]
The expectation is taken over the randomness of the algorithm. As an exam-
ple, consider the simple algorithm that always outputs the empty set; we call
this algorithm the baseline algorithm. On input S the Baseline Algorithm has an
inaccuracy equal to the number of items with frequency at least τ + ξ.
For the results in the next sections it will be useful to distinguish the error
of an algorithm on the very-frequent items and its error on the very-infrequent
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items. We can rewrite the inaccuracy as:
∑
d:fd(S)>τ+ξ
1− Pr[d ∈ A(S)] +
∑
d∈D:fd(S)<τ−ξ
Pr[d ∈ A(S)]
Thus, the (A, S)-inaccuracy with slack ξ can be rewritten as the inability to retain
the very-frequent items plus the inability to filter out the very-infrequent items.
For example, the baseline algorithm has an inaccuracy to filter of 0 inaccuracy
to retain equal to the number of very-frequent items.
Definition 11 (c–accuracy). An algorithmA is c–accurate if for any input search
log S and any very-frequent item d in S, the probability that A outputs d is at
least c.
Experimental Utility Measures
Traditionally, the utility of a privacy-preserving algorithm has been evaluated
by comparing some statistics of the input with the output to see “how much
information is lost.” The choice of suitable statistics is a difficult problem as
these statistics need to mirror the sufficient statistics of applications that will
use the sanitized search log, and for some applications the sufficient statistics
are hard to characterize. To avoid this drawback, Brickell et al. [10] measure the
utility with respect to data mining tasks and they take the actual classification
error of an induced classifier as their utility metric.
In this chapter we take a similar approach. We use two real applications
from the information retrieval community: Index caching, as a representative
application for search performance, and query substitution, as a representative
application for search quality. For both application the sufficient statistics are
histograms of keywords, queries, or query pairs.
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Index Caching. Search engines maintain an inverted index which, in its sim-
plest instantiation, contains for each keyword a posting list of identifiers of the
documents in which the keyword appears. This index can be used to answer
search queries, but also to classify queries for choosing sponsored search re-
sults. The index is usually too large to fit in memory, but maintaining a part of it
in memory reduces response time for all these applications. We use the formu-
lation of the index caching problem from Baeza–Yates [4]. We are given a keyword
search workload, a distribution over keywords indicating the likelihood of a
keyword appearing in a search query. It is our goal to cache in memory a set
of posting lists that for a given workload maximizes the cache-hit-probability
while not exceeding the storage capacity. Here the hit-probability is the prob-
ability that the posting list of a keyword can be found in memory given the
keyword search workload.
Query Substitution. Query substitutions are suggestions to rephrase a user
query to match it to documents or advertisements that do not contain the actual
keywords of the query. Query substitutions can be applied in query refinement,
sponsored search, and spelling error correction [54]. Algorithms for query sub-
stitution examine query pairs to learn how users re-phrase queries. We use an
algorithm developed by Jones et al. [54].
6.3 Negative Results
In this section, we discuss the deficiency of two existing models of disclosure
limitations for search log publication. Section 6.3.1 focuses on k-anonymity, and
Section 6.3.2 investigates differential privacy.
153
6.3.1 Insufficiency of Anonymity
k-anonymity and its variants prevent an attacker from uniquely identifying the
user that corresponds to a search history in the sanitized search log. While it
offers great utility even beyond releasing frequent items its disclosure guaran-
tee might not be satisfactory. Even without unique identification of a user, an
attacker can infer the keywords or queries used by the user. k-anonymity does
not protect against this severe information disclosure.
There is another issue largely overlooked with the current implemen-
tations of anonymity. That is instead of guaranteeing that the key-
words/queries/sessions of k individuals are indistinguishable in a search log
they only assure that the keywords/queries/sessions associated with k different
user-IDs are indistinguishable. These two guarantees are not the same since in-
dividuals can have multiple accounts or share accounts. An attacker can exploit
this by creating multiple accounts and submitting the same fake queries from
these accounts. It can happen that in a k-keyword/query/session-anonymous
search log the keywords/queries/sessions of a user are only indistinguishable
from k − 1 fake keywords/queries/sessions submitted by an attacker. It is
doubtful that this type of indistinguishability at the level of user-IDs is satis-
factory.
6.3.2 Impossibility of Differential Privacy
In the following, we illustrate the infeasibility of differential privacy in search
log publication. In particular, we show that, under realistic settings, no differ-
entially private algorithm can produce a sanitized search log with reasonable
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utility (utility is measured as defined in Section 6.2.3 using our notion of accu-
racy). Our analysis is based on the following lemma.
Lemma 13. For a set ofU users, let S and S ′ be two search logs each containing at
most m items from some domain D per user. LetA be an -differentially private
algorithm that, given S, retains a very-frequent item d in S with probability
p. Then, given S ′, A retains d with probability at least p/(eL1(S,S′)·/m), where
L1(S, S
′) =
∑
d∈D |fd(S)− fd(S ′)| denotes the L1 distance between S and S ′.
Lemma 13 follows directly from the definition of -differential privacy.
Based on Lemma 13, we have the following theorem, which shows that any
-differentially private algorithm that is accurate for very-frequent items must
be inaccurate for very-infrequent items. The rationale is that, if given a search
log S, an algorithm outputs one very-frequent item d in S, then even if the in-
put to the algorithm is a search log where d is very-infrequent, the algorithm
should still output d with a certain probability; otherwise, the algorithm cannot
be differentially private.
Theorem 12. Consider an accuracy constant c, a threshold τ , a slack ξ and a
very large domain D of size ≥ Um
(
2e2(τ+ξ)/m
c(τ+ξ)
+ 1
τ−ξ+1
)
, where m denotes the
maximum number of items that a user may have in a search log. Let A be an
-differentially private algorithm that is c-accurate (according to Definition 11)
for the very-frequent items. Then, for any input search log, the inaccuracy of A
is greater than the inaccuracy of an algorithm that always outputs an empty set.
Proof. Consider an -differentially private algorithmA′ that is c-accurate for the
very-frequent items. Fix some input S. We are going to show that for each very-
infrequent item d in S the probability of outputting d is at least c/(e(τ+ξ)/m). For
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each item d ∈ D construct S ′d from S by changing τ + ξ of the items to d. That
way d is very-frequent (with frequency at least τ + ξ) and L1(S, S ′d) ≤ 2(τ + ξ).
By Definition 11, we have that
Pr[d ∈ A′(S ′d)] ≥ c.
By Lemma 13 it follows that the probability of outputting d is at least
c/(e2(τ+ξ)/m) for any input database. This means that we can compute a
lower bound on the inability to filter out the very-infrequent items in S by
summing up this probability over all possible values d ∈ D that are very-
infrequent in S. Note, that there are at least D − Um
τ−ξ+1 many very-infrequent
items in S. Therefore, the inability to filter out the very-infrequent items
is at least
(
|D| − Um
τ−ξ+1
)
c/(e2(τ+ξ)/m). For large domains of size at least
Um
(
2e2(τ+ξ)/m
c(τ+ξ)
+ 1
τ−ξ+1
)
the inaccuracy is at least 2Um
τ+ξ
which is greater than the
inaccuracy of the baseline.
To illustrate Theorem 12, let us consider a search log S where each query
contains at most 3 keywords selected from a limited vocabulary of 900,000
words. Let D be the domain of the consecutive query pairs in S. We have
|D| = 5.3 × 1035. Consider the following setting of the parameters τ + ξ =
50,m = 10, U = 1,000,000,  = 1, that is typical practice. By Theorem 12, if an -
differentially private algorithmA is 0.01-accurate for very-frequent query pairs,
then, in terms of overall inaccuracy (for both very-frequent and very-infrequent
query pairs), A must be inferior to an algorithm that always outputs an empty
set. In other words, no differentially private algorithm can be accurate for both
very-frequent and very-infrequent query pairs.
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6.4 Achieving Privacy
In this section, we introduce a search log publishing algorithm called ZEALOUS
that has been independently developed by Korolova et al. [65] and us. ZEAL-
OUS ensures probabilistic differential privacy, and it follows a simple two-phase
framework. In the first phase, ZEALOUS generates a histogram of items in the
input search log, and then removes from the histogram the items with frequen-
cies below a threshold. In the second phase, ZEALOUS adds noise to the his-
togram counts, and eliminates the items whose noisy frequencies are smaller
than another threshold. The resulting histogram (referred to as the sanitized
histogram) is then returned as the output. Figure 6.1 depicts the steps of ZEAL-
OUS.
Algorithm ZEALOUS for Publishing Frequent Items of a Search Log
Input: Search log S, positive numbers m, λ, τ , τ ′
1. For each user u select a set su of up to m distinct items from u’s search
history in S.3
2. Based on the selected items, create a histogram consisting of pairs (k, ck),
where k denotes an item and ck denotes the number of users u that have k
in their search history su. We call this histogram the original histogram.
3. Delete from the histogram the pairs (k, ck) with count ck smaller than τ .
4. For each pair (k, ck) in the histogram, sample a random number ηk from
the Laplace distribution Lap(λ)4, and add ηk to the count ck, resulting in a
3These items can be selected in various ways as long as the selection criteria is not based on
the data. Random selection is one candidate.
4The Laplace distribution with scale parameter λ has the probability density function
1
2λe
− |x|λ .
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noisy count: c˜k ← ck + ηk.
5. Delete from the histogram the pairs (k, c˜k) with noisy counts c˜k ≤ τ ′.
6. Publish the remaining items and their noisy counts.
To understand the purpose of the various steps one has to keep in mind the
privacy guarantee we would like to achieve. Step 1., 2. and 4. of the algorithm
are fairly standard. It is known that adding Laplacian noise to histogram counts
achieves -differential privacy [25]. However, the previous section explained
that these steps alone result in poor utility because for large domains many
infrequent items will have high noisy counts. To deal better with large domains
we restrict the histogram to items with counts at least τ in Step 2. This restriction
leaks information and thus the output after Step 4. is not -differentially private.
One can show that it is not even (, δ)–probabilistic differentially private (for
δ < 1/2). Step 5. disguises the information leaked in Step 3. in order to achieve
probabilistic differential privacy.
In what follows, we will investigate the theoretical performance of ZEAL-
OUS in terms of both privacy and utility. Section 6.4.1 and Section 6.4.2 discuss
the privacy guarantees of ZEALOUS with respect to (, δ)-indistinguishability
and (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy, respectively. Section 6.4.3 presents a
quantitative analysis of the privacy protection offered by ZEALOUS. Sections
6.4.4 and 6.4.5 analyze the utility guarantees of ZEALOUS.
6.4.1 Indistinguishability Analysis
Theorem 13 states how the parameters of ZEALOUS can be set to obtain a sani-
tized histogram that provides (′, δ′)-indistinguishability.
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Search log SL
Histogram
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Histogram
Histogram ~s
〈 Bob 73, “honda accord”, . . . 〉
〈 Bob 73, “certified car”, . . . 〉
〈 CarlRu, “free mp3”, . . . 〉
. . .
free car honda certified
. . .
free car honda certified
. . .
free car honda
. . .
free car honda
. . .
τ
τ ′
filter
filter
add noise
filter
≥ τ
> τ ′
λ
≤ m keywords
per user
Figure 6.1: Privacy–Preserving Algorithm.
Theorem 13. [65] Given a search log S and positive numbers m, τ , τ ′, and λ,
ZEALOUS achieves (′, δ′)-indistinguishability, if
λ ≥ 2m/′, and (6.1)
τ = 1, and (6.2)
τ ′ ≥ m
(
1− log(
2δ′
m
)
′
)
. (6.3)
To publish not only frequent queries but also their clicks, Korolova et al. [65]
suggest to first determine the frequent queries and then publish noisy counts of
the clicks to their top-100 ranked documents. In particular, if we use ZEALOUS
to publish frequent queries in a manner that achieves (′, δ′)-indistinguishability,
we can also publish the noisy click distributions of the top-100 ranked docu-
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ments for each of the frequent queries, by simply adding Laplacian noise to the
click counts with scale 2m/′. Together the sanitized query and click histogram
achieves (2′, δ′)-indistinguishability.
6.4.2 Probabilistic Differential Privacy Analysis
Given values for , δ, τ and m, the following theorem tells us how to set the
parameters λ and τ ′ to ensure that ZEALOUS achieves (, δ)-probabilistic differ-
ential privacy.
Theorem 14. Given a search log S and positive numbers m, τ , τ ′, and λ, ZEAL-
OUS achieves (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy, if
λ ≥ 2m/, and (6.4)
τ ′ − τ ≥ max
(
−λ ln
(
2− 2e− 1λ
)
,−λ ln
(
2δ
U ·m/τ
))
, (6.5)
where U denotes the number of users in S.
Proof. Let H be the keyword histogram constructed by ZEALOUS in Step 2
when applied to S and K be the set of keywords in H whose count equals τ .
Let Ω be the set of keyword histograms, that do not contain any keyword in
K. For notational simplicity, let us denote ZEALOUS as a function Z. We will
prove the theorem by showing that, given Equations (6.4) and (6.5),
Pr[Z(S) /∈ Ω] ≤ δ, (6.6)
and for any keyword histogram ω ∈ Ω and for any neighboring search log S ′ of
S,
e− · Pr[Z(S ′)=ω] ≤ Pr[Z(S)=ω] ≤ e · Pr[Z(S ′)=ω]. (6.7)
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We will first prove that Equation (6.6) holds. Assume that the i-th keyword
in K has a count c˜i in Z(S) for i ∈ [1, |K|]. Then,
Pr[Z(S) /∈ Ω]
= Pr
[
∃i ∈ [1, |K|], c˜i > τ ′
]
= 1− Pr
[
∀i ∈ [1, |K|], c˜i ≤ τ ′
]
= 1−
∏
i∈[1,|K|]
(∫ τ ′−τ
−∞
1
2λ
e−
|x|
λ dx
)
(the noise added to c˜i has to be ≥ τ ′ − τ )
= 1−
(
1− 1
2
· e− τ
′−τ
λ
)|K|
≤ |K|
2
· e− τ
′−τ
λ
≤ U ·m
2τ
· e− τ
′−τ
λ (because |K| ≤ U ·m/τ )
≤ U ·m
2τ
· e−
−λ ln( 2δU·m/τ )
λ (by Equation 6.5)
= δ. (6.8)
Next, we will show that Equation (6.7) also holds. Let S ′ be any neighboring
search log of S. Let ω be any possible output of ZEALOUS given S, such that
ω ∈ Ω. To establish Equation (6.7), it suffices to prove that
Pr[Z(S) = ω]
Pr[Z(S ′) = ω]
≤ e, and (6.9)
Pr[Z(S ′) = ω]
Pr[Z(S) = ω]
≤ e. (6.10)
We will derive Equation (6.9). The proof of (6.10) is analogous.
Let H ′ be the keyword histogram constructed by ZEALOUS in Step 2 when
applied to S ′. Let ∆ be the set of keywords that have different counts in H and
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H ′. Since S and S ′ differ in the search history of a single user, and each user
contributes at most m keywords, we have |∆| ≤ 2m. Let ki (i ∈ [1, |∆|]) be
the i-th keyword in ∆, and di, d′i, and d∗i be the counts of ki in H , H ′, and ω,
respectively. Since a user adds at most one to the count of a keyword (see Step
2.), we have di − d′i = 1 for any i ∈ [1, |∆|]. To simplify notation, let Ei, E ′i, and
Ei
∗, E ′i
∗ denote the event that ki has counts di, d′i, d∗i in H , H ′, and Z(S), Z(S ′),
respectively. Therefore,
Pr[Z(S) = ω]
Pr[Z(S ′) = ω]
=
∏
i∈[1,|∆|]
Pr[Ei
∗ | Ei]
Pr[E ′i
∗ | E ′i]
.
In what follows, we will show that Pr[Ei
∗|Ei]
Pr[E′i
∗|E′i] ≤ e
1/λ for any i ∈ [1, |∆|]. We
differentiate three cases: (i) di ≥ τ , d∗i ≥ τ , (ii) di < τ and (iii) di = τ and
d∗i = τ − 1.
Consider case (i) when di and d∗i are at least τ . Then, if d∗i > 0, we have
Pr[Ei
∗ | Ei]
Pr[E ′i
∗ | E ′i]
=
1
2λ
e−|d
∗
i−di|/λ
1
2λ
e−|d∗i−d′i|/λ
= e(|d
∗
i−d′i|−|d∗i−di|)/λ
≤ e|di−d′i|/λ
= e
1
λ . (because |di − d′i| = 1 for any i)
On the other hand, if d∗i = 0,
Pr[Ei
∗ | Ei]
Pr[E ′i
∗ | E ′i]
=
∫ τ ′−di
−∞
1
2λ
e−|x|/λdx∫ τ ′−d′i
−∞
1
2λ
e−|x|/λdx
≤ e 1λ .
Now consider case (ii) when di is less than τ . Since ω ∈ Ω, and ZEALOUS
eliminates all counts in H that are smaller than τ , we have d∗i = 0, and Pr[E∗i |
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Ei] = 1. On the other hand,
Pr[E ′i
∗ | E ′i] =
 1, if d
′
i ≤ τ
1− 1
2
e−|τ
′−d′i|/λ, otherwise
Therefore,
Pr[Ei
∗ | Ei]
Pr[E ′i
∗ | E ′i]
≤ 1
1− 1
2
e−|τ ′−d′i|/λ
≤ 1
1− 1
2
e−(τ ′−τ)/λ
≤ 1
1− 1
2
e
ln
(
2−2e− 1λ
) (by Equation 6.7)
= e
1
λ .
Consider now case (iii) when di = τ and d∗i = τ − 1. Since ω ∈ Ω we have
d∗i = 0. Moreover, since ZEALOUS eliminates all counts in H that are smaller
than τ , it follows that Pr[E∗i | E ′i] = 1. Therefore,
Pr[Ei
∗ | Ei]
Pr[E ′i
∗ | E ′i]
= Pr[Ei
∗ | Ei] ≤ e 1λ .
In summary, Pr[Ei
∗|Ei]
Pr[E′i
∗|E′i] ≤ e
1/λ. Since |∆| ≤ 2m, we have
Pr[Z(S) = ω]
Pr[Z(S ′) = ω]
=
∏
i∈[1,|∆|]
Pr[Ei
∗ | Ei]
Pr[E ′i
∗ | E ′i]
≤
∏
i∈[1,|∆|]
e1/λ
= e|∆|/λ
≤ e (by Equation 6.6 and |∆| ≤ 2m).
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
163
Privacy Guarantee τ ′ = 100 τ ′ = 200
λ = 1 (, ′ = 10) δ = 1.3× 10−37 δ = 4.7× 10−81
δ′ = 1.4× 10−41 δ′ = 5.2× 10−85
λ = 5 (, ′ = 2) δ = 3.2× 10−3 δ = 6.5× 10−12
δ′ = 1.4× 10−8 δ′ = 2.9× 10−17
Table 6.1: (′, δ′)-indistinguishability vs. (, δ)-probabilistic differential
privacy. U = 500k, m = 5.
6.4.3 Quantitative Comparison of Prob. Diff. Privacy and In-
distinguishability for ZEALOUS
In Table 6.1, we illustrate the levels of (′, δ′)-indistinguishability and (, δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy achieved by ZEALOUS for various noise and
threshold parameters. We fix the number of users to U = 500k, and the max-
imum number of items from a user to m = 5, which is a typical setting that
will be explored in our experiments. Table 6.1 shows the tradeoff between util-
ity and privacy: A larger λ results in a greater amount of noise in the sanitized
search log (i.e., decreased data utility), but it also leads to smaller  and ′ (i.e.,
stronger privacy guarantee). Similarly, when τ ′ increases, the sanitized search
log provides less utility (since fewer items are published) but a higher level of
privacy protection (as δ and δ′ decreases).
Interestingly, given λ and τ ′, we always have δ > δ′. This is due to the fact
that (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy is a stronger privacy guarantee than
(′, δ′)-indistinguishability, as will be discussed in Section 6.5.
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6.4.4 Utility Analysis
Next, we analyze the utility guarantee of ZEALOUS in terms of its accuracy (as
defined in Section 6.2.3).
Theorem 15. Given parameters τ = τ ∗−ξ, τ ′ = τ ∗+ξ, noise scale λ, and a search
log S, the inaccuracy of ZEALOUS with slack ξ equals
∑
d:fd(S)>τ+ξ
1/2e−2ξ/λ +
∑
d∈D:fd(S)<τ−ξ
0
In particular, this means that ZEALOUS is (1 − 1/2e− ξλ )-accurate for the very-
frequent items (of frequency ≥ τ ∗ + ξ) and it provides perfect accuracy for the
very-infrequent items (of frequency < τ ∗ − ξ).
Proof. It is easy to see that ZEALOUS provides perfect accuracy of filtering out
infrequent items. Moreover, the probability of outputting a very-frequent item
is at least
1− 1/2e− ξλ
which is the probability that the Lap(λ)-distributed noise that is added to the
count is at least−ξ so that a very-frequent item with count at least τ + ξ remains
in the output of the algorithm. This probability is at least 1/2. All in all it has
higher accuracy than the baseline algorithm on all inputs with at least one very-
frequent item.
6.4.5 Separation Result
Combining the analysis in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.4.4, we obtain the following sep-
aration result between -differential privacy and (, δ)- probabilistic differential
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privacy.
Theorem 16 (Separation Result). Our (, δ)- probabilistic differentially private
algorithm ZEALOUS is able to retain frequent items with probability at least
1/2 while filtering out all infrequent items. On the other hand, for any -
differentially private algorithm that can retain frequent items with non-zero
probability (independent of the input database), its inaccuracy for large item
domains is larger than an algorithm that always outputs an empty set.
6.5 Comparing Indistinguishability with Probabilistic Differ-
ential Privacy
In this section we study the relationship between (, δ)-probabilistic differential
privacy and (′, δ′)-indistinguishability. First we will prove that probabilistic
differential privacy implies indistinguishability. Then we will show that the
converse is not true. We show that there exists an algorithm that is (′, δ′)-
indistinguishable yet blatantly non--differentially private (and also not (, δ)-
probabilistic differentially private for any value of  and δ < 1). This fact might
convince a data publisher to strongly prefer an algorithm that achieves (, δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy over one that is only known to achieve (′, δ′)-
indistinguishability. It also might convince researchers to analyze the proba-
bilistic privacy guarantee of algorithms that are only known to be indistinguish-
able as in [23] or [85].
First we show that our definition implies (, δ)-indistinguishability.
Proposition 9. If an algorithmA is (, δ)-probabilistic differentially private then
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it is also (, δ)-indistinguishable.
Proof. Assume that, for all search logs S, we can divide the output space Ω into
to two sets Ω1,Ω2, such that
(1) Pr[A(S) ∈ Ω2] ≤ δ, and
for all search logs S ′ differing from S only in the search history of a single user
and for all O ∈ Ω1:
(2) Pr[A(S) = O] ≤ e Pr[A(S ′) = O] and
Pr[A(S ′) = O] ≤ e Pr[A(S) = O].
Consider any subset O of the output space Ω of A. Let O1 = O ∩ Ω1 and O2 =
O ∩ Ω2. We have
Pr[A(S) ∈ O]
=
∫
O∈O2
Pr[A(S) = O]dO +
∫
O∈O1
Pr[A(S) = O]dO
≤
∫
O∈Ω2
Pr[A(S) = O]dO + e
∫
O∈Ω1
Pr[A(S ′) = O]dO
≤ δ + e
∫
O∈Ω1
Pr[A(S ′) = O]dO
≤ δ + e · Pr[A(S ′) ∈ Ω1].
The converse of Proposition 9 does not hold. In particular, there exists an
an algorithm that is (′, δ′)-indistinguishable but not (, δ)-probabilistic differ-
entially private for any choice of  and δ < 1, as illustrated in the following
example.
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Example 6. Consider the following algorithm that takes as input a search log S with
search histories of U users.
Algorithm Aˆ
Input: Search log S ∈ DU
1. Sample uniformly at random a single search history from the set of all histories
excluding the first user’s search history.
2. Return this search history.
The following proposition analyzes the privacy of Algorithm Aˆ.
Proposition 10. For any finite domain of search histories D Algorithm Aˆ is
(′, 1/(|D| − 1))-indistinguishable for all ′ > 0 on inputs from DU .
Proof. We have to show that for all search logs S, S ′ differing in one user history
and for all sets O :
Pr[Aˆ(S) ∈ O] ≤ Pr[Aˆ(S ′) ∈ O] + 1/(|D| − 1).
Since Algorithm Aˆ neglects all but the first input this is true for neighboring
search logs not differing in the first user’s input. We are left with the case of
two neighboring search logs S, S ′ differing in the search history of the first user.
Let us analyze the output distributions of Algorithm 1 under these two inputs
S and S ′. For all search histories except the search histories of the first user
in S, S ′ the output probability is 1/(|D| − 1) for either input. Only for the two
search histories of the first user S1, S ′1 the output probabilities differ: Algorithm
1 never outputs S1 given S, but it outputs this search history with probability
1/(|D|− 1) given S ′. Symmetrically, Algorithm Aˆ never outputs S ′1 given S ′, but
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it outputs this search history with probability 1/(|D|−1) given S. Thus, we have
for all sets O
Pr[Aˆ(S) ∈ O] =
∑
d∈O∩(D−S1)
1/(|D| − 1) (6.11)
≤ 1/(|D| − 1) +
∑
d∈O∩(D−S2)
1/(|D| − 1) (6.12)
= Pr[Aˆ(S) ∈ O] + 1/(|D| − 1) (6.13)
The next proposition shows that every single output of the algorithm constitutes a
privacy breach.
Proposition 11. For any search log S, the output of Algorithm Aˆ constitutes a
privacy breach according to -differentially privacy for any value of .
Proof. Fix an input S and an output O that is different from the search history
of the first user. Consider the input S ′ differing from S only in the first user
history, where S ′1 = O. Here,
1/(|D| − 1) = Pr[A(S) = O] 6≤ e Pr[A(S ′) = O] = 0.
Thus the output S breaches the privacy of the first user according to -
differentially privacy.
Corollary 3. Algorithm Aˆ is (′, 1/(|D| − 1))-indistinguishable for all ′ > 0. But
it is not (, δ)-probabilistic differentially private for any  and any δ < 1.
By Corollary 3, an algorithm that is (′, δ′)-indistinguishable may not achieve
any form of (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy, even if δ′ is set to an ex-
tremely small value of 1/(|D| − 1). This illustrates the significant gap between
(′, δ′)-indistinguishable and (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy.
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Figure 6.2: Preservation of the counts of the top-j most frequent items by
ZEALOUS under varying m. The domain of items are key-
words, queries, clicks, and query pairs. Preservation is mea-
sured as the average L1-distance and KL-divergence of the re-
leased counts and their true counts and the number and frac-
tion of unpublished top-j most frequent items are shown.
6.6 Choosing Parameters
Apart from the privacy parameters  and δ, ZEALOUS requires the data pub-
lisher to specify two more parameters: τ , the first threshold used to eliminate
keywords with low counts (Step 3), andm, the number of contributions per user.
These parameters affect both the noise added to each count as well as the sec-
ond threshold τ ′. Before we discuss the choice of these parameters we explain
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Figure 6.3: Same as Figure 6.2 except that the x-axis is now varying j for
top-j and not m for the number of contributions.
the general setup of our experiments.
Data. In our experiments we work with a search log of user queries from a major
search engine collected from 500,000 users over a period of one month. This
search log contains about one million distinct keywords, three million distinct
queries, three million distinct query pairs, and 4.5 million distinct clicks.
Privacy Parameters. In all experiments we set δ = 0.001. Thus the probability
that the output of ZEALOUS could breach the privacy of any user is very small.
We explore different levels of (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy by varying
.
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τ 1 3 4 5 7 9
τ ′ 81.1 78.7 78.6 78.7 79.3 80.3
Table 6.2: τ ′ as a function of τ for m = 2,  = 1, δ = 0.01
6.6.1 Choosing Threshold τ
We would like to retain as much information as possible in the published search
log. A smaller value for τ ′ immediately leads to a histogram with higher utility
because fewer items and their noisy counts are filtered out in the last step of
ZEALOUS. Thus if we choose τ in a way that minimizes τ ′ we maximize the
utility of the resulting histogram. Interestingly, choosing τ = 1 does not neces-
sarily minimize the value of τ ′. Table 6.2 presents the value of τ ′ for different
values of τ for m = 2 and  = 1. Table 6.2 shows that for our parameter settings
τ ′ is minimized when τ = 4. We can show the following optimality result which
tells us how to choose τ optimally in order to maximize utility.
Proposition 12. For a fixed , δ and m choosing τ = d2m/eminimizes the value
of τ ′.
The proof follows from taking the derivative of τ ′ as a function of τ (based
on Equation (6.5)) to determine its minimum.
6.6.2 Choosing the Number of Contributions m
Proposition 12 tells us how to set τ in order to maximize utility. Next we will
discuss how to set m optimally. We will do so by studying the effect of vary-
ing m on the coverage and the precision of the top-j most frequent items in the
sanitized histogram. The top-j coverage of a sanitized search log is defined as the
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(A) Number of distinct items released under ZEALOUS.
m 1 4 8 20 40
keywords 6667 6043 5372 4062 2964
queries 3334 2087 1440 751 408
clicks 2813 1576 1001 486 246
query pairs 331 169 100 40 13
(B) Number of total items ×103 released under ZEALOUS.
m 1 4 8 20 40
keywords 329 1157 1894 3106 3871
queries 147 314 402 464 439
clicks 118 234 286 317 290
query pairs 8 14 15 12 7
Table 6.3: Releases of ZEALOUS
fraction of distinct items among the top-j most frequent items in the original
search log that also appear in the sanitized search log. The top-j precision of a
sanitized search log is defined as the distance between the relative frequencies in
the original search log versus the sanitized search log for the top-j most fre-
quent items. In particular, we study two distance metrics between the relative
frequencies: the average L-1 distance and the KL-divergence.
As a first study of coverage, Table 6.3 shows the number of distinct items (re-
call that items can be keywords, queries, query pairs, or clicks) in the sanitized
search log as m increases. We observe that coverage decreases as we increase
m. Moreover, the decrease in the number of published items is more dramatic
for larger domains than for smaller domains. The number of distinct keywords
decreases by 55% while at the same time the number of distinct query pairs de-
creases by 96% as we increase m from 1 to 40. This trend has two reasons. First,
from Theorem 14 and Proposition 12 we see that threshold τ ′ increases super-
linearly in m. Second, as m increases the number of keywords contributed by
the users increases only sub-linearly in m; fewer users are able to supply m
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keywordsqueriesclicksquery pairs
56 20 14 7
Table 6.4: Avg number of items per user in the original search log
items for increasing values of m. Hence, fewer items pass the threshold τ ′ as
m increases. The reduction is larger for query pairs than for keywords, because
the average number of query pairs per user is smaller than the average number
of keywords per user in the original search log (shown in Table 6.4).
To understand how m affects precision, we measure the total sum of the
counts in the sanitized histogram as we increase m in Table 6.3. Higher total
counts offer the possibility to match the original distribution at a finer granular-
ity. We observe that as we increase m, the total counts increase until a tipping
point is reached after which they start decreasing again. This effect is as ex-
pected for the following reason: As m increases, each user contributes more
items, which leads to higher counts in the sanitized histogram. However, the
total count increases only sub-linearly with m (and even decreases) due to the
reduction in coverage we discussed above. We found that the tipping point
where the total count starts to decrease corresponds approximately to the aver-
age number of items contributed by each user in the original search log (shown
in Table 6.4). This suggests that we should choosem to be smaller than the aver-
age number of items, because it offers better coverage, higher total counts, and
reduces the noise compared to higher values of m.
Let us take a closer look at the precision and coverage of the histograms of
the various domains in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. In Figure 6.2 we vary m between 1
and 40. Each curve plots the precision or coverage of the sanitized search log
at various values of the top-j parameter in comparison to the original search
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log. We vary the top-j parameter but never choose it higher than the number of
distinct items in the original search log for the various domains. The first two
rows plot precision curves for the average L-1 distance (first row) and the KL-
divergence (second row) of the relative frequencies. The lower two rows plot the
coverage curves, i.e., the total number of top-j items (third row) and the relative
number of top-j items (fourth row) in the original search log that do not appear
in sanitized search log. First, observe that the coverage decreases asm increases,
which confirms our discussion about the number of distinct items. Moreover,
we see that the coverage gets worse for increasing values of the top-j parameter.
This illustrates that ZEALOUS gives better utility for the more frequent items.
Second, note that for small values of the top-j parameter, values of m > 1 give
better precision. However, when the top-j parameter is increased, m = 1 gives
better precision because the precision of the top-j values degrades due to items
no longer appearing in the sanitized search log due to the increased cutoffs.
Figure 6.3 shows the same statistics varying the top-j parameter on the x-
axis. Each curve plots the precision for m = 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 40, respectively. Note
that m = 1 does not always give the best precision; for keywords, m = 8 has the
lowest KL-divergence, and for queries, m = 2 has the lowest KL-divergence. As
we can see from these results, there are two “regimes” for setting the value of
m. If we are mainly interested in coverage, then m should be set to 1. However,
if we are only interested in a few top-j items then we can increase precision
by choosing a larger value for m; and in this case we recommend the average
number of items per user.
We will see this dichotomy again in our real applications of search log analy-
sis: The index caching application does not require high coverage because of its
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storage restriction. However, high precision of the top-j most frequent items is
necessary to determine which of them to keep in memory. On the other hand, in
order to generate many query substitutions, a larger number of distinct queries
and query pairs is required. Thus m should be set to a large value for index
caching and to a small value for query substitution.
6.7 Application-Oriented Evaluation
In this section we show the results of an application-oriented evaluation of
privacy-preserving search logs generated by ZEALOUS in comparison to a k-
anonymous search log and the original search log as points of comparison. Note
that our utility evaluation does not determine the “better” algorithm since when
choosing an algorithm in practice one has to consider both the utility and disclo-
sure limitation guarantees of an algorithm. Our results show the “price” that we
have to pay (in terms of decreased utility) when we give the stronger guarantees
of (probabilistic versions of) differential privacy as opposed to k-anonymity.
Algorithms.
We experimentally compare the utility of ZEALOUS against a representa-
tive k-anonymity algorithm by Adar for publishing search logs [1]. Recall that
Adar’s Algorithm creates a k-query anonymous search log as follows: First
all queries that are posed by fewer than k distinct users are eliminated. Then
histograms of keywords, queries, and query pairs from the k-query anony-
mous search log are computed. ZEALOUS can be used to achieve (′, δ′)-
indistinguishability as well as (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy. For the
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ease of presentation we only show results with probabilistic differential privacy;
using Theorems 13 and 14 it is straightforward to compute the corresponding
indistinguishability guarantee. For brevity, we refer to the (, δ)-probabilistic
differentially private algorithm as –Differential in the figures.
Evaluation Metrics.
We evaluate the performance of the algorithms in two ways. First, we mea-
sure how well the output of the algorithms preserves selected statistics of the
original search log. Second, we pick two real applications from the information
retrieval community to evaluate the utility of ZEALOUS: Index caching as a rep-
resentative application for search performance, and query substitution as a rep-
resentative application for search quality. Evaluating the output of ZEALOUS
with these two applications will help us to fully understand the performance
of ZEALOUS in an application context. We first describe our utility evaluation
with statistics in Section 6.7.1 and then our evaluation with real applications in
Sections 6.7.2 and 6.7.3.
6.7.1 General Statistics
We explore different statistics that measure the difference of sanitized his-
tograms to the histograms computed using the original search log. We ana-
lyze the histograms of keywords, queries, and query pairs for both sanitization
methods. For clicks we only consider ZEALOUS histograms since a k-query
anonymous search log is not designed to publish click data.
In our first experiment we compare the distribution of the counts in the his-
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Figure 6.4: Distributions of counts in the histograms over keywords,
queries, clicks, and query pairs in the original search log and its
sanitized versions created by 10-anonymity and 5-probabilistic
differential privacy (with m = 1).
tograms. Note that a k-query anonymous search log will never have query and
keyword counts below k, and similarly a ZEALOUS histogram will never have
counts below τ ′. We choose  = 5,m = 1 for which threshold τ ′ ≈ 10. Therefore
we deliberately set k = 10 such that k ≈ τ ′.
Figure 6.4 shows the distribution of the counts in the histograms on a log-log
scale. Recall that the k-query anonymous search log does not contain any click
data, and thus it does not appear in Figure 6.4(c). We see that the power-law
shape of the distribution is well preserved. However, the total frequencies are
lower for the sanitized search logs than the frequencies in the original histogram
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Figure 6.5: Average difference between counts of items in the original his-
togram and the -probabilistic differential privacy-preserving
histogram, and the k-anonymous histogram for varying pa-
rameters  (with m = 1) and k.
because the algorithms filter out a large number of items. We also see the cutoffs
created by k and τ ′. We observe that as the domain increases from keywords to
clicks and query pairs, the number of items that are not frequent in the original
search log increases. For example, the number of clicks with count equal to one
is an order of magnitude larger than the number of keywords with count equal
to one.
While the shape of the count distribution is well preserved, we would also
like to know whether the counts of frequent keywords, queries, query pairs,
and clicks are also preserved and what impact the privacy parameters  and
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the anonymity parameter k have. Figure 6.5 shows the average differences to
the counts in the original histogram. We scaled up the counts in sanitized his-
tograms by a common factor so that the total counts were equal to the total
counts of the original histogram, then we calculated the average difference be-
tween the counts. The average is taken over all keywords that have non-zero
count in the original search log. As such this metric takes both coverage and
precision into account.
As expected, with increasing  the average difference decreases, since the
noise added to each count decreases. Similarly, by decreasing k the accuracy
increases because more queries will pass the threshold. Figure 6.5 shows that
the average difference is comparable for the k–anonymous histogram and the
output of ZEALOUS. Note that the output of ZEALOUS for keywords is more
accurate than a k-anonymous histogram for all values of  > 2. For queries we
obtain roughly the same average difference for k = 60 and  = 6. For query
pairs the k-query anonymous histogram provides better utility.
We also computed other metrics such as the root-mean-square value of the
differences and the total variation difference; they all reveal similar qualitative
trends. Despite the fact that ZEALOUS disregards many search log records (by
throwing out all but m contributions per user and by throwing out low frequent
counts), ZEALOUS is able to preserve the overall distribution well.
6.7.2 Index Caching
In the index caching problem, we aim to cache in-memory a set of posting lists
that maximizes the hit-probability over all keywords (see Section6.2.3). In our
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Figure 6.6: Hit probabilities of the inverted index construction based on
the original search log, the k-anonymous search log, and the
ZEALOUS histogram under varying parameters k and  (and
contributions m in (b)).
experiments, we use an improved version of the algorithm developed by Baeza–
Yates to decide which posting lists should be kept in memory [4]. Our algorithm
first assigns each keyword a score, which equals its frequency in the search log
divided by the number of documents that contain the keyword. Keywords are
chosen using a greedy bin-packing strategy where we sequentially add posting
lists from the keywords with the highest score until the memory is filled. In our
experiments we fixed the memory size to be 1 GB, and each document posting
to be 8 Bytes (other parameters give comparable results). Our inverted index
stores the document posting list for each keyword sorted according to their rel-
evance which allows to retrieve the documents in the order of their relevance.
We truncate this list in memory to contain at most 200,000 documents. Hence,
for an incoming query the search engine retrieves the posting list for each key-
word in the query either from memory or from disk. If the intersection of the
posting lists happens to be empty, then less relevant documents are retrieved
from disk for those keywords for which only the truncated posting list is kept
on memory.
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Figure 6.6(a) shows the hit–probabilities of the inverted index constructed
using the original search log, the k-anonymous search log, and the ZEALOUS
histogram (for m = 6) with our greedy approximation algorithm. We observe
that our ZEALOUS histogram achieves better utility than the k-query anony-
mous search log for a range of parameters. We note that the utility suffers only
marginally when increasing the privacy parameter or the anonymity parame-
ter (at least in the range that we have considered). This can be explained by
the fact that it requires only a few very frequent keywords to achieve a high
hit–probability. Keywords with a big positive impact on the hit-probability are
less likely to be filtered out by ZEALOUS than keywords with a small positive
impact. This explains the marginal decrease in utility for increased privacy.
As a last experiment we study the effect of varying m on the hit-probability
in Figure 6.6(b). We observe that the hit probability for m = 6 is above 0.36
whereas the hit probability for m = 1 is less than 0.33. As discussed a higher
value for m increases the accuracy, but reduces the coverage. Index caching re-
ally requires roughly the top 85 most frequent keywords that are still covered
when setting m = 6. We also experimented with higher values of m and ob-
served that the hit-probability decreases at some point.
6.7.3 Query Substitution
Algorithms for query substitution examine query pairs to learn how users re-
phrase queries. We use an algorithm developed by Jones et al. in which related
queries for a query are identified in two steps [54]. First, the query is partitioned
into subsets of keywords, called phrases, based on their mutual information.
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Next, for each phrase, candidate query substitutions are determined based on
the distribution of queries.
We run this algorithm to generate ranked substitution on the sanitized search
logs. We then compare these rankings with the rankings produced by the origi-
nal search log which serve as ground truth. To measure the quality of the query
substitutions, we compute the precision/recall, MAP (mean average precision)
and NDG (normalized discounted cumulative gain) of the top-j suggestions for
each query; let us define these metrics next.
Consider a query q and its list of top-j ranked substitutions q′0, . . . , q′j−1 com-
puted based on a sanitized search log. We compare this ranking against the
top-j ranked substitutions q0, . . . , qj−1 computed based on the original search
log as follows. The precision of a query q is the fraction of substitutions from the
sanitized search log that are also contained in our ground truth ranking:
Precision(q) =
|{q0, . . . , qj−1} ∩ {q′0, . . . , q′j−1}|
|{q′0, . . . , q′j−1}|
Note, that the number of items in the ranking for a query q can be less than j.
The recall of a query q is the fraction of substitutions in our ground truth that are
contained in the substitutions from the sanitized search log:
Recall(q) =
|{q0, . . . , qj−1} ∩ {q′0, . . . , q′j−1}|
|{q0, . . . , qj−1}|
MAP measures the precision of the ranked items for a query as the ratio of true
rank and assigned rank:
MAP(q) =
j−1∑
i=0
i+ 1
rank of qi in [q′0, . . . , q′j−1] + 1
,
where the rank of qi is zero in case it does is not contained in the list [q′0, . . . , q′j−1]
otherwise it is i′, s.t. qi = q′i′ .
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Our last metric called NDCG measures how the relevant substitutions are
placed in the ranking list. It does not only compare the ranks of a substitution
in the two rankings, but is also penalizes highly relevant substitutions according
to [q0, . . . , qj−1] that have a very low rank in [q′0, . . . , q′j−1]. Moreover, it takes the
length of the actual lists into consideration. We refer the reader to the paper by
Chakrabarti et al. [15] for details on NDCG.
The discussed metrics compare rankings for one query. To compare the util-
ity of our algorithms, we average over all queries. For coverage we average
over all queries for which the original search log produces substitutions. For all
other metrics that try to capture the precision of a ranking, we average only over
the queries for which the sanitized search logs produce substitutions. We gen-
erated query substitution only for the 100,000 most frequent queries of the orig-
inal search log since the substitution algorithm only works well given enough
information about a query.
In Figure 6.7 we vary k and  for m = 1 and we draw the utility curves
for top-j for j = 2 and j = 5. We observe that varying  and k has hardly
any influence on performance. On all precision measures, ZEALOUS provides
utility comparable to k-query-anonymity. However, the coverage provided by
ZEALOUS is not good. This is because the computation of query substitutions
relies not only on the frequent query pairs but also on the count of phrase pairs
which record for two sets of keywords how often a query containing the first set
was followed by another query containing the second set. Thus a phrase pair
can have a high frequency even though all query pairs it is contained in have
very low frequency. ZEALOUS filters out these low frequency query pairs and
thus loses many frequent phrase pairs.
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Figure 6.7: Quality of the query substitutions of the -probabilistic dif-
ferential privacy-preserving histogram, and the k-anonymous
histogram for varying parameters  (with m = 1) and k. The
quality is measured by comparing the top-2 and top-5 sug-
gested query substitutions to the ground truth recording the
NDCG, MAP, precision, and recall.
As a last experiment, we study the effect of increasing m for query substitu-
tions. Figure 6.8 plots the average coverage of the top-2 and top-5 substitutions
produced by ZEALOUS for m = 1 and m = 6 for various values of . It is clear
that across the board larger values of m lead to smaller coverage, thus confirm-
ing our intuition outlined the previous section.
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Figure 6.8: Coverage of the query substitutions of the privacy-preserving
histogram for m = 1 and m = 6.
6.8 Related Work
Related work on anonymity in search logs [1, 47, 82, 50] is discussed in Sec-
tion 6.3.1.
More recently, there has been work on privacy in search logs. Korolova et
al. [65] proposes the same basic algorithm that we propose and review in Sec-
tion 6.4.5 They show (′, δ′)-indistinguishability of the algorithm whereas we
show (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy of the algorithm which is a strictly
stronger guarantee (see Section 6.5). One difference is that our algorithm has
two thresholds τ, τ ′ as opposed to one and we explain how to set threshold τ op-
timally. Korolova et al. [65] set τ = 1 (which is not the optimal choice in many
cases). Our experiments augment and extend the experiments of Korolova et
al. [65]. We illustrate the tradeoff of setting the number of contributions m for
various domains and statistics including L1-distance and KL divergence which
extends [65] greatly. Our application oriented evaluation considers different
5In order to improve utility of the algorithm as stated in [65], we suggest to first filter out in-
frequent keywords using the 2-threshold approach of ZEALOUS and then publish noise counts
of queries consisting of up to 3 frequent keywords and the clicks of their top ranked documents.
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applications. We compare the performance of ZEALOUS to that of k-query
anonymity and observe that the loss in utility is comparable for anonymity and
privacy while anonymity offers a much weaker guarantee.
6.9 Beyond Search Logs
While the main focus of this chapter are search logs, our results apply to other
scenarios as well. For example, consider a retailer who collects customer trans-
actions. Each transaction consists of a basket of products together with their
prices, and a time-stamp. In this case ZEALOUS can be applied to publish fre-
quently purchased products or sets of products. This information can also be
used in a recommender system or in a market basket analysis to decide on the
goods and promotions in a store [43]. Another example concerns monitoring
the health of patients. Each time a patient sees a doctor the doctor records the
diseases of the patient and the suggested treatment. It would be interesting to
publish frequent combinations of diseases.
All of our results apply to the more general problem of publishing frequent
items / itemsets / consecutive itemsets. Existing work on publishing frequent
itemsets often only tries to achieve anonymity or makes strong assumptions
about the background knowledge of an attacker, see for example some of the
references in the survey by Luo et al. [73].
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6.10 Conclusions
This chapter contains a comparative study about publishing frequent keywords,
queries, and clicks in search logs. We compare the disclosure limitation guar-
antees and the theoretical and practical utility of various approaches. Our
comparison includes earlier work on anonymity and (′, δ′)–indistinguishability
and our proposed solution to achieve (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy in
search logs. In our comparison, we revealed interesting relationships between
indistinguishability and probabilistic differential privacy which might be of in-
dependent interest. Our results (positive as well as negative) can be applied
more generally to the problem of publishing frequent items or itemsets.
A topic of future work is the development of algorithms to release useful
information about infrequent keywords, queries, and clicks in a search log while
preserving user privacy.
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